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Abstract
In this reserach, we analyse the formation of dominance hierarchies from dif-
ferent viewpoints and various models of dominance hierarchy formation have
been proposed, one important class being winner-loser models and another be-
ing Swiss tournaments.
We start by understanding the structure of hierarchies emerging under the in-
fluence of winner and loser effects and two situations are considered: (i) when
each individual has the same, fixed (unchanged) aggression threshold, mean-
ing that all of them use the same rule when deciding whether to fight or retreat,
and (ii) when individuals select an aggression threshold comparing their own
and their opponent’s abilities, and fighting if and only if the situation is suffi-
ciently favourable to themselves. For both situations, we investigate if we can
achieve hierarchy linearity, and if so, when it is established. We are particu-
larly interested in the question of how many fights are necessary to establish a
dominance hierarchy.
To examine these questions we use existing and new statistical measures. Be-
sides understanding the structure and the temporal dynamic of the hierarchy
formation, we also analyse the effect of the information that each individual
has about the strength of their opponents on linearity.
For the second situation, where individuals choose different aggression thresh-
old, we find the appropriate level of aggression and examine the conditions
when an individual needs to be more aggressive and when not.
Lastly, we develop a model which allows only the individuals with the same
number of wins and losses to fight each other. We show that linear hierarchies
are always established. A formula for the total number of fights is derived, and
the effect of group size on the level of aggressiveness is analysed.
12
Chapter 1
Introduction
Many animals spend their lives, or a part of their lives, living in groups that
occupy the same territory. There are a lot of factors why an individual would
choose to live in a group, such as mating, foraging benefits [88], etc., but
perhaps the most important one, is the anti-predator vigilance [87]. Living in
a group allows its members to divide the tasks; while some individuals watch
out for predators, the rest can search for food.
On the other hand, living in groups can have different costs. For example,
if the resources such as food, mating or territory are limited, individuals often
arrange themselves into a ranking system. Those with a higher rank can benefit
by a high success in reproduction and access to food resources. This arrange-
ment where everyone or almost everyone has a clear position in the group
is called a dominance hierarchy. Individuals often establish their position by
aggressive fights between themselves.
There are a lot of factors that influence dominance hierarchy formation,
two of those are winner and loser effects. Winner and loser effects occur when
previous victories lead to an increased probability of winning and previous
defeats lead to a decreased probability of winning respectively ([11], [61],
[62], [105]).
There is not a large body of theory to predict the position of an individual
13
Introduction
in a dominance hierarchy [90]. Most theoretical work is concerned with the
modelling of winner and loser effects (but see [21], [23] for alternative mod-
els). Landau ([75], [76]) showed that intrinsic factors such as age or size alone
cannot produce hierarchies similar to ones observed in nature, pointing to the
importance of extrinsic factors such as prior experience. Once factors such as
winner and loser effects were added to the model, hierarchies similar to those
found in nature were obtained. Landau ([75], [76]) considered the combined
effects of winner and loser effects on hierarchy formation. Others have seen
how winner and loser effects separately influence dominance hierarchy forma-
tion ([17], [42], [44], [58]). Dugatkin [42] and Dugatkin & Dugatkin [44]
developed a simulation framework which explored the properties of emerging
hierarchies in groups of four individuals under different assumptions about the
strength of winner and loser effects.
In this research, we analyse and model the formation of dominance hier-
archies, in particular the influence of winner and loser effects. Our aim is to
find answers to questions such as: Is it possible to find the time when the hi-
erarchy is established and when an individual dominates the others so that the
dominance relationship cannot be reversed? So far, in winner-loser models,
the temporal dynamic of the hierarchy formation has not been analysed. In
addition, we explore the conditions under which an individual should be more
aggressive and when it should retreat.
In this work, we combine game-theoretical concepts with the theory of dom-
inance hierarchies. For this reason in the first part of this chapter we introduce
such concepts and in the second part, we present the literature on dominance
hierarchies.
14
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1.1 Game Theory
Game theory is the study of the decision-making of individuals where an indi-
vidual’s choice might affect the outcomes of others. Its origin is in 1920s with
Borel [18] and von Neumann, although there are earlier examples with game
theoretical elements involved [36]. It was only in 1944 when von Neumann
and Morgenstern published the book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
[123] that Game theory was established as a field in its own. In 1950s Game
theory was applied to different situations arising in politics, but it has seen an
interest from other disciplines as well such as psychology, biology and logic.
The basic key elements of a game theoretical model are the following:
Players: In a game we might have a finite or an infinite number of play-
ers who are decision-makers. Their decisions affect the outcome of the game.
Often the games in biology are characterized by two players for simplicity rea-
sons.
Strategies: During different stages of the game, a player has choices to make
and the possible choices in each stage are known as actions. A strategy of a
player is defined as the action that it chooses at every possible stage of the
game. If only one specific strategy is chosen to be played in different positions
of the game, this strategy is called a pure strategy. For a finite set {S1, S2, ..., Sn}
of pure strategies, we can define a mixed strategy as the probability vector p
= (p1, p2, ..., pn) where pi is the probability that the player will decide to play
strategy Si.
Payoffs: The “award” that a player gets when playing a game is known as the
payoff. When there are only two individuals interacting and each of them
has a finite set of pure strategies, the payoffs can be represented by a matrix
called the payoff matrix. Such games are called bimatrix games. Suppose that
{S1, S2, ...Sn} is the set of pure strategies of player 1 and {T1, T2, ..., Tm} is the
set of pure strategies for player 2. The payoffs for both payers are determined
15
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by the pair of matrices
A = (aij)i=1,...,n;j=1,...,m, B = (bij)i=1,...,m;j=1,...,n (1.1)
where aij and bji are the payoffs of player 1 and 2 respectively, after player 1
chooses strategy Si and its opponent is playing strategy Tj.
In the case of a symmetric game where both individuals have the same set
of strategies T1, T2, ..., Tm and the reward gained after using a certain strategy
depends only on the other strategies and not who is playing them, the game
can be described as an n × n matrix A = (aij)i,j=1,...,n where the value in the
ith row and jth column gives the payoff of the row player that uses strategy Ti
against the column player using strategy Tj. The classical Hawk-Dove game
described below is an example of a symmetric game.
1.1.1 Nash equilibria
In any game, each player tries to choose a strategy that offers the highest pay-
off. But how does one find the “best strategy” when its payoff depends on
what strategy its opponent is playing? The concept of Nash equilibrium [96]
is important to study the strategies used by different players. Before giving its
definition, it is useful to first give the definition of the best response.
Definition 1. A strategy S is a best response to strategy U if E[T ,U] ≤ E[S,U];
for all strategies T , where E[S,U] denotes the payoff to a player using S against
a player using U [29].
Now we give the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium [96], is a set of strategies, one for each player,
such that neither player can profitably alter their strategy (i.e. increase their
payoff) unilaterally [22].
16
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If we use the terminology of the best response, we say that a game is in
a Nash equilibrium if and only if all the individuals in the group are playing
the best response against their opponents’ strategies. Mathematically in a two-
player game, the strategy S is a Nash equilibrium if
E[S, S] ≥ E[T, S], ∀T 6= S (1.2)
When E[S, S] > E[T, S], ∀T 6= S, we say that strategy S is a strict Nash equilib-
rium.
1.2 Evolutionary game theory
In biology, game theory is used to model and analyse the conflict and coopera-
tion in different groups of animals [57]. In contrast to the game theory where
each player tries to be rational, Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is determined
by natural selection which drives different organisms towards the maximisa-
tion of reproductive success [57]. An important concept in EGT is that of the
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) introduced by Maynard Smith and Price
[84], but it was derived by MacArthur and Hamilton’s sex ratio work ([56],
[79]) that was based on Fisher’s principle and is closely related to the concept
of Nash equilibrum.
1.2.1 Evolutionarily stable strategies
In a biological sense the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is
usually applied to evolutionary processes.
A strategy is an ESS if when adopted by a population (residents) cannot
be invaded by a small number of individuals playing any alternative (mutant)
strategy. Mathematically an ESS is defined as follows:
Assume that the majority of the population is playing strategy S and a small
17
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number of “mutants” (a fraction ε of the total population) adopt strategy T .
Then we can give the following definition.
Definition 3. The strategy S is evolutionarily stable against strategy T if
E[S, (1−ε)S+εT ] > E[T, (1−ε)S+εT ] for any sufficiently small value of ε > 0.
S is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if it is evolutionary stable against T
for every other strategy T 6= S ([24], [29]).
This implies that in a population involving randomly selected pairs of in-
dividuals playing two-player games, strategy S which can be a pure or mixed
strategy, is an ESS if either
E[S, S] > E[T, S] (1.3)
or
E[S, S] = E[T, S] and E[S, T ] > E[T, T ] (1.4)
∀T 6= S, where E[S, S] is the expected payoff of an individual playing strategy
S against an individual who is playing strategy S .
In a population involving randomly selected groups ofN individuals playing
N -player games, strategy S is an ESS if either:
E[S;SN−1] > E[T ;SN−1] (1.5)
or
E[S;SN−1] = E[T ;SN−1] and E[S, SN−2, T ] > E[T, SN−2, T ] (1.6)
∀T 6= S, where E[S;Si, TN−1−i] is the expected payoff of an individual playing
strategy S against i individuals playing strategy S and N − i − 1 individuals
playing strategy T , respectively [24].
If condition (1.3) holds than the individuals (mutants) using strategy T ,
lose against a population of individuals that are using strategy S, thus they
18
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cannot invade the residents. If condition (1.4) holds than even if a mutant
individual does equally well as the resident when playing against a resident
individual, it cannot invade the population of residents. Thus a strategy S is
an ESS if either condition (1.3) or (1.4) holds. Furthermore we note that a
game can have more than one ESS simultaneously, or there might be occasions
where no ESS are present. When comparing with the Nash equilibria, an ESS
is always a Nash equilibria (from conditions (1.3) and (1.4)), but the reverse
is not always true. However a strict Nash equilibria is an ESS, because for a
strategy to be a strict Nash equilibria, condition (1.3) must hold.
1.2.2 The diagonal rule
The diagonal rule allows us to find the ESS in a n-strategy game. Assume that
the pure strategies are θ1, θ2,...,θn with the corresponding n× n payoff matrix.
Now suppose that in the payoff matrix, the ith diagonal payoff E[θi, θi] is the
largest payoff in the ith column. This yields E[θi, θi] > E[θj, θi], ∀j 6= i.
Let us denote by γ 6= θi a mixed strategy which can be written as a combination
of the pure strategies θi as follows
γ = p1θ1 + p2θ2 + ...+ pnθn (1.7)
where p1 + p2 + ...+ pn = 1 and each pi ≥ 0.
Next, because E[θj, θi] < E[θi, θi] we can write the following
E[γ, θi] = p1E[θ1, θi] + p2E[θ2, θi] + ...+ pnE[θn, θi]
< p1E[θi, θi] + p2E[θi, θi] + ...+ pnE[θi, θi]
= (p1 + p2 + ...+ pn)E[θi, θi]
= E[θi, θi]
(1.8)
Thus we have proved that E[γ, θi] < E[θi, θi] which yields the following
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theorem [91]:
Theorem 1.2.1. The Diagonal Rule: In a n-strategy game with pure strategies
θ1, θ2,..., θn, if E[θi, θi] > E[θj, θi], ∀j 6= i, then θi is a pure ESS.
1.2.3 The classical Hawk-Dove model
Here we give a classic example of an evolutionary game, that of the Hawk-Dove
game ([83], [84]) which is widely used to model situations where groups of
animals compete with each other to gain access to biological resources such as
food, territory, mating, etc. The game is described as follows:
Suppose that in a population, individuals fight with each other over a re-
ward V > 0. Each individual can choose to either be aggressive, play Hawk
(H) or non-aggressive, play Dove (D). When a Hawk meets a Hawk they
engage in an aggressive interaction until there is a winner and a loser. The
winner gets the reward V and the loser pays a cost of injury C (or gains re-
ward −C). Thus the expected reward when a Hawk meets another Hawk, is
E[H,H] =
1
2
(V − C). When a Hawk meets a Dove, the Hawk is aggressive
and the Dove always retreats from fighting. Thus the Hawk gets the reward
V , the Dove gets 0 and does not pay any cost as it does not engage in a fight.
Hence E[H,D] = V and E[D,H] = 0. When a Dove meets another Dove they
either share the reward V , or only one takes it and the other pays no cost, the
winner being selected at random. The overall payoff of Doves in this case is
E[D,D] =
V
2
. The following payoff matrix describes this game.

Hawk Dove
Hawk
V − C
2
V
Dove 0
V
2

From the payoff matrix, we notice that the Dove strategy cannot be a pure ESS
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as E[H,D] > E[D,D] and thus in a population of Doves a Hawk individual al-
ways invades. Let us find now the conditions when playing Hawk is a pure
ESS. For V > C (the reward of winning is bigger than the cost of losing) we
have E[H,H] > E[D,H]. In this case, because E[H,D] > E[D,D] and thus
playing Hawk is a pure ESS. We can show that playing Hawk is also a pure
ESS when V = C as E[H,D] > E[D,D]. Let us see now what happens for
V < C, i.e. when the reward of winning is smaller than the cost of losing so
that we have E[H,H] < E[D,H]. This means that in a population of residents
playing the Hawk strategy, it is best to play Dove. Thus we get a mixed ESS.
Denote by p = (p, 1 − p) the mixed strategy where an individual plays Hawk
with probability p ∈ [0, 1] and plays Dove otherwise. In order for this mixed
strategy to be an ESS, the payoff of an individual playing Hawk needs to be
equal to the payoff of an individual playing Dove, i.e.
p
V − C
2
+ (1− p)V = p · 0 + (1− p)
V
2
(1.9)
from which we get
p =
V
C
(1.10)
For p to be an ESS we need E[p,q] > E[q,q], for all q 6= p. We have
E[p,q] = q
1
2
V
C
(V − C) +
V
C
(1− q)V + q(0)
(
1−
V
C
)
+
(
1−
V
C
)
(1− q)
1
2
V,
(1.11)
E[q,q] = q2
1
2
(V − C) + q(1− q)V + q(1− q)(0) +
1
2
V (1− q)2. (1.12)
From (1.11) and (1.12) we obtain
E[p,q]− E[q,q] =
1
2
C
(
V
C
− q
)2
> 0 (1.13)
which yields the desired result. This means that a Hawk does better against a
Dove than a Dove does against another Dove. Thus we have a unique mixed
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ESS where the individuals play Hawk with probability
V
C
and Dove with prob-
ability 1−
V
C
.
1.3 Dominance hierarchies
In this section, we present the literature on dominance hierarchies.
Dominance hierarchies can be linear, so that animal A dominates all others, B
dominates all others except A, etc, or can be non-linear where the position of
individuals in the group is complex. For example we can have hierarchies in
groups of animals where two or more individuals have the same position or
when circular triads are present. A circular triad is a subgroup of 3 individuals
A, B and C where the relation A → B → C → A holds, (→ stands for “dom-
inates” ). This means that individual A dominates B, individual B dominates
C but individual C dominates A.
In this thesis, we are concerned with situations where whole groups form
from scratch, with individuals meeting each other for the first time, for exam-
ple in leks ([60], [71]). In such situations individuals will often enter into a
series of pairwise contests, in order to establish their position within the group.
In general, linear hierarchies are very stable; for example, when chickens were
taken from their group and reintroduced days later, they reoccupied the previ-
ous place that they had in the group [23]. Once the hierarchy is formed, the
off-springs usually take a place behind or ahead their parents and siblings.
Dominance hierarchies have been the subject of study by behavioral ecolo-
gists for a long time and at first sight it is surprising that an individual would
accept a subordinate rank within a hierarchy ([4], [41]). However, linear hier-
archies are found to be present e.g. in birds, mammals, ants, fish or crustaceans
([1], [10], [31], [55], [85], [92], [93], [106], [110]). When 15 colonies of
monogynous queenless ants [93] were put in plaster nets, 6 types of agonistic
interactions were observed that were consistent over a period of 2 weeks. The
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workers ants were then ordered according to these aggressive behavior.
Some animals are more aggressive than others and the level of aggressive-
ness depends upon many factors such as experience, the value of winning the
contest, resource holding potential (RHP ) (see e.g., [15], [16], [95], [114],
[115]). In our model RHP will simply mean the ability of an individual to win
an escalated contest [101], abstracted away from any particular causal effect.
In reality, there are a large number of elements that determine the RHP . Very
broadly, these elements can be divided into physical attributes, such as size,
age and physical strength (intrinsic factors) and psychological attributes, such
as prior experience (extrinsic factors).
In more detail, there are a lot of results demonstrating a strong correlation
between RHP and body size ([3], [20], [78]). For example it has been ob-
served that larger animals are more aggressive towards smaller ones and that
they have more chances of winning an encounter ([54], [69]). However, other
results show that such physical attributes are not the only important determi-
nant of RHP . For example [32] showed that 37.5% of a group of house crickets
won aggressive interactions, even though they had smaller body size. In [59],
bigger individuals lost 30% of the aggressive interactions.
Prior experience as well can have an important effect on the RHP of an
individual. For example if an individual has won more fights than it has lost in
the past, it may increase its potential to win in the future. In this research, we
assume that all individuals have identical physical abilities, so that the outcome
of an encounter is significantly determined by past experience (although our
results depend upon only a mechanical updating of RHP after a contest, so
it would allow for real physical as well as psychological changes, too). In
particular we consider so-called “winner and loser effects”, but there can be
other extrinsic factors such as the audience and bystander effects that influence
the level of aggression. The audience effect ([39], [52], [86]) occurs when an
individual changes its strategy as a result of being watched by others and the
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bystander effect occur when an individual changes the fighting behavior as a
result of watching the other individuals in the group.
There is a lot of experimental evidence ([8], [13], [77], [108]) showing
the presence of the loser effect in different groups of animals that lasts for
several days. On the other hand the winner effect is less common, with only
some species showing it. In stickleback fish Gasterosteus aculeatus it was ob-
served that the loser effect lasted for twice as long as the winner effect [8].
In copperhead snakes Agkistrodon contortrix it was observed that there was no
effect after a winning experience, while the effects of losing lasted for more
than one day; individuals that had previously lost did not engage in any fight
(they retreated), and lost when challenged, whereas those individuals that had
previously won, won six of the ten subsequent contests [108].
1.3.1 Dugatkin’s model of dominance hierarchy formation
Dugatkin [42] and Dugatkin & Dugatkin [44] developed a model to explore
the structure of dominance hierarchies under different strengths of winner and
loser effects (W ≥ 0 and L ∈ [0, 1]). The model consists of N individuals
who are characterised by their RHP and aggression threshold (θ). The RHP
value describes the ability of an individual to win an aggressive interaction (as
described in Section 1.3), whereas θ indicates whether an individual engages
in a fight in the first place. Further, it is assumed that the outcome of a fight
(i.e. win or loss) influences the RHP . While a win increases an individual’s
ability to win the next fight, a loss decreases it. Two models which differed
in the amount of information an individual has about its opponents’ fighting
abilities were analysed. The non-updated model assumes that no information
about the current ability is available [42], whereas the updated model assumes
that information (although with varying levels of accuracy) is accessible [44].
In the following we describe both models in detail.
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1.3.1.1 The non-updated model
All individuals possess the same RHP initially (denoted by RHPinitial) and at
each time step two individuals, x and y, are drawn at random to engage in an
aggressive interaction. Individual x decides to fight against individual y at time
t if
RHPx,t
RHPinitial
≥ θ (1.14)
holds, and it retreats otherwise, where RHPx,t describes the RHP of individual
x at time t, and θ is a fixed aggression threshold. In this model, individual x
has no information about the current RHP of individual y. Individual y is
considered similarly. Each pairwise interaction results in one of three possible
outcomes:
(1) both individuals decide to fight and x wins with probability
Px,y(t) =
RHPx,t
RHPx,t +RHPy,t
(1.15)
(and consequently y wins with probability Py,x(t) = 1− Px,y(t));
(2) one chooses to fight and the other retreats;
(3) both individuals retreat, which is known as a double kowtow.
The outcome of the contest is assumed to affect the RHP . If individual x wins
or individual y retreats then we obtain
RHPx,t+1 = (1 +W )RHPx,t. (1.16)
Similarly, if x loses or retreats then we have
RHPx,t+1 = (1− L)RHPx,t. (1.17)
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A similar dynamic holds for individual y. Consequently, the RHP of both indi-
viduals changes due to the outcome of their pairwise interactions, but in this
model individuals are only able to track the changes of their own RHP (this
may not be entirely realistic as we touch upon in Section 2.6).
Dugatkin [42] considered a group of four individuals and recorded the
number of wins of each individual over each of the others in a single realisation
of 1,000 interactions. He defined θ = 1 (meaning that individual x will fight
at time t if RHPx,t ≥ RHPinitial holds) and analysed winner and loser effects
of varying strengths (W = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5 and L = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5,
respectively).
The results obtained from this simulation are summarised in Table 1.1.
When only the winner effect was present each individual had a clear posi-
tion in the hierarchy; higher-ranked individuals were characterised by a larger
total number of wins, and also the ratios of their number of wins compared to
their number of losses (excluding double kowtows) against each lower ranked
individuals were high. This is true for all values of W . When only the loser
effect was present one individual always emerged as the dominant individual
and the position of the others was unclear as subordinate individuals started
retreating quickly, and so the interactions between them resulted in mutual
retreat. However, increasing the winner effect for a given value of the loser ef-
fect L increased the number of individuals with a clear position in the hierarchy
(nevertheless the hierarchy was not always linear). Dugatkin saw the influence
of the winner and loser effect in larger group sizes like when N = 6, 8, 12 and
concluded that the pattern was the same as for N = 4. The loser effect appears
to be stronger than the winner effect. For example in a group of 8 individuals,
all individuals have a clear rank in the hierarchy when only the winner effect
is present, but under a small value of the loser effect and a large value of the
winner effect, only the top two to four individuals have a clear position.
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W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
− 146 136 140
8 − 8 172
21 170 − 168
6 18 7 −
− 146 172 160
6 − 168 158
7 9 − 167
2 2 3 −
− 4 158 164
161 − 146 172
6 2 − 183
0 1 3 −
L =
0.1
− 0 0 0
171 − 171 163
0 0 −0
0 0 0 −
− 161 195 156
0 − 2 0
0 0 − 0
10 159 153 −
− 177 173 157
0 − 0 0
0 0 − 0
0 0 0 −
− 152 171 159
0 − 0 0
0 0 − 0
4 179 171 −
L =
0.2
− 156 168 174
0 − 3 3
0 0 −0
0 0 0 −
− 156 178 149
0 − 0 0
0 0 − 0
0 0 1 −
− 1 1 0
0 − 0 0
157 173 − 148
1 3 0 −
− 2 173 149
147 − 160 196
0 0 − 0
1 0 3 −
L =
0.3
− 0 3 1
181 − 172 154
0 0 −0
0 0 0 −
− 0 0 0
6 − 0 4
156 178 − 163
0 0 0 −
− 0 1 0
178 − 164 153
0 0 − 0
1 0 5 −
− 0 0 1
0 − 0 0
163 184 − 158
0 0 0 −
Table 1.1: The winner and the loser effects in a population of 4 individuals,
θ = 1, 1000 potential interactions. Entries in rows represents the number of
times that the row player has defeated the column player (Dugatkin [42]).
1.3.1.2 The updated model
Dugatkin & Dugatkin [44] relaxed the (probably unrealistic) assumption that
an individual has no knowledge of its opponent’s RHP . They assumed that
the opponent’s RHP can be estimated and the (error-prone) estimate is drawn
uniformly from the interval [(1 − η)RHPy,t; (1 + η)RHPy,t] where η describes
the accuracy of the estimate. The case η = 0 models the situation where each
individual has perfect knowledge of its opponent’s RHP [44]. The estima-
tion of individual y is denoted by RHP y,t and thus individual x decides to be
aggressive when
RHPx,t
RHP y,t
≥ θ (1.18)
holds and retreats otherwise. The probability that x wins remains
Px,y(t) =
RHPx,t
RHPx,t +RHPy,t
. (1.19)
The analysis of the updated model was done under combinations of η = 0; 0.25; 0.75,
θ = 0, 0.5, 1 and for the same values of winner and loser effects as in the non-
updated model whereW = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5 and L = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3; 0.4; 0.5.
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Pairwise interactions affect RHP as described in equations (1.16) and (1.17).
In total we have 324 combinations of θ, W , L and η and for each of these
combinations the following was simulated:
(1) All individuals had RHPinitial = 10.
(2) All individuals had RHPinitial = 10, but two individuals always overes-
timate their opponent’s RHP by choosing the maximum of the interval
range and two individuals always underestimate their opponent’s RHP
by choosing the minimum of that range.
(3) RHPinitial = 10, 12, 14, 16 for the four individuals respectively.
(4) RHPinitial = 10, 12, 14, 16 for the four individuals respectively, but the two
individuals with the lowest RHP always overestimate their opponent’s
RHP and the two individuals with the highest RHP always underesti-
mate their opponent’s RHP .
(5) RHPinitial = 10, 12, 14, 16 for the four individuals respectively, but the two
individuals with the lowest RHP always underestimate their opponent’s
RHP and the two individuals with the highest RHP always overestimate
their opponent’s RHP .
For all the analysed cases, clear linear hierarchies were established (i.e.
the higher-ranked individuals won more contests in total than lower-ranked
individuals, and more direct contests against lower-placed individuals). Inter-
estingly, the three different values of η made no differences to the hierarchy,
and thus overestimation or underestimation of the opponent’s ability to win a
fight had no impact on the establishment of linear hierarchies, as long as some
ability to estimate this ability was possessed [44].
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1.3.2 A Measurement of linearity
Often the hierarchies found in nature are not perfectly linear (where each indi-
vidual has a clear rank in the group). Sometimes two or more individuals have
the same rank or circular triads might be present. It is of interest to measure
how far from linearity hierarchies are. Landau and Kendall ([68], [75]) have
both introduced an index of linearity denoted by L and K respectively where
both take a value between 0 and 1. A value of 1 indicates a perfect linear hier-
archy and a value of 0 represents a non linear hierarchy.
1.3.2.1 Landau’s index of linearity
Landau [75] developed a method that measures the linearity of a hierarchy.
This index is calculated as follows:
h =
(
12
N3 −N
) N∑
x=1
(
Vx −
N − 1
2
)2
(1.20)
where N is the group size and Vx is the number of individuals that are domi-
nated by individual x. It was agreed in [12] and [33] that values of h ≥ 0.9
correspond to ’strong’, nearly linear hierarchies. Equation (1.20) is used when
there are no individuals with tied rank numbers. However this index can also
be used when there are tied ranks by using an adaptation proposed by [97].
Here if two individuals x and y have the same rank, we increase both values Vx
and Vy by 1/2.
1.3.2.2 Kendall’s index of linearity
Another measurement of linearity is that developed by Kendall [68]. The
method of calculating this index is given by Appleby [6] and the steps are
as follows.
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A B C D E F G Row total (Ri)
A - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
B 0 - 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 2
C 0 0 - 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1.5
D 0 0.5 0.5 - 0 0.5 0.5 2
E 0 0.5 0.5 1 - 0 0.5 2.5
F 0 1 1 0.5 1 - 1 4.5
G 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 - 2.5
Table 1.2: Matrix of relationships between 7 individuals named A, B, C, D,
E, F and G where row individual dominant to column individual is indicated
by 1; column individual dominant to row individual is indicated by 0 and the
unknown relationships are indicated by 0.5.
(1) Construct a matrix of relationships, in which the row individual i domi-
nant to the column individual is indicated by 1 and the column individual
dominant to the row individual is indicated by 0. Unknown relationships
are indicated by 0.5.
(2) For each individual (i = 1, ..., N) calculate the row sum Ri which repre-
sents the number of individuals dominated by i (Table 1.2).
(3) Calculate d which is the number of circular triads (see Section 2.2.1) by
d =
N(N − 1)(2N − 1)
12
−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2. (1.21)
(4) The index of linearity K is calculated as follow:
K =
 1−
24d
N3−N
: N odd
1− 24d
N3−4N
: N even
The value of K for odd values of N is the same as Landau’s h. In Kendall’s
original procedure it was assumed that no tied relationships were present.
However by indicating unknown relationships by 1/2, the above procedure
could be applied to hierarchies with unknown relationships. On the other
hand, if the number of unknown relationships is relatively large the value of
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K may be negative. Depending on the number of tied relationships K can
overestimate or underestimate the level of linearity. De Vries [38] proposed an
improved test of linearity that is not affected by the number of tied relation-
ships. The steps of the procedure are as follows.
(1) Construct the matrix of relationships where the row individual dominant
to the column individual is indicated by 1 and the column individual
dominant to the row individual is indicated by 0. Unknown relationships
are also indicated by 0.
(2) Construct 2u matrices where u is the number of unknown relationships.
Thus for a pair of individuals (A, B), if they have an unknown relation-
ship, in a new matrix the position (A, B) will be indicated by 1 and the
position (B, A) by 0 or the other way around. Because there are 2 possi-
bilities for each unknown relationship, the total number of matrices that
we construct is 2u.
(3) For each of the 2u matrices, calculate the number of circular triads d.
(4) Calculate the number of circular triads d′ as the average of all d values.
(5) The index of linearity is defined as
K ′ = 1−
d′
max(d)
. (1.22)
De Vries also proposed a two-step randomisation test as an alternative one to
K ′ (see [38])
1.3.3 Reproductive skew
In this research we use the concept of reproductive skew to analyse how lim-
ited resources are divided between a group of individuals. The distribution of
reproduction varies among breeding individuals that share the same territory
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[66]. Reproduction skew measures the division of reproduction among group
members. In high-skew groups, only the individuals that have a high position
in the group obtain a large share of reproduction. In low-skew groups, repro-
duction is distributed more evenly among group members. A classical example
of high reproductive skew is that of eusocial insects where only the queen
(dominant individual) reproduces. In Liostenogaster flavolineata (hover wasps)
it is observed that only one female produces more offspring in the group, even
though there might be more females in the group able to mate and lay eggs
[112]. On the other hand in Mungos mungo (the banded mongoose) a low
reproductive skew has been found to be present. There are a lot of factors that
influence such variation in different groups of animals (see [19], [46], [47],
[48], [66]). Most of the theoretical work is based on the idea that the top-
ranked individual has control over reproduction but might share an amount of
that with lower-ranked individuals so that they do not leave the group ([45],
[120], [121], [122]).
However it is not clear the extent to which top-ranked individuals control re-
production. This leads to the idea of incomplete control models of skew, where
lower-ranked individuals can have an effect on the distribution of reproduc-
tion ([64], [65], [102]). Dominant individuals can allow the lower-ranked
individuals to have an influence on the distribution of reproduction because
sometimes producing more offspring can be costly for the dominant individual
when they can be produced by subordinate individuals at a lower cost.
But how is reproductive skew measured? There are more than 20 indices used
to find whether there is an even or uneven distribution of reproduction among
group members. The most used index is that by [67] denoted by S and is
calculated by equation (1.23)
S =
νNb +NN
Nb +NN
(1.23)
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where Nb is the number of individuals that are breeders, NN is the number of
individuals that are non breeders and ν measures the variation of reproductive
output among breeders. S takes values between 0 and 1 where a value of
S equal to 0 indicates that reproduction is equally distributed among group
members and a value of S equal to 1 indicates that reproduction is only by the
dominant individual.
Another popular index of skew is that by Kokko & Lindstrom [70] denoted by
λ and calculated by formula 1.24
E[pr] =
λ(1− λ)r−1
1− (1− λ)n
(1.24)
where E[pr] is the expected proportion of matings by males that are in rank
r. This index also takes a value between 0 and 1, where λ → 0 indicates no
reproduction skew and λ→ 1 indicates a high-skew.
1.3.4 Tournament models of dominance hierarchy formation
Different groups of animals can be thought to follow different types of tour-
naments when they establish the dominance hierarchy. In the following we
explain some of the tournaments that we use in our research.
A tournament is a competition consisting of a series of contests and a large
number of individuals. In each contest two individuals are paired against each
other to fight over a reward. There are a number of tournaments that differ-
ent groups of animals follow to establish a dominance hierarchy such as the
knockout tournament, the round-robin (all-play-all) tournament and the Swiss
tournament. In the following we briefly describe these models.
In knockout tournaments, 2n individuals are paired together. In the first
round we get 2n−1 winners and 2n−1 losers. The losers are eliminated from the
competition, while the winners are repaired together. This process continues
until the last round where one single individual remains undefeated. This yield
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2n − 1 contests in total. Knockout tournaments are considered in detail in
[25] and [26]. This type of tournament is useful when there is a large group
of individuals and only the top-ranked one gets the payoff, otherwise when
intermediate rank individuals obtain a reward as well, this model might not be
useful.
In round-robin tournament (all-play-all) all possible pairings can occur and
the number of contests for a group of 2n individuals is 2n−1(2n − 1). Mesterton
Gibbons and Dugatkin [90] used a round-robin tournament to model domi-
nance hierarchy formation, in particular they were interested to see whether
the established hierarchy was linear or not. Furthermore they introduced the
concept of RHP into this model and analysed its influence on linearity. They
concluded that the level of linearity depends on the group size, RHP and
aggression threshold. A disadvantage of round robin tournaments is that for
larger group sizes there would be a large number of fights which leads to loss
of energy and injury [23]. Thus this model works better for smaller groups.
Another disadvantage of this tournament is that it forces those that do not
do well in early contests to fight until the end, when they could have been
eliminated earlier as they get nothing by fighting. Here is where the Swiss
tournament is useful, because it has less fights than the round-robin. In Swiss
tournaments for a group of size 2n there are 2n−1n contests in total, which is
intermediate between knockout tournaments and round-robin.
1.3.5 A Swiss tournament model by Broom and Cannings
1.3.5.1 Some preliminaries
A Swiss tournament is a tournament which originates with a chess competition
taking place in Zurich (hence the name) in 1895. In a group of 2n players,
those with the same score are paired together to compete. If they have differ-
ent scores, those with a score as close as possible are paired together. Broom
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& Cannings [23] have modelled the Swiss tournament as a Hawk-Dove type
games ([83], [84]); the winner gets an extra score and the loser stays on the
same score. The payoff matrix in this case is denoted by M and is given as
follows:
M =
12(W + L− C) W
L 1
2
(W + L)
 (1.25)
where W is the reward for the winner, L is the reward for the loser and C is
the cost for losing. There is always a unique ESS when considering a single
interaction of this game. If p is the probability of being aggressive in the ESS
then the followings apply:
(1) p = 0 means that an individual plays Dove, which happens ifW − L < 0.
The pay-off for this strategy is 1
2
(W + L).
(2) p = 1means that an individual plays Hawk, which happens ifW−L ≥ C.
The payoff for this strategy is then 1
2
(W + L− C).
(3) For 0 ≤ W − L < C we have p = W−L
C
and the payoff in this case is
1
2
(W + L)− 1
2C
(W − L)2.
In general the payoff will be 1
2
(W + L − p2C) where p = mid(0, W−L
C
, 1) is
the second largest value of 0, W−L
C
and 1. For the Hawk-Dove model in Swiss
tournaments case 1 never happens. Thus the payoff can be written as 1
2
(W +
L− 1
C
min(C, (W − L))2). We define
R(x, y) =
1
2
(
x+ y −
1
C
min(C, (x− y)
)2
(1.26)
for x ≥ y, which is the expected payoff at the ESS forW = x and L = y. Then
the following results are true.
Result 1. If x ≥ y then x ≥ R(x, y) ≥ y.
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2n
2n−1 winners
2n−2 2n−2
2n−1 losers
2n−2 2n−2
Figure 1.1: The division of individuals using a Swiss tournament
This means that the expected payoff prior to a contest is between the ex-
pected payoff of the winner and the payoff of the loser after the contest.
Result 2. If x ≥ y ≥ z and y − z ≥ C then R(x, y)−R(y, z) ≥ C.
This means that the reward for winning twice is x, for winning once and
losing once y, and for losing twice is z [23]. Then the reward for winning one
contest is at least C greater than the reward for winning no contests.
1.3.5.2 The Model
In a population of size 2n, each individual starts with the same score 0|0 (0
wins from 0 contests). At the end of the first round where these 2n players
are randomly paired together, we get 2n−1 individuals on a score 1|1 and 2n−1
individuals on a score 0|1. In the second round, the winners are paired together
and the losers together. At the end of this round we get 2n−2 individuals on
a score 0|2, 2n−1 individuals on a score 1|2 and 2n−2 on a score 2|2. Then
individuals on the same score are paired against each other. We get an almost
accurate ordering by using the Swiss tournament and the winner is established
in n rounds (if there are no draws). The total number of contests until we stop
is 2n−1n and after j rounds there are
(
j
i
)
2n−j players on i|j (i.e. i wins from j
contests), ∀i = 0, ..., j.
The reward for finishing on a score i|n is Vi such that V0 ≤ V1 ≤ ... ≤ Vn.
In Swiss tournaments the followings are defined:
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• Wij is the expected reward for an individual with a score of i|j (i wins
until round j). Thus Win = Vi, ∀i
• Mij is the payoff matrix for an individual with a score i|j playing in round
j + 1. The expected reward for winning is W(i+1)(j+1) and the expected
reward for losing isWi(j+1) as (i+1)|(j+1) and i|(j+1) are the only two
possible states that an individual on a score i|j can be in subsequently.
Thus the matrix M will be:
Mij =
12(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1) − C) W(i+1)(j+1)
Wi(j+1)
1
2
(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1))
 (1.27)
• Next, the probability of being aggressive in the ESS of Mij is defined by
pij and is given by
pij = mid(0,
W(i+1)(j+1) −Wi(j+1)
C
, 1) (1.28)
The expected reward Wij will then be
Wij =
1
2
(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1) − p
2
ijC). (1.29)
Result 3. For i ≤ k ≤ j,Wij ≤ Wkj.
This means that the expected reward for an individual who has won k
contests is at least as large as an individual with less wins i, at the end of
round j.
From Result 3, we can write
pij = min
(
W(i+1)(j+1) −Wi(j+1)
C
, 1
)
(1.30)
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and
Wij = R(W(i+1)(j+1),Wi(j+1)) ∀i ≤ j ≤ N − 1. (1.31)
Note that there is a unique choice of pij for every position, which is the only
candidate ESS, but not necessarily an ESS [23]. The following results are
also true for Swiss tournaments (see [23] for proofs of these results).
Result 4. Wij ≤ W(i+1)(j+1) if i ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
This result means that the expected reward of an individual cannot decrease
after a win.
Result 5. Wij ≥ Wi(j+1) if i ≤ j ≤ N − 1.
This result means that the expected reward of an individual cannot increase
after a loss.
Result 6. If pi(j+1) = 1 then pij = 1. Equivalently if pij < 1 then pi(j+1) < 1.
This means that if an individual loses after playing any mixed strategy other
than pure Hawk, on the next round it cannot play pure Hawk. However, pij are
not necessarily monotonically decreasing with j for a given i.
1.3.6 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows.
In Chapter 2, we analyse the influence of winner and loser effects on domi-
nance hierarchy formation. Two cases are considered: (i) when individuals
do not know the strength of their opponents and (ii) when they can estimate
the strength of their opponents with varying levels of accuracy. For each case
the linearity of hierarchies is measured. We do this by analysing the average
number of wins for an individual where we use the index of linearity K and
by analysing the temporal change in the RHP where the concept of overlap is
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used. We then find the time (how many rounds) when the hierarchy is estab-
lished. For the non-updated model we find analytically the number of wins for
the second and third place in a group of four individuals when only the loser
effect is present. The probability of having a unique loser is also analysed.
In Chapter 3, we introduce game-theoretical elements in the form of strate-
gic factors to the winner and loser model developed in Chapter 2. For a general
strategy, we find its expected payoff and hence find the appropriate range of
strategies. We use two payoff functions: the first representing situations where
the resources are unlimited, and the other representing situations with limited
resources. Using both payoff functions we analyse the level of aggressiveness
for an individual and in particular we find that in the second case individuals
need to be more aggressive to obtain a higher share of the resources.
In Chapter 4, we develop a new model of dominance hierarchy formation,
based upon the Swiss tournament model by Broom & Cannings [23]. Analysis
of the model shows that linear dominance hierarchies are always established.
We find the number of rounds until the winner, the second place and the full
hierarchy is established and a formula for the total number of fights is derived.
Furthermore, we explore the effect of group size, reward and cost on the level
of aggressiveness and on the expected payoff.
In Chapter 5, we summarise our main findings, the contributions of this
study and give some directions of future research.
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Chapter 2
Modelling Dominance Hierarchies
Under Winner and Loser Effects
2.1 Introduction
For a long time, the question as to what stops a lower-ranked individual to
overturn its social rank, has been a big puzzle in biology. A Substantial amount
of work is carried out on this subject, but only the last couple of decades, the
focus has been on the winner and loser effects. These factors have an important
role on the level of aggressiveness for an individual and are found to be one of
the possible mechanisms of dominance hierarchy formation in different groups
of animals ([8], [13], [77], [108]). Therefore, in this chapter, we analyse in
more detail the influence of winner and loser effects on dominance hierarchy
formation.
Our starting point is the model developed by Dugatkin and Dugatkin &
Dugatkin ([42], [44]) (see Chapter 1 for the model description and results).
For each combination of the winner and loser effect, he analysed the number of
wins of each individual in the group. Although this model makes good predic-
tions about how different species arrange themselves into a ranking order, his
results are based on a single observation for each of the analysed cases. We are
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interested in looking at the distribution of the number of wins for each case, to
ascertain if different observations will always yield effectively the same results
(in most cases they do, but there are exceptions, as we see in Section 2.3). The
average is important as the logical representative of the distribution.
We start by extending the framework developed in ([42], [44]). For ease
of comparison, we will use the same model that Dugatkin has used with the
only difference being in the updated model where the errors are treated dif-
ferently (see Section 2.5). We start by analysing the average behaviour of the
original model (as opposed to considering a single realisation) by recording the
average number of wins of each individual over any other individual present
in the population on the basis of 10,000 simulations and consider appropriate
statistics to describe the properties of the emerging hierarchies. To this end
we evaluate the linearity of the hierarchy by adapting the index of linearity
introduced by Kendall [68], denoted by K (0 ≤ K ≤ 1). Values of K close to
one are indicative of linear hierarchies and values of K close to zero indicate
no linear hierarchy to be present. We calculate the index of linearity based on
the averaged number of wins for all considered parameter combinations and
this systematic investigation of the model from [42] reveals that a near linear
hierarchy is achieved for all the analysed cases.
Besides understanding the structure of the emerging hierarchy we are in-
terested in understanding the temporal dynamic of the hierarchy formation, in
particular we want to explore when (or after how many interactions) a hierar-
chy is established. This knowledge can be of importance for experimentalists
as it gives a guideline for the number of interactions that need to be observed.
To do so we firstly need to define when we consider a hierarchy as estab-
lished. This will be based upon pairwise comparisons, and we will use the term
“distinguishable” to indicate when two individuals can be thought to clearly oc-
cupy different positions in the hierarchy.
Additionally, we are interested in the role of information in the process
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of hierarchy formation. Based on [42] and [44], we consider the situations
where:
i. an individual has no information about the current RHP of its opponent,
ii. an individual is fully aware of the current RHP of its opponent and
iii. an individual can make a noisy estimate about the current RHP of its
opponent.
Next for each pair of individuals and different parameter combinations,
we calculate the time until both individuals are considered to be distinguish-
able regarding their rank in the hierarchy. We discuss our results in Sections
2.3-2.5. This chapter prepares the platform for developing game-theoretical
models, where levels of aggression (for example) are strategic factors, with
the best choice depending upon the natural parameters, including species or
habitat-specific features which affect how resources are divided (the reproduc-
tive skew).
Parts of this chapter are published in [73].
2.2 Methods
In the following we use the non-updated and updated (with different levels of
accuracy) model to explore the properties of the process of hierarchy forma-
tion; in particular we explore its temporal dynamics. To do so, for each model,
we firstly analyse the number of wins of each individual over all other individ-
uals present in the population after 1000 interactions (and therefore at a fixed
point in time) and secondly the temporal changes in the RHP of each individ-
ual over these 1000 interactions for the non-updated and updated model. We
note that in both analyses, the rank of an individual is calculated differently.
While in the first analysis the rank is determined by the total number of wins
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in the second analysis it is determined by the size of the RHP . However, the
two definitions are highly correlated as equations (1.16) and (1.17) guarantee
that a high number of wins corresponds to a high value of RHP . All results
presented in the following are based on averaging over 10,000 simulations and
we explore the same parameter constellations as in [42] to allow for a direct
comparison of the results. Therefore we mainly consider groups of size four
but we have additionally analysed the behaviour of larger groups and obtained
similar patterns. We occasionally comment on the results for larger group sizes
in later sections.
2.2.1 Analysis of the average number of wins
We start our analysis by determining the rank of all individuals at all times t.
Since we allow multiple contests between the individuals, it makes sense to ar-
range individuals according to their number of wins; the higher the number of
wins, the higher the position in the hierarchy (this was the case in the models
of [42] and [44] as well). If two individuals have the same number of wins, the
rank is assigned at random. We note that an alternative way of deciding the
ordering of the hierarchy would be by placing an individual above another if it
had won more of their pairwise contests (although this latter definition has the
significant disadvantage of sometimes not yielding an ordering). Theoretically
on some occasions, these two definitions can produce different orderings of a
given hierarchy, but in practice this is very rare, and so there is no practical
difference. Next we determine the matrix W = [wij]i,j=1,...,N which contains
the average number of wins of the individual with rank i over individual with
rank j under different strengths of the winner and loser effects, noting that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between individuals and ranks. The re-
sulting hierarchy is perfectly linear (K = 1) if all individuals have a different
number of wins, and have won (lost) all of their decisive contests against those
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lower (higher) in the hierarchy than them. To quantify the degree of linearity
we calculate in the next step the index of linearity [68] using the following
procedure.
(1) From the matrix of wins W we construct an index matrix F=(fij) where
(fij) is the fraction of decisive interactions between individuals i and j
(i.e. from those contests not involving a double kowtow) which were
won by individual i (so that fij + fji = 1). This matrix will be called the
matrix of fractions.
(2) For this matrix F calculate the row sum Ri for i = 1, ..., N .
(3) Calculate the index of linearity
K = 1−
d
dmax
, (2.1)
(see [6]), where
d =
1
12
N(N − 1)(2N − 1)−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2, dmax =
1
24
(N3 −N). (2.2)
The method used above is an adaptation of that developed by Kendall [68].
In that case the interaction between a pair of individuals was a single contest
with a unique top individual, so that exactly one of fij and fji was 1 and the
other was 0. The parameter d was the number of circular triads of matrix
F, where a circular triad is a subgroup of three individuals denoted by A, B
and C in a larger group which has the form A → B → C → A which means
that A dominates B, B dominates C but C dominates A. No circular triads
corresponds to a completely linear hierarchy.
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Below we show that the original definition of d as the number of circular
triads, in the case where there was a single contest between each pair of in-
dividuals, is a special case of our definition from (2.2). For the single contest
case, d is the total number of triples minus the total number of transitive triples
[9]. The number of transitive triples is
N∑
i=1
(
Ri
2
)
(see [9]), and so
d =
(
N
3
)
−
N∑
i=1
(
Ri
2
)
=
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
6
−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2 +
1
2
N∑
i=1
Ri
=
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
6
−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2 +
1
2
N(N − 1)
2
=
N(N − 1)(2N − 1)
12
−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2, (2.3)
which is the form for d that we apply in our model for more general values of
Ri (see also [38]). For the formula (2.1), dmax corresponds to the maximum
value that d can take. In general this is given by
dmax =
1
24
(N3 −N). (2.4)
For the case where fij was 0 or 1 [6], this was also the formula for odd values
of N , but for even values this is not achievable, and the maximum is
dmax =
1
24
(N3 − 4N). (2.5)
In our model we use dmax from (2.4) as this is achievable for fractional fij,
even though our group size is generally even (N = 4).
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2.2.2 Analysis of the temporal change in RHP
It is assumed that each aggressive interaction changes the RHP of the individ-
uals involved according to equations (1.16) and (1.17). In the following we
investigate the temporal dynamics of the hierarchy formation by analysing the
change in RHP for each individual over time. To do so we define the rank of an
individual at time t ∈ [1,∞] based on its RHP (higher-ranked individuals have
a higher RHP than lower-ranked individuals) and determine the probability
distribution of the RHP values of the first, second, . . . , N th rank based on the
10,000 simulations at each point in time. This allows us to ask how distinguish-
able individuals of different ranks are based on the ability to win an aggressive
interaction. The degree of distinguishability between two individuals at time
t is determined by the overlap νxy(t) (see the grey area in Figure 2.1) of the
density of the RHP values, denoted by fx(t) and fy(t) (note that this overlap
was termed OVL by Schmid & Schmidt [107]). We have 0 ≤ νxy(t) ≤ 1, ∀t and
Figure 2.1: Probability distributions functions of the RHP of two individuals
at time t. The shaded area describes the overlap between the two distributions.
the smaller νxy(t), the clearer the distinction between the ranks of the individ-
uals. If there is complete overlap then the individual with the higher rank is
effectively chosen at random. In the following we call two individuals x and y
distinguishable if νxy(t) < 0.1 holds. The overlapping area νxy(t) is determined
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using the Kolomogorov distancemax
∀z
|Fx,t(z)−Fy,t(z)| between the distributions
Fx,t and Fy,t. Assuming that the Kolmogorov distance is realised at position z
∗
we obtain
νxy(t) =
∫ ∞
z∗
fy,t(z)dz +
∫ z∗
−∞
fx,t(z)dz = 1 + (Fx,t(z
∗)− Fy,t(z
∗))
= 1−max
∀z
|Fx,t(z)− Fy,t(z)|.
In our model, the values of RHP are discrete rather than continuous, but
except for very early in the process (and with the single exception of the top
individual when only the loser effect is present, as we discuss later) the number
of possible discrete values becomes large and our discrete distribution can be
approximated by a continuous distribution. We use this procedure to determine
the overlap νxy for all combinations of individuals and every point in time. In
this way we are able to determine when νxy(t) falls below 0.1 for all x, y, and
consequently when all ranks become distinguishable. We note that it is possible
that νxy(t) can increase above 0.1 again (though this never in practice happens
except at the very early stages of certain cases). In the following we call the
(final) time when νxy(t) falls below 0.1, a domination event.
2.3 Results for the non-updated model
In the following we assume a group of four individuals which are initialised
with RHPinitial = 10 and an aggression threshold θ = 1, unless stated other-
wise. We explore the dynamics of hierarchy formation by analysing the aver-
age number of wins and the temporal change in the RHP . These dynamics
are analysed for various combinations of winner and loser effects where both
W and L take values from 0 up to 0.5. We show only W and L in the range
from 0 to 0.3 in intervals of increment 0.1, as the behaviour at other values
is consistent with the values shown, and 0.3 is a large value for a winner or a
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loser effect (see how large RHP becomes in Figure 2.11 leading to predictable
contest outcomes).
2.3.1 Analysis of the average number of wins
For different strengths of winner and loser effects we record the average num-
ber of wins of each individual after 1000 aggressive interactions. Table 2.1
shows the matrix of wins W = [wij]i,j=1,...,N for each set of parameters. Each
single entry wij indicates the number of wins of individual with rank i over
individual with rank j. Following our definition, it is clear that every individ-
W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
− 153.51 161.59 163.67
15.13 − 150.21 158.38
7.52 15.48 − 148.63
4.57 7.34 14.46 −
− 160.71 164.99 166.37
7.33 − 158.32 162.98
3.21 7.29 − 157.42
1.78 2.93 6.67 −
− 162.67 166.23 167.01
4.91 − 160.88 164.36
2.04 4.81 − 160.19
0.99 1.81 4.11 −
L = 0.1
− 166.12 166.91 166.79
0 − 1.55 1.69
0 0.06 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 161.81 167.47 168.01
4.27 − 104.83 105.28
0.06 0.09 − 0.61
0 0 0 −
− 162.58 167.61 168.12
3.69 − 147.53 148.61
0.32 0.74 − 8.01
0 0 0 −
− 163.48 167.51 168.38
2.76 − 152.81 153.92
0.28 0.81 − 30.78
0 0 0 −
L = 0.2
− 166.33 166.56 166.64
0 − 1.57 1.75
0 0.06 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 165.09 167.21 167.17
1.28 − 14.71 14.89
0.006 0.05 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 164.45 167.41 167.62
1.81 − 93.29 93.61
0.03 0.06 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 164.56 167.37 167.91
1.86 − 136.76 137.72
0.14 0.21 − 1.11
0 0 0 −
L = 0.3
− 164.05 166.62 166.81
0 − 1.54 1.74
0 0.06 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 165.79 166.91 167.09
0.35 − 2.68 2.91
0.01 0.06 − 0.51
0 0 0 −
− 165.28 167.31 167.36
1.02 − 32.81 33.01
0.02 0.05 − 0.52
0 0 0 −
− 165.29 167.71 167.46
0.94 − 78.09 78.11
0.02 0.05 − 0.37
0 0 0 −
Table 2.1: Matrices of winsW in the non-updated model for different strengths
of the winner and loser effect (W = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3 and L = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3),
N = 4, θ = 1 and t=1000.
ual has a clear rank in the hierarchy as the average number of wins for all
individuals in all cases are different. When only the loser effect is present, all
individuals in the group score except the individual that takes the last place.
This is because the first to lose a fight will retreat in all subsequent contests, as
its RHP is lower than RHPinitial and therefore equation (1.14) does not hold.
Increasing the loser effect in the absence of the winner effect does not make
any difference to the structure. When only the winner effect is present, all in-
dividuals in the group score and have a clear position in the hierarchy. When
increasing the winner effect in the absence of the loser effect, we notice that
higher ranked individuals win an increasing fraction of the individual contests.
In particular, each individual scores increasingly better against those individu-
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als that are lower in rank, and increasingly worse against those that are higher
in rank. In Figure 2.2 we plot the total average number of wins for each posi-
tion in the hierarchy for different combinations of W and L. To check how far
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Figure 2.2: The total average number of wins for positions 1, 2, 3 and 4 for
different combinations ofW and L in the non-updated model as given in Table
2.1.
from linearity a hierarchy is we calculate the index of linearity K as described
in equation (2.1). The following example calculates K for when W = 0.1 and
L = 0. The corresponding matrix of wins for this case is
W =

− 153.51 161.59 163.67
15.13 − 150.21 158.38
7.52 15.48 − 148.63
4.57 7.34 14.46 −

(2.6)
Then the matrix of fractions F will be
F =

− 153.51
168.64
161.59
169.11
163.67
168.24
15.13
168.64
− 150.21
165.69
158.38
165.72
7.52
169.11
15.48
165.69
− 148.63
163.09
4.57
168.24
7.34
165.72
14.46
163.09
−

=

− 0.91 0.96 0.97
0.09 − 0.91 0.96
0.04 0.09 − 0.91
0.03 0.04 0.09 −

(2.7)
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From the matrix of fractions F, now we calculate the row sums Ri, i =
1, 2, 3, 4
Ri =

2.84
1.96
1.04
0.16

(2.8)
Next we calculate the average number of circular triads d by using equation
(2.2) as follows
d =
N(N − 1)(2N − 1)
12
−
1
2
N∑
i=1
(Ri)
2 = 7− 6.51 = 0.49.
Thus in this example there are on average 0.49 circular triads. To find K we
need to know the maximum number of circular triads (maximum value that d
can take) and this is found by
dmax =
1
24
(N3 −N) = 2.5.
Finally we can calculate the value of K for when W = 0.1 and L = 0 which
is K = 1 − d
dmax
= 0.804. This shows that in this case we obtain a near linear
hierarchy.
Figure 2.3 shows the values of the index of linearity K calculated by equa-
tion (2.1) for different values of W and L. We observe that K is close to 1
for all parameter combinations considered, indicating a near linear hierarchy
in almost all of the cases. Further, we see that, as expected, K increases with
W . When the loser effect is increased for a given positive value of W , each
individual except the first placed individual does worse than before. This has a
mild impact on K.
When both winner and loser effects are present, we observe two different
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outcomes.
i. Hierarchies with a clear first and second place, a bottom individual with
zero wins and the third place individual which does not differ much from
the fourth place individual.
ii. Hierarchies with a clear first place individual, but the second place indi-
vidual is not that different from the third placed one (see the case when
W=0.1 and L=0.3).
These outcomes depend on the values of winner and loser effects. If we si-
multaneously increase winner and loser effects, we get a slight increase in the
index of linearity (see Figure 2.3). These results also hold for larger group
sizes. Figure 2.4 describes the index of linearity K under the influence of the
loser effect only.
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Figure 2.3: Index of linearity for different values of W and L, calculated from
the (unrounded) values of the average number of wins from Table 2.1.
2.3.2 Analytical results for the loser effect only
In this section, we present some analytical results for dominance hierarchies
emerging under the influence of the loser effect. We consider only the loser
effect because (i) there is more documented evidence in different species that
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Figure 2.4: Change of index of linearity K when the group size is increased
from 4 to 9 under the influence of the loser effect only.
show the presence of this effect, and (ii) the precise value of the loser effect
does not have any influence on dominance hierarchy formation or the number
of wins for each individual.
In Section 2.3.1, we found that such hierarchies have a clear first place
individual with a large number of wins and a last place individual with zero
wins. The average number of wins of the second place does not differ much
from the average number of wins of the third place. Here, we are interested
to find analytically how many wins on average the second and the third place
individuals have.
Let us denote by A, B, C and D the four individuals in the group. At each
point in time, two random individuals are pitted against each other to engage
in an aggressive interaction. From the model we know that if an individual
loses a fight, it is going to retreat afterwards (as it does not meet the aggression
threshold θ). This means that the first individual to lose, will occupy the last
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place in the hierarchy.
We start by finding the total number of rounds where pairings between
unbeaten individuals (that have not lost any fight) happen. Without loss of
generality, we assume that in round 1, individual A wins against individual B.
We denote this relation by A → B. Thus individual B will retreat every time
that it is picked by another in the group to fight. From Figure 2.5, we find that
 
Third Round
Second Round
First Round  → 
 → 
 →   → 
 → 
 →   → 
 → 
 →   → 
Figure 2.5: Rounds of fights between unbeaten individuals, where in each of
them, one individual is losing for the first time. There are six possible hierar-
chical structures represented by the six branches, e.g., the first one follows the
path A→ B, A→ C, A→ D.
there are three rounds of fights between unbeaten individuals. In this figure we
have 6 branches (e.g., the first branch represents the sequence A→ B, A→ C,
A → D), where each of the branches represents a hierarchical structure with
a sequence of losses. In each round one individual is losing for the first time.
Because we assumed that in the first round A→ B, in the following round we
can have either A→ C, C → A or C → D and in the third round we can have
either, A→ D, D → A, C → D, D → C, C → A or A→ C.
Between these three rounds we can have pairings of unbeaten individuals with
individuals that have previously lost and hence are going to retreat. These
types of pairings contribute to the average number of wins that an individual
has over the others. So the next step is to find how often these happen.
In the following, we denote by xn the number of times that an unbeaten in-
dividual chooses a particular individual that has previously lost, until a new
pairing between unbeaten individuals happens. Then xn has a geometric (0)
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distribution which we denote by xn ∼ Geo(p), where p is the probability that
conditioned upon the next game involving the above contest or two unbeaten
individuals, it is the two unbeaten individuals that play.
From the first round, we have individual B as the only loser. Thus between
round one and round two, we can have these possible pairings: A → B,
C → B or D → B and assume that these combinations occur x1, x2 and x3
times respectively.
In other words, x1 for example, represents the number of wins of individual
A over individualB until one of the pairingsA→ C, C → A or C → D in round
two happens. Each of these pairings happens with a probability 1/4. Thus we
have x1 ∼ Geo (3/4). The same applies to x2 and x3 and so x2 ∼ Geo (3/4) and
x3 ∼ Geo (3/4).
Now we find the number of pairings between an unbeaten individual and
an individual that has previously lost between the second and the third round.
After the second round we have two losers. From the path A → B, A → C in
Figure 2.5, the two losers are B and C. Thus the possible pairings are: A→ B,
A→ C, D → B, D → C. We assume that these happen x4, x5, x6 and x7 times,
respectively. Again, for the same reasons as in round 1, they are geometrically
distributed with probability p = 1/2. Thus xn ∼ Geo (1/2) , ∀n = 4, 5, 6, 7.
From the second path in Figure 2.5 (A → B, C → A) we can have these
possible pairings: C → B, C → A, D → B, D → A, which again happen
x4, x5, x6 and x7 times respectively. They are geometrically distributed with
probability p = 1/2 (xn ∼ Geo (1/2) , ∀n = 4, 5, 6, 7).
From the third path in Figure 2.5 (A→ B, C → D) we can have these possible
pairings: C → B, C → D, A → B, A → D, which again happen x4, x5, x6
and x7 times respectively. They are geometrically distributed with probability
p = 1/2 (xn ∼ Geo (1/2) , ∀n = 4, 5, 6, 7).
The analysis of the 6 branches in Figure 2.5, will assign a rank to each
individual in the hierarchy. These results are shown in Table 2.2. The orderings
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1stbranch 2ndbranch 3rdbranch
1st A:3 + x1 + x4 + x5+.. D:1+x3+x6+x7+.. C:2+x2+x4+x5+..
2nd D:x3 + x6 + x7 A:2 + x1 + x4 + x5 D:x3 + x6 + x7
3d C:x2 C:x2 A:1 + x1
4th B: 0 B: 0 B:0
4thbranch 5thbranch 6thbranch
1st D:1+x3+x6+x7+ .. C:2+x2+x4+x5+.. A:2+x1+x6+x7+..
2nd C:1 + x2 + x4 + x5 A:1 + x1 + x6 + x7 C:1 + x2 + x4 + x5
3d A:1 + x1 D:x3 D:x3
4th B: 0 B: 0 B:0
Table 2.2: The rank and the number of wins of each individual in Figure 2.5.
of individuals are the reverse of the order of their first loss. For example the
first individual to lose will occupy the last place, the second individual to lose
will occupy the third place and so on. The second and the third place in Table
2.2 represent the second and the third place by losses. This structure (based
on the number of losses) will be called the sequence hierarchy, which is a linear
one. The ranks that we are interested to work out are in order of the highest
number of wins. This hierarchy, based on the number of wins, will be called the
real hierarchy. For example, if x3 + x6 + x7 < x2, means that individual C has
more wins than individual D and thus it will occupy the second position and D
will occupy the third position in the real hierarchy. The combined number of
wins between the second and the third place in the sequence hierarchy is the
same as in the real hierarchy and by averaging over the all branches we find it
to be
6 + 4x1 + 4x2 + 4x3 + 3x4 + 3x5 + 3x6 + 3x7
6
. (2.9)
We know that the expected value of variable xn that is geometrically dis-
tributed, xn ∼ Geo(p), is E[xn] =
1
p
− 1. Then the expected average number of
wins between the second and the third place is
E[
6 + 4x1 + 4x2 + 4x3 + 3x4 + 3x5 + 3x6 + 3x7
6
]
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=
6 + 4
3
4
+ 4
3
4
+ 4
3
4
+ 3
1
2
+ 3
1
2
+ 3
1
2
+ 3
1
2
6
=
23
6
≈ 3.833. (2.10)
because E[x1] = E[x2] = E[x3] =
1
3
4
− 1 = 1
3
and E[x4] = E[x5] = E[x6] =
E[x7] =
1
1
2
− 1 = 1.
But how do we find the average number of wins for the second and the
third place respectively? To answer this question, for every branch in Figure
2.5, we analyse the case when the second place by losses is the third place by
wins and when the third place by losses is the second place by wins.
We denote by Yi and Zi the total number of wins for the second and third
place respectively in branch i, ∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. We need to work out the
values of Zi and Yi and for every particular value of Zi, we need to find the
probability of Zi being less than Yi. In particular we need to calculate
∞∑
zi=0
ziP (Zi = zi and Zi ≤ Yi) +
∞∑
yi=0
yiP (Yi = yi and Zi > Yi). (2.11)
In the following we calculate the value of equation (2.11) for every branch in
Table 2.2.
Number of wins for the third position in the first branch
In the first branch we have Z1 = x2 and Y1 = x3+x6+x7. In this case equation
(2.11) becomes:
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1) +
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1) (2.12)
In order to calculate equation (2.12), we separately calculate
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1) and
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1) and add them
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together. We start by calculating the second summation. We have
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1) =
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1)P (Z1 > Y1). (2.13)
In order to calculate (2.13), we need to first calculate P[Y1=y1]
Y1 is given as the sum of three independent variables x3, x6, x7 that are all geo-
metrically distributed with probabilities 3/4, 1/2 and 1/2 respectively. We also
know that the sum of 2 independent geometrically distributed random vari-
ables that have the same probability p, is a negative binomial random variable
denoted by NB(r; p) where r is the number of random variables and p is the
probability that a new pairing with unbeaten individuals happens. Hence, we
find that Y = x6 + x7 has a negative binomial distribution with pdf
P [Y = y] =
(
1
2
)2(
1
2
)y
(y + 1) (2.14)
We can now calculate
P [Y1 = y1] =
y1∑
x3=0
P (X3 = x3)P (Y = y1 − x3)(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)x3 (1
2
)2(
1
2
)y1−x3
(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)x3 (1
2
)y1 (1
2
)−x3
(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
16
)(
1
2
)x3 (1
2
)y1
(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
16
)(
1
2
)x3 (1
2
)y1 (1
2
)y1 (1
2
)−y1
(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)y1 (1
2
)x3−y1
(y1 − x3 + 1)
=
y1∑
x3=0
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)y1
2y1−x3(y1 − x3 + 1)
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=
y1∑
k=0
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)y1
2k(k + 1) (2.15)
where k = y1 − x3.
In order to calculate (2.15) we need to first calculate the sum
y1∑
k=0
2k(k+1) and
then substitute into (2.15). Doing this we have
y1∑
k=0
2k(k + 1) =
y1∑
k=0
tk(k + 1)
=
y1∑
k=0
d
dt
(tk+1)
=
d
dt
(t) +
d
dt
(t2) + ...+
d
dt
(ty1) +
d
dt
(ty1+1)
=
d
dt
(t+ t2 + ...+ ty1 + t
y1+1)
=
d
dt
[
1− ty1+1
1− t
]
=
1
(1− t2)
[
1− ty1+2 − (y1 + 2)t
y1+1 + (y1 + 2)t
y1+2
]
=
1
(1− t)2
[
1 + (y1 + 1)t
y1+2 − (y1 + 2)t
y1+1
]
(2.16)
where t = 2.
Evaluating (2.16) for t=2 we have
y1∑
k=0
2k(k + 1) = 1 + (y1 + 1)2
y1+2 − (y1 + 2)2
y1+1. (2.17)
Now we substitute (2.17) into (2.15) and obtain:
P [Y1 = y1] =
y1∑
k=0
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)y1
2k(k + 1)
=
(
3
16
)(
1
4
)y1 [
1 + (y1 + 1)2
y1+2 − (y1 + 2)2
y1+1
]
=
(
3
4
)
1
4
(
1
4
)y1 [
1 + (y1 + 1)2
y1+2 − (y1 + 2)2
y1+1
]
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1 [
1 + (y1 + 1)2
y1+2 − (y1 + 2)2
y1+1
]
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=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1 [
1 + (y1 + 1)2
y1+12− (y1 + 1 + 1)2
y1+1
]
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+
(
3
2
)
(y1 + 1)
(
1
2
)y1+1
−
3
4
(y1 + 1)
(
1
2
)y1+1
−
(
3
4
(
1
2
)y1+1
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+
(
3
4
)
(y1 + 1)
(
1
2
)y1+1
−
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1
.
Finally we can calculate:
∑
y1P [Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1]. (2.18)
We know that Z1 ∼ Geo (3/4) so we can write P (Z1 > Y1)=(1/4)
y1+1. Thus
equation (2.18) can be calculated as follows
∞∑
y1=0
y1P [Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1] =
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1)P (Z1 > Y1)
=
∞∑
y1=0
y1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1](1
4
)y1+1
=
∞∑
y1=0
y1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2y1+2
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
8
)y1+1]
=
∞∑
y1=0
[
y1
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2y1+2
+
(
3
4
)(
1
8
)y1+1
y21
]
=
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=0
y1
(
1
4
)2y1+2
+
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=0
(
1
8
)y1+1
y21
=
592
25725
. (2.19)
So far we have calculated the second sum in equation (2.12), and now we
calculate the first sum which is
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1). (2.20)
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First we need to evaluate P (Z1 = z1).
We have P (Z1 = z1) = (3/4) (1/4)
z1 because Z1 ∼ Geo (3/4). Thus we have
P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1) = P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1
P (Y1 = y1)
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)z1 ∞∑
y1=z1
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)z1 (3
4
) ∞∑
y1=z1
(
1
4
)y1+1
+
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=z1
y1
(
1
2
)y1+1
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)z1
[
(
3
4
)(
1
3
)(
1
4
)z1
+
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)z1
(z1 + 1)
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)(2z1+1)
+
(
9
16
)(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 1). (2.21)
Substituting (2.21) into (2.20) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1) =
∞∑
z1=0
z1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2z1+1
+
(
9
16
)(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 1)
]
=
(
3
4
) ∞∑
z1=0
z1
(
1
4
)2z1+1
+
(
9
16
) ∞∑
z1=0
z1(z1 + 1)
(
1
8
)z1
=
(
3
4
)
·
(
4
225
)
+
(
9
16
)
·
(
128
343
)
=
5743
25725
. (2.22)
Substituting (2.19) and (2.22) into (2.12) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 < Y1) +
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1 and Z1 > Y1)
=
5743
25725
+
592
25725
=
181
735
≈ 0.2463.
This means that the average number of wins of the third place in the first
branch of the tree is 0.2463. We will repeat the same procedure for the other
five branches in order to find the average number of wins of the third place.
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Number of wins for the third position in the second branch
In the second branch the second place has Y2 = 2 + x1 + x4 + x5 wins. We
have that x1 has the same form as x3; they are both geometrically distributed
with the same probability p. Also x4 and x5 are of the same form as x6 and x7
respectively. Thus Y1 = x1+x4+x5 = x3+x6+x7. This means that the number
of wins of the second place is then 2 + Y1.
The third place has Z2 = x2 = Z1 wins, which is the same as in the first branch
of the tree.
Again, we are interested to calculate equation (2.11) which in this branch be-
comes
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1+2)+
∞∑
y1=0
(y1+2)P [Y1+2 = y1+2 and Z1 > Y1+2].
(2.23)
As in the first branch, we first calculate
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)P [Y1 + 2 = y1 + 2 and Z1 > Y1 + 2] (2.24)
and we have
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)P [Y1 + 2 = y1 + 2 and Z1 > Y1 + 2]
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)P [Y1 + 2 = y1 + 2]P [Z1 > Y1 + 2]
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)P (Y1 = y1)
(
1
4
)y1+3
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1](1
4
)y1+3
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2y1+4
+
(
3
16
)(
1
8
)y1+1
y1
]
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=
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)
(
1
4
)2y1+4
+
(
3
64
) ∞∑
y1=0
y1(y1 + 2)
(
1
8
)y1+1
=
3
4
·
31
3600
+
3
64
·
23
343
=
247
25725
≈ 0.0096. (2.25)
Secondly we calculate the rest of equation (2.23) which is:
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 2). (2.26)
In order to calculate (2.26) we find first P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 2). We have
P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 2)
= P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1−2
P (Y1 + 2 = y1 + 2)
= P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1−2
P (Y1 = y1)
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)z1 ∞∑
y1=z1−2
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=z1−2
y
(
1
2
)y1+1]
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)z1 [(3
4
)(
1
3
)(
1
4
)z1−2
+
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)z1−2
(z1 − 1)
]
=
(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2z1−1
+
(
9
4
)(
1
8
)z1
(z1 − 1). (2.27)
Now we substitute equation (2.27) into equation (2.26) and obtain
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 2)
=
∞∑
z1=0
z1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2z1−1
+
(
9
4
)(
1
8
)z1
(z1 − 1)
]
=
(
3
4
) ∞∑
z1=0
z1
(
1
4
)2z1−1
+
(
9
4
) ∞∑
z1=0
z1(z1 − 1)
(
1
8
)z1
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=
(
3
4
)
·
(
64
225
)
+
(
9
4
)
·
(
16
343
)
=
8188
25725
≈ 0.31829. (2.28)
Finally we substitute equation (2.24) and equation (2.28) into equation (2.23)
and we have
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 2) +
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 2)P (Y1 + 2 = y1 + 2 and Z1 > Y1 + 2)
=
8188
25725
+
247
25725
=
241
735
≈ 0.32789.
Thus the average number of wins of the third place in the second branch of the
tree is 0.32789.
Number of wins for the third position in the third branch
As in the previous branches, in this branch as well we calculate the average
number of wins for the third place, which is found by equation (2.11). In the
third branch, the second place has Y3 = x3 + x6 + x7=Y1 wins, which is the
same as in the first branch. The third place has Z3 = 1 + x1 = 1 + Z1 wins,
because x1 and x2 are both geometrically distributed with probability p = 3/4.
Thus equation (2.11) in the third branch becomes:
∞∑
z1=0
(z1+1)P [Z1+1 = z1+1 and Z1+1 ≤ Y1]+
∞∑
y1=0
y1P [Y1 = y1 and Z1+1 > Y1]
(2.29)
where Z1=z1 and Y1 = x3 + x6 + x7.
Again we see the two sums in (2.29) separately and then add them together.
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We start by calculating
∞∑
y1=0
y1P [Y1 = y1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1] =
∞∑
y1=0
y1P (Y1 = y1)P (Z1 + 1 > Y1)
=
∞∑
y1=0
y1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
(
3
4
)(
1
2
)y1+1](1
4
)y1
=
∞∑
y1=0
y1
[(
3
4
)(
1
4
)2y1+1
+ y1
(
3
8
)(
1
8
)y1]
=
(
3
4
) ∞∑
y1=0
y1
(
1
4
)2y1+1
+
(
3
8
) ∞∑
y1=0
y21
(
1
8
)y1
=
3
4
·
4
225
+
3
8
·
72
343
=
2368
25725
≈ 0.09205. (2.30)
Next we calculate
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1]. (2.31)
First we work out the value of
P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1].
which is
P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1] = P (Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1)
∞∑
y1=z1+1
P (Y1 = y1)
= P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1+1
P (Y1 + y1)
=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1 ∞∑
y1=z1+1
[
3
4
(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
3
4
(
1
2
)y1+1]
=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1 [3
4
∞∑
y1=z1+1
(
1
4
)y1+1
+
3
4
∞∑
y1=z1+1
y1
(
1
2
)y1+1]
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=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1
[
3
4
·
1
3
(
1
4
)z1+1
+
3
4
(
1
2
)z1+1
(z1 + 2)
=
3
4
(
1
2
)2z1+2
+
9
32
(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 2). (2.32)
Now we substitute (2.32) into (2.31) and obtain
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P (Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1]
=
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)2z1+2
+
9
32
(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 2)
]
=
3
4
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)
(
1
4
)2z1+2
+
9
32
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)(z1 + 2)
(
1
8
)z1
=
3
4
·
16
225
+
9
32
·
1024
343
=
22972
25725
≈ 0.89298. (2.33)
Now that we have calculated (2.30) and (2.33) separately, we substitute them
in (2.29) and have
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1] +
∞∑
y1=0
y1P [Y1 = y1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1]
=
22972
25725
+
2368
25725
=
724
735
≈ 0.985.
Thus the average number of wins of the third place in the third branch of the
tree is 0.985.
Number of wins for the third position in the fourth branch
In the fourth branch of the tree, the second place has Y4 = 1 + x2 + x4 + x5 =
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1 + Y1 wins, because x2 + x4 + x5 = x3 + x6 + x7 = Y1. The third place has
Z4 = 1 + x1 = 1 + Z1 wins.
Then, equation (2.11) that calculates the average number of wins of the third
place, in this branch becomes:
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1]+
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1]. (2.34)
Again as on the previous branches, we calculate the two sums in (2.34) sepa-
rately and add them together.
First let us evaluate the value of
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1]; (2.35)
we have
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1]
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P (Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1)P (Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1)
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P (Y1 = y1)P (Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1)·
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
3
4
(
1
2
)y1+1](1
4
)y1+1
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)2y1+2
+ y1
3
4
(
1
8
)y1+1]
=
3
4
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
(
1
4
)2y1+2
+
3
4
∞∑
y1=0
y1(y1 + 1)
(
1
8
)y1+1
=
3
4
·
16
225
+
3
4
·
16
343
=
2272
25725
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≈ 0.08832. (2.36)
Now we evaluate the second part of (2.34) which is
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1]. (2.37)
In order to calculate (2.37) we first find the value of
P (Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1] (2.38)
and we have
P (Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1]
= P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1
P (Y1 = y1)
=
3
4
(
1
4
)2z1+1
+
9
16
(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 1). (2.39)
Substituting (2.39) into (2.37) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1]
=
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)2z1+1
+
9
16
(
1
8
)z1
(z1 + 1)
]
=
3
4
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)
(
1
4
)2z1+1
+
9
16
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)
2
(
1
8
)z1
=
3
4
·
64
225
+
9
16
·
576
343
=
29788
25725
≈ 1.15794. (2.40)
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Substituting (2.36) and (2.40) into (2.34) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
(z1 + 1)P [Z1 + 1 = z1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 ≤ Y1 + 1]
+
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 + 1 > Y1 + 1]
=
29788
25725
+
2272
25725
=
916
735
≈ 1.2463. (2.41)
Thus the average number of wins of the third place in the fourth branch of the
tree is 1.2463.
Number of wins for the third position in the fifth branch
In the fifth branch, the second place has Y5 = 1+x1+x6+x7 = 1+Y1 wins. The
third place here has Z5 = x3 = Z1 wins. Proceeding exactly as in the previous
branches, what we need to calculate is
∞∑
z1=0
z1P [Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1+1]+
∞∑
y1=0
(y1+1)P [Y1+1 = y1+1 and Z1 > Y1+1].
(2.42)
Let us first start by calculation the second sum of (2.42) which is as follows:
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 > Y1 + 1]
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P (Y1 = y1)P (Z1 > Y1 + 1)
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
3
4
(
1
2
)y1+1](1
4
)y1+2
=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
[
3
4
(
1
4
)2y1+3
+ y1
3
16
(
1
8
)y1+1]
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=
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)
(
1
4
)2y1+3
+
3
16
∞∑
y1=0
y1(y1 + 1)
(
1
8
)y1+1
=
3
4
·
4
225
+
3
16
·
16
343
=
568
25725
≈ 0.0221. (2.43)
The first sum of (2.42) is
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 1). (2.44)
First we calculate
P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 1) = P (Z1 = z1)
∞∑
y1=z1−1
P (Y1 = y1)
=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1 ∞∑
y1=z1−1
[
3
4
(
1
4
)y1+1
+ y1
3
4
(
1
2
)y1+1]
=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1 [3
4
∞∑
y1=z1−1
(
1
4
)y1+1
+
3
4
∞∑
y1=z1−1
y1
(
1
2
)y1+1]
=
3
4
(
1
4
)z1 [3
4
·
1
3
(
1
4
)z1−1
+
3
4
(
1
2
)z1−1
z1
]
=
3
4
(
1
4
)2z1
+
9
8
(
1
8
)z1
z1. (2.45)
Substituting (2.45) into (2.44) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (Z1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 1) =
∞∑
z1=0
z1
[
3
4
(
1
4
)2z1
+
9
8
(
1
8
)z1
z1
]
=
3
4
∞∑
z1=0
z1
(
1
4
)2z1
+
9
8
∞∑
z1=0
(z1)
2
(
1
8
)z1
=
3
4
·
16
225
+
9
8
·
72
343
. (2.46)
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Substituting (2.43) and (2.46) into (2.42) we obtain
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (X1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 1) +
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 > Y1 + 1]
=
7447
25725
+
568
25725
=
229
735
(≈ 0.3116). (2.47)
Thus the average number of wins of the third place in the fifth branch of the
tree is equal to 0.3116.
Number of wins for the third position in the sixth branch
In the sixth branch, the second place has Y6 = 1 + x1 + x6 + x7 = 1 + Y1 wins.
The third place has Z6 = x3 = Z1 wins. We notice that the number of wins of
the second and third place in this branch is the same as the number of wins of
the second and the third place in the fifth branch. Thus the average number of
wins for the third place is
∞∑
z1=0
z1P (X1 = z1 and Z1 ≤ Y1 + 1) +
∞∑
y1=0
(y1 + 1)P [Y1 + 1 = y1 + 1 and Z1 > Y1 + 1]
=
229
735
(≈ 0.3116).
Having found the average number of wins for the third place in every branch of
Table 2.2, we can now calculate the average number of wins over all branches
and this is 181+241+724+916+229+229
735
· 1
6
=4
7
(≈ 0.5714).
Thus the average number of wins of the third place in a group of 4 individuals
equally able to win a fight in a situation when only the loser effect is present is
equal to 0.5714.
We can now calculate the number of wins for the second place, because we
have the combined number of wins of the second and third place given in equa-
tion (2.10). Then, the average number of wins of the second placed individual
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is 23
6
− 4
7
=137
42
(≈ 3.2619).
2.3.2.1 Nonlinearity due to ties in the final positions
The number of wins in Table 2.1 are an average over 10,000 simulations, and
in fact the simulations do not always yield linear hierarchies. The fact that
in every case they sometimes do, is enough to demonstrate linearity on aver-
age. Nonlinearity in real dominance hierarchies can occur through a number
of bottom-ranked individuals having equivalent (lack of) status, and this can
also happen in our model. We now consider the probability of having a unique
last-placed individual when only the loser effect is in place (this is the simplest
case as we get the same structure for different values of the loser effect), and
observe the large probability of ties here. The set of all possible structures with
at least two individuals with zero wins will be denoted by A. When an indi-
vidual has lost a contest in this version of our model, it will always concede
any subsequent contest. Thus if our population enters the set A it can never
leave it, and the final dominance hierarchy will not have a unique last-placed
individual. We denote all final hierarchies not in A as the set B.
The first encounter will give us a winner denoted byW and a loser denoted
by L(0) where L(0) stands for a loser with 0 wins. This leads to a state of
the population SWL(0) (in our notation we list the individuals that have fought,
omitting any individual that has not engaged in a contest). Conditional on the
next fight not being between the two existing individuals, we have either:
1) A new individual fights the original loser and wins. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWWL(0) with a probability 2/5.
2) A new individual fights the original winner and loses. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWL(0)L(0), an element of the set A, with a probability 1/5.
3) A new individual fights the original winner and wins. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWL(+)L(0) with a probability 1/5, where L(+) denotes a loser that
has won a previous contest (the original winner).
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4) The next fight is between the two new individuals. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWWL(0)L(0), an element of A, with a probability 1/5.
Similar working from the states SWWL(0) and SWL(+)L(0) yields the transi-
tion diagram from Figure 2.6. Adding all the above probabilities for the four
cases, we obtain the final probability of ending up in state A, as opposed to B,
as 11/20. Thus the probability of finishing in a hierarchy with a unique last-
placed individual, in set B, is 9/20. Note that this does not necessarily mean
that in this case we have a linear hierarchy, because we might have a tie be-
tween the second and the third place (note that this is another way for linearity
on average not to translate to linearity in every simulation).
Figure 2.6: Transition probabilities between states for N = 4. A represents a
structure with two losers with zero wins, W is a winner that has not yet lost a
fight, L(+) is a previous winner that has now lost, L(0) is a loser with no wins
and B represent all final structures with only one loser with zero wins.
The case when N=5
Now we increase the group size from 4 to 5. We have the same possibilities as
when N = 4. Thus starting with SWL(0) and conditional upon the next fights
not being between the two existing individuals we have either:
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1) A new individual fights the original loser and wins. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWWL(0) with a probability 1/3.
2) A new individual fights the original winner and loses. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWL(0)L(0), an element of the set A, with a probability (3/9)(1/2) =
(1/6) , where 3/9 is the probability for a new individual to meet the previous
winner and 1/2 is the probability of winning.
3) A new individual fights the original winner and wins. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWL(+)L(0) with a probability 1/6.
4) The next fight is between the two new individuals. This means that
SWL(0) 7→ SWWL(0)L(0), an element of A, with a probability 1/3.
Similar working from the states SWWL(0) and SWL(+)L(0) yields the transition di-
agram from Figure 2.7. Adding all the above probabilities for the four cases, we
obtain the final probability of ending up in state A, as opposed to B, as 0.234.
Thus the probability of finishing in a hierarchy with a unique last-placed indi-
vidual, in set B, is 0.234. As expected, we notice that when the group size is
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Figure 2.7: Transition probabilities between states for N = 5. A represents a
structure with two losers with zero wins, W is a winner that has not yet lost a
fight, L(+) is a previous winner that has now lost, L(0) is a loser with no wins
and B represent all final structures with only one loser with zero wins.
increased, the probability of everyone scoring except for the last placed indi-
vidual, decreases.
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General group size N
In general from the state Sα,β,1, where α=number of winners W, β=number
of L(+)’s and 1 means that we have one loser with zero, L(0), we can go to 4
different possible states as shown in Figure 2.8. Thus for example if we start
 �     ,     ,  
  
                                                                           
      2                        
 
                                  
                                                                        �     , ,                                               � , ,                                                          � ,     ,    
 
                                                                            
                           2 2  
           
 
Figure 2.8: Possible states with the corresponding transition proba-
bilities, where R =
α(α− 1)
2
+ (N − α − β − 1)(α + β + 1) +
(N − α− β − 1)(N − α− β − 2)
2
.
from the state SWL(0) which is the result of the first contest between 2 random
individuals in a population of size N, in the next round of fights we can go to
state SWWL(0) , state SWL(+)L(0) and state A with the corresponding transition
probabilities given in Figure 2.8. In the first round of the pairwise interactions
we have α=1, β=0.
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2.3.3 Analysis of the temporal change in RHP
In this section we analyse the temporal dynamic of the change in overlap νxy(t),
x, y = 1, . . . , 4, x 6= y, t ≥ 1 of the probability distributions of the four ranks at
time t. For the sake of brevity we present the results for only one combination
of the winner and loser effect in three different situations: i. only the loser
effect is present in the population, ii. only the winner effect is present and iii.
both effects are present.
2.3.3.1 The loser effect only
Figure 2.9 shows the probability distributions of the four ranks at time t = 500
when W = 0, L = 0.1 and Figure 2.10 the corresponding areas of overlap
νxy(t), ∀ t ≤ 500. There is a clear first place individual if only the loser effect
is present (we reached the same conclusion when analysing the average num-
ber of wins). Further, the second and the fourth place are distinguishable as
ν24(t) decreases below the threshold point 0.1 (see Figure 2.10 and again the
same conclusion could be drawn on the basis of Table 2.1). However, Figure
2.9 shows clearly that the second to fourth place individuals all appear close
in RHP in comparison to the dominant first individual. The areas of overlaps
ν23(t) and ν34(t) are almost the same and the pairs corresponding to these over-
laps are not distinguishable. The RHP of the top individual stays unchanged,
equal to RHPinitial, meaning that the top individual has a distribution which
takes the value 10 with probability 1. Its RHP at time t = 500 over 10,000
simulations is shown by the vertical line x = log(10) (Figure 2.9).
Due to the discrete nature of the RHP , it is possible in the very early time
steps that the overlap ν can decrease below 0.1 and then increase above 0.1
again (as mentioned previously) several times, but this never happens later on
(in practice; theoretically this would be possible), and a dominance event is
defined as the time when two individuals became distinguishable in this way
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Figure 2.9: Probability distribution for the second, third, forth place individuals
forW = 0 and L = 0.1 at t = 500. The probability distribution for the first place
individual is represented by the vertical line (x = log(10)) because it’s RHP
stays unchanged.
for the last time. The obtained temporal dynamic in the change of the area of
overlap allows us to ask when (meaning after how many fights) the dominance
hierarchy is established, i.e. when the last domination event occurs.
We cannot calculate the overlap between the top individual and the other in-
dividuals in the same way, as the RHP of the top individual stays unchanged
at 10. In this case we say that the top individual will be distinguishable from
the second placed individual when the 90% quantile of the distribution of the
RHP of the second individual is less than 10 (i.e. we effectively consider the
probability of the second placed individual to be 10 as the overlap). The same
method will be used to distinguish the top individual from the third and the
fourth placed individuals. For the time of domination events of other pairs of
individuals, the overlap concept will be used. In the case considered the hierar-
chy is established quite early; 11 fights are needed for the first and the second
place to become distinguishable, which is the final domination event.
It should be noted that this overlap criterion is possibly a rather conservative
measure. It is based upon the comparison between randomly selected second
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Figure 2.10: Time course of the corresponding area of overlap νxy(t), x =
2, 3, 4, y = 3, 4 when W = 0 and L = 0.1. ν23(t) and ν34(t) overlap with each
other. The overlap between the top individual and the other individuals be-
comes close to 0 very quickly.
place and third place individuals, whereas in a real hierarchy there would be a
pair of individuals in the second and third places, for example. The values of
their RHP will not be independent, and are likely to be negatively correlated;
the better the second place does, the more likely the third place would do
worse. Increasing the loser effect does not make any change in domination
events as we obtain the same structure.
2.3.3.2 The winner effect only
Now we consider the situation where only the winner effect is present and
assume W = 0.1 and L = 0. We know from Table 2.1 that in this situation all
individuals have a clear position in the hierarchy and this result is confirmed by
Figures 2.11 and 2.12. It is clear that the area of overlap νxy(t) falls below 0.1
for all combinations of x and y and we are interested in when the domination
event occurs.
We note that at the start the RHP of the different individuals can only take
some discrete values causing the fluctuations of the area of overlap (see Figure
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Figure 2.11: Probability distribution for the 4 individuals in the non-updated
model when W = 0.3 and L = 0
2.12). Further, from Figure 2.12 we observe that the final domination event
occurs quite late. The last domination event occurs between the second and
the third place individuals, which finally become distinguishable at time point
t = 395. Hence roughly 400 fights are enough to specify the place of each
individual in the hierarchy. Increasing the winner effect in the absence of the
loser effect does greatly decrease the time needed to establish a hierarchy. The
times of domination event for different values of the winner effect are shown
in Table 2.3
2.3.3.3 Winner and Loser effects
In this analysis we assume that both the winner and loser effect are present
and possess the valuesW = 0.3 and L = 0.2. We know from the matrix of wins
given in Table 2.1 that the third place individual scores an average of approxi-
mately one win, whereas the last individual never wins (as it is the first one to
lose and retreats afterwards). Thus the third and the fourth place individuals
are expected to have almost identical RHP , confirmed by Figures 2.13 and
2.14. The overlapping probability distributions are concentrated around low
values. We further observe that the first place individual is clearly distinguish-
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Figure 2.12: Time course of the corresponding area of overlap νxy(t), x, y =
1, . . . , 4, x 6= y, when W = 0.1 and L = 0.
able from the others. Interestingly, the RHP of the second place individual
has a bi-modal distribution. This implies that sometimes (in most cases) the
second place individual is distinguishable from the third, and sometimes it is
not. This phenomenon is caused by the outcomes of the very early interactions:
through “bad luck” the second place individual can lose sufficiently many early
fights and its RHP fall below 10 (implying that it will never fight another con-
test again), or it can win sufficiently many early fights and its RHP will never
fall below 10. Whether an individual will be in a given part of the bi-modal
distribution is thus determined in the early contests.
Based on Figure 2.14 we conclude that the second and the fourth places
are distinguishable as ν24(t) < 0.1 from a very early time. The second and
the third place individuals appear to be clearly different based on the analysis
of the average number of wins, with the second place individual doing much
better, but the area of the overlap ν23(t) decreases only to 0.18 (at t = 45)
and then stays unchanged. This means that for 82% of hierarchies they are
clearly different and for 18% they are effectively the same. These values (18%
and 82%) correspond to the right and left area of the bi-modal distribution,
respectively. We note that this result contradicts the claim of repeatability for
79
Modelling Dominance Hierarchies Under Winner and Loser Effects
−80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
log(RHP)
Pd
f a
t T
=5
00
 
 
4th
3rd
2nd
1st
Figure 2.13: Probability distribution functions for the 4 individuals in the non-
updated model when W = 0.3 and L = 0.2 at t = 500.
the simulations from [42] as different individual simulations will yield very
different results. In general in this type of winner-loser model, this only occurs
when there is bimodality in one of the individuals; in all of our cases the second
individual out of four, though it is possible for very large winner effects for
this to happen for the third individual. In hierarchies with more individuals,
theoretically this could happen for any individual except the first or the last.
The last pair of individuals to become distinguishable is the first and the
second place, and this happens at t = 47 (the time of the final domination
event). Summarizing, when both the winner and loser effect are present, the
first place individual always becomes distinguishable. ForW = 0.3 and L = 0.2
the second place individual has a bi-modal distribution. In general however,
if the ratio between the loser and the winner effect is sufficiently large then
the bi-modal shape disappears (individuals will eventually have RHP under
10), but as the ratio becomes smaller, a small upper area appears, which is of
increasing size the smaller the ratio. The times of all of the domination events
for different combinations of winner and loser effects are shown in Table 2.3.
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Figure 2.14: Area of overlap νxy over time when W = 0.3 and L = 0.2. ν13(t)
and ν14(t) become close to 0 very quickly, and so are close to the x-axis
2.4 Results for the updated model with perfect as-
sessment
We will now consider the hierarchy structures which emerge when each indi-
vidual is aware not only of its own RHP through time, but likewise that of its
opponent. This corresponds to η = 0 in [44]. All other features of the model
are the same as in the previous section.
2.4.1 Analysis of the average number of wins
We start by analysing the average number of wins in the updated model. Table
2.4 shows the matrices of wins for W,L = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3. We observe that for
every combination ofW and L linear hierarchies are established. The strength
of the winner and the loser effects do not have any significant influence on
the number of wins of the first, second and third place individuals; they only
affect the last place. This individual always scores zero when only the winner
effect is present, but generally scores something when the loser effect or both
effects are operating. This is the opposite behaviour that we get from the non-
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W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
T12 = 328
T13 = 15
T14 = 1
T23 = 395
T24 = 29
T34 = 373
T12 = 169
T13 = 8
T14 = 1
T23 = 204
T24 = 26
T34 = 196
T12 = 115
T13 = 4
T14 = 1
T23 = 153
T24 = 27
T34 = 136
L = 0.1
T12 = 11
T13 = 9
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
T12 = 74
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 800
T34 =∞
T12 = 82
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 207
T24 =∞
T34 =∞
T12 = 67
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 109
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
L = 0.2
T12 = 11
T13 = 9
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
T12 = 28
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 679
T34 =∞
T12 = 39
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 =∞
T34 =∞
T12 = 47
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
L = 0.3
T12 = 11
T13 = 9
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
T12 = 19
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
T12 = 32
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
T12 = 30
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 =∞
T24 = 1
T34 =∞
Table 2.3: The times of the domination events for the non-updated model with
θ = 1 and various values of W and L. Txy is the (final) time when νxy(t) falls
below 0.1.
updated model. In Figure 2.15 we plot the total average number of wins for
each position in the hierarchy for different combinations of W and L.
2.4.2 Analysis of the temporal change in RHP
Following the same process as in the non-updated model, in this section we
analyse the RHP values of all individuals. Firstly and in accordance with the
results obtained above, we observe that for all combinations of W and L, all
ranks in the hierarchy are distinguishable (see Figures 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19,
2.20 and 2.21). Additionally we calculate the final time when the dominance
hierarchy is established and find three different outcomes depending onW and
L values.
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W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
− 164.07 165.79 166.04
1.01 − 163.39 164.74
0.12 0.46 − 163.38
0 0 0 −
− 164.09 165.72 166.18
1.01 − 163.38 164.72
0.11 0.47 − 163.33
0 0 0 −
− 164.04 165.82 166.12
1.01 − 163.41 164.66
0.12 0.46 − 163.34
0 0 0 −
L = 0.1
− 163.38 164.76 166.10
0 − 163.21 165.84
0 0.48 − 164.15
0 0.11 0.99 −
− 163.85 165.33 166.48
0.10 − 163.60 165.26
0.0048 0.15 − 163.99
0.0004 0.01 0.19 −
− 163.92 165.35 166.58
0.26 − 163.59 165.28
0.01 0.16 − 163.77
0.0002 0.003 0.06 −
− 164.04 165.41 166.62
0.36 − 163.39 165.28
0.02 0.18 − 163.64
0.0001 0.001 0.03 −
L = 0.2
− 163.44 164.69 166.06
0 − 163.37 165.74
0 0.46 − 164.14
0 0.11 1 −
− 163.81 165.17 166.68
0.03 − 163.44 165.33
0.001 0.18 − 163.99
0.0001 0.02 0.35 −
− 163.84 165.20 166.58
0.1 − 163.65 165.30
0.005 0.15 − 163.96
0.0003 0.01 0.20 −
− 163.93 165.27 166.56
0.19 − 163.59 165.29
0.01 0.15 − 163.85
0.0004 0.004 0.10 −
L = 0.3
− 163.37 164.67 166.10
0 − 163.37 165.82
0 0.46 − 164.08
0 0.11 1.01 −
− 163.64 165.17 166.68
0.01 − 163.37 165.44
0.0002 0.21 − 163.98
0.0001 0.03 0.46 −
− 163.88 165.24 166.49
0.06 − 163.58 165.35
0.004 0.17 − 163.94
0.0003 0.01 0.27 −
− 163.89 165.23 166.58
0.08 − 163.58 165.32
0.004 0.15 − 163.89
0.003 0.01 0.0.23 −
Table 2.4: Matrices of wins W in the updated model for different strength of
the winner and loser effect (W = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3 and L = 0; 0.1; 0.2; 0.3), N = 4,
θ = 1 and 1000 aggressive interactions.
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Figure 2.15: The total average number of wins for positions 1, 2, 3 and 4 for
W = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and L = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 in the updated model as given in
Table 2.4. Note that all of the plots for these combinations are overlapping and
thus are represented by a single line.
When only the winner effect is present (Figure 2.16 and 2.17), on average
41 fights are necessary to establish a linear hierarchy. After this nothing new
happens to the hierarchy and the rank of the individuals. The last domination
event between a pair of individuals is that between the second and the third
place individuals. We note that the value ofW does not have any effect on the
time to establish the hierarchy.
We obtained a similar pattern when only the loser effect is present (Figure
2.18 and 2.19). Irrespective of the value of L the structure is established at the
point t = 44 and the last pair to become distinguishable are the second and
third place individuals.
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Figure 2.16: Probability distribution functions of RHP for the 4 individuals in
the updated model: t = 500, only W is present (L = 0).
Lastly, when winner and loser effects are both present in the population
at varying strengths, hierarchies are established latest at time point t = 32
(Figures 2.20 and 2.21). Again, as in the two cases above, the last pair to
become distinguishable are the second and third place individuals.
Table 2.5 shows the times of the dominance events between all pair of in-
dividuals for various values of winner and loser effects. In general, the best
scenario for fast hierarchy formation is when both the winner and loser effects
are present in a group of individuals as the dominance hierarchy is established
earlier than when only one is present. The first pair to become distinguishable
is the first and the fourth place individuals, whereas the last pair is again that of
the second and the third place individuals. This is the case for all the possible
values of the winner and loser effects. In the following we consider the influ-
ence of the fighting threshold θ on the dynamics of hierarchy formation. So far
we considered θ = 1 and from equation (1.18) it is clear that a lower fighting
threshold θ means that the number of possible fights is increased. When de-
creasing θ to 0.8 the qualitative dynamic of the updated model is unchanged
but the time needed to establish a dominance hierarchy is increased. In par-
ticular for 0 < W ≤ 0.2 and 0 < L ≤ 0.2, the final domination events occur
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Figure 2.17: νxy over time when only W is present. ν14(t) becomes close to 0
very quickly, and so is close to the x-axis.
later than for the situation with θ = 1. Once we increase the values of the win-
ner and loser effects, however, we notice that the time of the final domination
events do not differ much from the previous case when θ = 1.
The results obtained for the updated model hold also for larger groups.
Table 2.6 shows the time of the domination event for each pair in a group of 8
individuals. As expected the hierarchy is established much later compared to a
group of four individuals.
2.5 Results for the updated model with assessment
error
In this section we relax the assumption that an individual has perfect knowl-
edge of the RHP of its opponent. As described in Section 2.1 we assume that
an individual assesses an opponent with a real RHP of RHPy,t as having a
value of (1 + ε)RHPy,t, where ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and stan-
dard deviation 0.2 (truncated above at 1 and below at -1). This type of error
is somewhat different to that used in [44], who used uniformly distributed
intervals, although the results do not hugely depend upon the distribution of
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Figure 2.18: Probability distribution functions of RHP for the 4 individuals in
the updated model: t = 500, only L is present.
error used. In the following we again consider 4 individuals with an aggression
threshold θ = 1 and analyse the RHP through time. We note that the analysis
of the number of wins leads to similar results as in Section 2.4.1 and for brevity
we exclude this.
When θ = 1 and ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard de-
viation 0.2, linear hierarchies are formed for all combinations of W and L.
Even though the individuals can make only an approximate estimation of their
opponent’s RHP with a normally distributed error ε, this does not have any
significant effect on the linearity of the hierarchy. The only impact that ε has
is on the time to hierarchy establishment. In this case the individuals need to
interact more with each other (compared with the case when ε=0) in order to
establish a linear hierarchy.
We can conclude that ε stabilizes linear hierarchies, meaning that only a
little information about your opponents strength is necessary in order to es-
tablish a linear hierarchy. Lowering the aggression threshold leads to a similar
dynamic as described in Section 2.4. We still obtain linear hierarchies for all
combinations of W and L, however the time until the hierarchy is established
is increased. Table 2.7 shows that for θ = 0.8 and imperfect information, lin-
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Figure 2.19: νxy over time when only L is present. ν14(t) coincides with the
x-axis after t = 1.
ear hierarchies are achieved on all the analysed cases. The time of domination
events depends on the values of the winner and loser effects, with an increase
in the size of either effect generally reducing the time to the domination events.
Comparing this with the results of the updated model with θ = 1 and perfect
assessment from Table 2.5, we can see that the hierarchy generally takes longer
to be established, but that the difference is not large. This is a cumulative effect
of making individuals more aggressive by reducing θ and reducing the accuracy
of their information; when we make one of these changes only, we find times
between those from the two extremes (we have omitted tables corresponding
to these cases).
Summarizing, in this section we showed that using the updated model with
different levels of accuracy, linear hierarchies are always achievable. When
individuals have perfect information about their opponent’s RHP , the linear
hierarchy is established earlier than when they overestimate or underestimate
their opponents. More interactions are necessary in the second case, but after
a certain point in time (depending on the values of the winner and the loser
effects) the hierarchy is stabilized. When we lowered the aggression threshold,
the linear hierarchies were established later than in the first two cases. We
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Figure 2.20: Probability distribution functions of RHP for the 4 individuals in
the updated model: t = 500, both W and L are present.
can conclude that the updated model with different levels of accuracy always
produces linear hierarchies. The time when these are established depends upon
the level of information that individuals have about others in the group, and
upon the value of the aggression threshold, where the higher the threshold and
the smaller the error, the shorter the time to hierarchy formation.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter we explored how winner and loser effects influence domi-
nance hierarchy formation using a simulation based model developed first in
Dugatkin [42] and Dugatkin & Dugatkin [44]. We considered two main situ-
ations: the non-updated model, when an individual has no information about
the current resource holding potential (RHP ) of its opponent, and the updated
model, when an individual can estimate the RHP of its opponent with various
levels of accuracy. We built on the model of [42] and [44] by providing a more
complete analysis of the non-updated and updated model. All of our results
are based on 10,000 simulations rather than one single realisation. In partic-
ular we developed new statistical measures for the time when a dominance
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Figure 2.21: νxy through time when both W and L are present. ν13(t), ν14(t)
and ν24(t) become close to 0 very quickly, and so are close to the x-axis.
hierarchy is established.
These methods include a more detailed analysis of large numbers of in-
teractions and an extension of the classical idea of the index of linearity K
(developed by Kendall [68]) to this general number of interactions. An impor-
tant consideration was the time to establishment of the hierarchy, and we have
introduced a new measure to distinguish pairs of individuals, and to establish
when dominance has been achieved. We have then been able to find when
our hierarchy has been established for each of the different models that we
consider, and make comparisons between them.
The values of the index of linearityK are perhaps exaggerated as a measure
because high scores looks like they predict high linearity, when the reality can
be more complex. We have used fractions of interactions experienced by one
individual over the others where it has emerged as the winner, but this ratio
is not the only important aspect, the absolute values of the number of wins is
potentially important as well. For example the ratio 20/2 indicates more dis-
tinguishability between two individuals scoring 20 and 2 wins, than the ratio
2/0.2 for those with 2 and 0.2 wins. These low numbers can indicate an av-
eraging which can include hierarchies with indistinguishable final individuals,
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W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
T12 = 22
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 40
T24 = 5
T34 = 16
T12 = 22
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 41
T24 = 5
T34 = 17
T12 = 22
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 41
T24 = 5
T34 = 16
L = 0.1
T12 = 16
T13 = 5
T14 = 1
T23 = 44
T24 = 1
T34 = 24
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 30
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 31
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 31
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
L = 0.2
T12 = 16
T13 = 5
T14 = 1
T23 = 40
T24 = 1
T34 = 22
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 32
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 29
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 30
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
L = 0.3
T12 = 16
T13 = 5
T14 = 1
T23 = 41
T24 = 1
T34 = 22
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 32
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 30
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
T12 = 11
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 31
T24 = 1
T34 = 11
Table 2.5: The time of the domination events for the updated model with per-
fect estimation: θ = 1, various values of W and L. Txy is the (final) time when
νxy(t) falls below 0.1.
although even high numbers can be the result of bimodality in RHP . One pos-
sible (simplistic) solution is to add a baseline value of wins to all table entries
when calculating K, which necessarily will have a smaller effect, the larger the
number of decisive contests.
For the non-updated model we found different types of hierarchy formation
for each of the three main cases, although the values of the index of linearity
show that almost linear hierarchies are established. When only the winner
effect is present, each individual scores in the group, three of them with a
high number of wins, and all interactions lead to fights. It appears that this
structure is the simplest one and that it can be achieved quite early, however
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Individual 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 T12 =
782
T13 =
17
T14 = 5 T15 = 1 T16 = 1 T17 = 1 T18 = 1
2 T23 =
806
T24 =
29
T25 = 8 T26 = 3 T27 = 3 T28 = 3
3 T34 =
745
T35 =
48
T36 =
13
T37 = 6 T38 = 6
4 T45 =
635
T46 =
57
T47 =
10
T48 =
10
5 T56 =
522
T57 =
46
T58 =
18
6 T67 =
321
T68 =
34
7 T78 =
85
Table 2.6: The time of domination events between each pair of individuals in
the updated model with θ = 1 and perfect estimation: W = 0.1, L = 0 for a
group of size 8. Txy is the (final) time when νxy falls below 0.1.
our analysis of the RHP showed that up to 400 interactions are needed to
establish a linear hierarchy. When only the loser effect was present, the first
place individual scores a high number of wins, and all others a small number.
The analysis of the RHP through time showed that the overlap between the
second and the third place individuals is almost 0.4 which is much bigger than
the threshold 0.1 where we consider two individuals to be distinguishable. This
structure (with second and third positions indistinguishable) is established very
early compared with the case when only the winner effect is present, with only
11 possible interactions needed.
When both winner and loser effects are present we obtained a structure
where the first place is always clear with an individual who has a high number
of wins, and the second place individual has quite a high average number of
wins, with a high number of wins on some simulations and on other simula-
tions the number of wins does not differ much from the number of wins of the
third placed individual; this corresponds with the RHP analysis where the sec-
ond place individual often has a bimodal distribution of the RHP . This means
that different individual simulations will yield different results, where some-
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W = 0 W = 0.1 W = 0.2 W = 0.3
L = 0
T12 = 122
T13 = 4
T14 = 1
T23 = 151
T24 = 22
T34 = 134
T12 = 68
T13 = 4
T14 = 1
T23 = 91
T24 = 13
T34 = 78
T12 = 41
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 61
T24 = 9
T34 = 50
L = 0.1
T12 = 123
T13 = 18
T14 = 1
T23 = 137
T24 = 4
T34 = 110
T12 = 59
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 78
T24 = 1
T34 = 59
T12 = 33
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 51
T24 = 1
T34 = 38
T12 = 31
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 52
T24 = 1
T34 = 37
L = 0.2
T12 = 67
T13 = 14
T14 = 1
T23 = 77
T24 = 4
T34 = 58
T12 = 43
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 57
T24 = 1
T34 = 36
T12 = 25
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 44
T24 = 1
T34 = 27
T12 = 25
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 39
T24 = 1
T34 = 23
L = 0.3
T12 = 48
T13 = 9
T14 = 1
T23 = 58
T24 = 4
T34 = 40
T12 = 32
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 49
T24 = 1
T34 = 27
T12 = 22
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 39
T24 = 1
T34 = 20
T12 = 19
T13 = 1
T14 = 1
T23 = 35
T24 = 1
T34 = 17
Table 2.7: The time of domination events for the updated model with θ = 0.8
and imperfect estimation for various values of W and L. Txy is the (final) time
when νxy(t) falls below 0.1.
92
Modelling Dominance Hierarchies Under Winner and Loser Effects
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
0
200
400
600
800
1000
 
Lower rank individual
 
Higher rank individual
Ti
m
e 
of
 th
e 
do
m
in
at
io
n 
ev
en
t
rank 1 
rank 2 
rank 3
rank 4 
rank 5 
rank 6 
rank 7 
Figure 2.22: The time of domination events between each pair of individuals
in the updated model with θ = 1 and perfect estimation: W = 0.1, L = 0 for a
group of size 8. Txy is the (final) time when νxy falls below 0.1.
times the second place individual will be distinguishable from the third and
sometimes not (this partially contradicted previous results from [42]); which
occurs is decided very early in the process.
The non-updated model has some limitations as in reality the individuals
could potentially approximate what the average “strength” of another individ-
ual would be at a certain time and then use this estimation when deciding
whether to fight or retreat. If only the winner effect is in operation, for exam-
ple, then an individual may be able to estimate the rate of increase of RHP of
an average opponent just by considering the time elapsed, as the RHP of all
will tend to increase. Thus the updated model, with varying levels of accuracy,
is more realistic.
For the updated model, with perfect information of the strength of the oth-
ers, we conclude that a linear hierarchy is always established. The values of
the winner and loser effects, and whether they are considered alone or both to
be present in the group, do not have any influence on linearity. When the RHP
was analysed we calculated that the linear hierarchy is established at the time
t = 41 when only the winner effect is present, at time t = 32 when only the
loser effect is present and at t = 44 when both the winner and the loser effect
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are present. If individuals do not have perfect information about the strength
of their opponents, this does not have any real influence on the linearity (as
was shown previously by [44]). The only effect that it has is on the time when
these linear hierarchies are established. More interactions are needed in this
case than when individuals have perfect information about the RHP of others.
The same results are achieved when the aggression threshold θ is lowered from
1 to 0.8, when the establishment of the dominance hierarchy occurs later than
when θ=1. Thus, as long as individuals know something about the strength
of their opponents, a dominance hierarchy is always likely to be established
in this model, and the precise model parameters have only a relatively small
effect.
Our model thus predicts that for real biological populations, provided that
animals can estimate the strength of their groupmates (and this estimation
does not have to be accurate), then an unambiguous dominance hierarchy can
be established in a relatively small number of interactions. Thus if contests
are not too costly, and the group stays together for a sufficiently long time, a
linear hierarchy will be formed. We predict some variation, so that when infor-
mation is more reliable, or when loser effects dominate, the time to hierarchy
formation will be the shortest. For the group as a whole a short hierarchy for-
mation phase is of course beneficial, as risk of injury and lost time and energy
are minimised [116]. If animals cannot estimate their groupmates’ strength
at all, then our model predicts far longer periods of hierarchy formation of-
ten with less clear-cut results. It seems unreasonable, however, to assume that
even after a number of contests animals can possess so little information. Thus
it seems likely that, as often observed in real populations, linear hierarchies
should form relatively quickly. Of course it should be noted that many real
populations are more complex, with group membership in a state of flux, or
coalitions between group-mates (e.g. close relatives) ([37],[111]), and so of-
ten our idealised conditions will not apply.
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In the model analysed in this chapter, no strategic elements are consid-
ered. This is in contrast to other models of dominance hierarchy formation,
such as that of Broom and Cannings [23], where individuals differed in their
level of aggressiveness, and evolutionarily stable strategies were found. In the
following chapter we introduce such game theoretical elements to our winner
and loser models, considering strategic choices of the aggression threshold, for
instance (in conjunction to varying rewards and costs for winning or losing dif-
ferent types of contests, we note that in the current model there is no benefit
to not fighting, and individuals retreat at a certain threshold due to a loss of
confidence).
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Chapter 3
A Game-Theoretical Winner and
Loser Model of Dominance
Hierarchy Formation
3.1 Introduction
In [42] and [44] (as well as [73]), each individual had the same fixed level of
aggression; they would retreat for the same excess of the number of wins over
the number of losses. In this chapter we introduce game-theoretical elements
in the form of aggressiveness level into this model. The motivation behind this
is that in real populations, individuals behave in a more complex way. They can
adopt different strategies when deciding whether to fight or retreat as opposed
to adopting the same fixed strategy. We assume that each individual can choose
its own strategy, independent of their opponent’s strategy. We are particularly
interested in determining the appropriate level of the aggression threshold and
exploring whether a unique strategy, or mixture of strategies, emerges in the
population considered. Our model set up allows us to answer questions such as,
under what circumstances should an individual fight more in order to establish
a higher rank in the hierarchy and when should it retreat? We use a framework
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similar to the Hawk-Dove model [83], where an individual can choose to either
fight or concede, with each individual making its choice simultaneously. When
two individuals choose to fight they engage in an aggressive interaction; the
winner will increase its RHP by a factor 1 + V1 and the loser will reduce its
RHP by a factor 1 − C1. When one individual fights and the other concedes,
the individual that chooses to fight increases its RHP by a factor 1+V2 and the
retreating individual has its RHP reduced by a factor 1−C2. In the case when
both individuals retreat, they have their RHP multiplied by 1−C2. Individuals
adopt their own strategies, meaning whether to fight and or to concede in an
aggressive interaction given their history of fights won and lost, from a range
of possible strategies. For each of these possible strategies we will determine
the resulting expected payoff and conclude whether the adopted strategy is
beneficial to the individual or not. We will analyse two cases: when each indi-
vidual adopts a strategy that enables them to fight in all interactions, and when
they adopt strategies that enables them to fight until a certain point in time
(based upon how many contests they have won or lost) and retreat afterwards.
We will determine the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for this fighting
game, calculate the possible stopping times of the game for different strategies,
and analyse the relationship between the stopping time and the difference be-
tween the number of wins and the number of losses for an individual. We find
that a unique strategy evolves, as opposed to a mixture of strategies. Thus in
any scenario there exists a unique ESS, and individuals should not switch be-
tween strategies. We find that the hierarchy forms quickly, after which there
are no mutually aggressive contests. As explained above, individuals fight for
more access to resources and we will investigate the effects of different payoff
functions on the ESSs within our model. In particular we compare payoffs
which depend upon the level of resource an individual receives to those which
depend upon the proportion of the overall resource that it receives. The latter
payoff function is particularly appropriate when resources are scarce. Once the
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dominance hierarchy is established it is easier for the group to divide resources
between them: the higher the position in the hierarchy the higher the payoff.
The division of resources has been analysed by different authors (see e.g., [28],
[66]). We will use the concept of reproductive skew ([27], [66], [103], [109],
[121]), which refers to the distribution of reproductive rights in a group of an-
imals. We will use the term more generally to refer to how limited resources
and hence payoffs (which are generally proportional to reproductive levels in
evolutionary games) are divided among our group. When the reproductive
skew is high the division of resources is uneven with the high ranking individ-
uals obtaining more resources than the lower ranking ones (for examples see
[40], [94], [104]). In contrast, if the reproductive skew is low the division of
resources is even and all ranks of individuals have similar resource levels (see
[30], [81]). Further, we will explore the interplay between all three game-
theoretical elements, Vi, Ci and strategies θ, and analyse whether there is a
general pattern for the ESS when the Vi and Ci are increased (or decreased).
Additionally, we develop a simulation framework to investigate the effect of
the group size on the level of aggression.
We note that Andersen et al. [5] developed an alternative optimization
based model to analyse the effect of group size on aggression level and showed
that the theoretical results obtained are supported by experimental data ob-
served in domesticated pigs; we discuss this in Section 3.6. Lastly we compare
our theoretical results with experimental evidence which is rather different for
different groups of animals such as birds, farmed animals or fish (see e.g.,[5],
[14],[50], [51], [72], [98], [113] [117]). Parts of this chapter are published
in [74].
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3.2 The model
We assume a large population of social individuals living together in groups.
At the beginning of the consideration, groups of size N are randomly formed,
so that all individuals are members of a group and we analyze a specific group
of N individuals. Each individual has an RHP value, which, as mentioned
in Chapter 1, is a measure of its ability to win an aggressive interaction (cf.
[42] and [44]) and which is altered by the outcome of each interaction. At the
beginning, as in the previous chapters, all individuals are assigned the same
initial RHP , denoted by RHPinitial. We assume that all individuals know their
own RHP , and that of any opponent. In each round t (t = 1, ..., T ), two
individuals are randomly chosen to engage in an aggressive interaction, while
the rest of individuals do not engage in any aggressive interactions. Through
time an individual’s RHP changes due to winning or losing (in reality it will be
mainly the extrinsic factors than change, but our model could cope with other
eventualities equally well); while a win increases the RHP , a loss decreases it
and each individual keeps track of the changes in their own RHP and that of
its opponents. More precisely, suppose that at time t the two individuals pitted
against each other are x and y. We denote by RHPx,t individual x’s RHP at
time t. Individual x can decide to be aggressive or retreat once it has been
chosen and this decision is based on the strategy θx ≥ 0 which is its aggression
threshold.
Individual x fights individual y at this time (plays Hawk) if
RHPx,t
RHPy,t
≥ θx (3.1)
holds, otherwise it will retreat (play Dove), where RHPy,t and θy are the indi-
vidual’s y RHP at time t and its aggression threshold respectively. The pairwise
interaction lead to one of the following outcomes:
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(1) Both individuals x and y decide to engage in an aggressive interaction
and the probability that x wins is given by
Px,y(t) =
RHPx,t
RHPx,t +RHPy,t
, (3.2)
and consequently individual y wins with a probability Py,x(t) = 1−Px,y(t).
(2) One individual engages in the aggressive interaction and the other re-
treats.
(3) Both individuals decide not to fight.
After a win the RHP increases and after a loss it decreases. More precisely,
if individual x wins and individual y loses then they increase and decrease
respectively their own RHP as follows:
RHPx,t+1 = (1 + V1)RHPx,t (3.3)
RHPy,t+1 = (1− C1)RHPy,t. (3.4)
If individual x wins and individual y retreats then they increase and decrease
respectively their own RHP as follows:
RHPx,t+1 = (1 + V2)RHPx,t (3.5)
RHPy,t+1 = (1− C2)RHPy,t. (3.6)
Equivalent changes to the RHP s apply if individual y wins.
If both individuals retreat (double kow-tow) then they decrease their RHP s
as follows:
RHPx,t+1 = (1− C2)RHPx,t, (3.7)
RHPy,t+1 = (1− C2)RHPy,t. (3.8)
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In this model V1, V2 are proportional increases in RHP and C1, C2 are propor-
tional decrease in RHP where V1, V2 ≥ 0 and C1, C2 ∈ [0, 1].
The aim of each member of the population is to maximise its payoff at
time T . In the following we assume that the payoff function is defined as the
natural logarithm of the RHP (which corresponds to the situation of unlimited
resources) but consider in Section 3.3.5 the effects of an alternative payoff
function (which corresponds to the situation of limited resources). Now there
are two main reasons for considering the natural logarithm of theRHP . Firstly,
while we want to keep to Dugatkin’s terminology as much as possible, the
multiplicative nature of how the RHP increases, means that RHP values can
become large very quickly. If we would assume the expected RHP as the
payoff, then even a minuscule chance of winning enough contests to be the
top individual would be worth almost any risk. Considering the logarithm
means that winning (losing) any contest increases (decreases) the payoff by
the same amount irrespective of the current RHP . Secondly, taking the natural
logarithm of the RHP guarantees that the payoffs increase in precisely the
same way as in evolutionary matrix games, and in particular the Hawk-Dove
game, which we use as an analogy in this chapter.
This model set-up allows us to track the changes in RHP of all N individ-
uals at the time points t = 1, . . . , T and therefore to evaluate which strategy θ
results in the highest payoff over time. In this context, the ESS [82] as defined
in Chapter 1, proves to be an important concept.
3.3 The two-individual model
For simplicity, in this section we consider groups of two individuals only. This
will allow us to find some analytical results which will give us general insights
into the dynamics of our model. We will then generalise to larger groups in
Section 3.4.
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3.3.1 Expected payoffs when players always fight (θx=θy =
0)
We assume that both individuals, denoted by x and y, possess the sameRHPinitial
values. Further, individuals x and y play the strategies θx = θy = 0, meaning
that both individuals will fight until time T (cf. equation (3.1)). In this sec-
tion and throughout the chapter we assume V1 = V2 = V , C1 = C, C2 = 0.
V1 = V2 = V implies that winning a fight and having your opponent retreat
has the same effect on the RHP . Retreating is seen as a recognition of the
opponent’s superiority and therefore is treated similar to a loss. But contrary
to the model analysed in Chapters 1 and 2, here we do not assume that losing
a fight and retreating has the same effect on the RHP . This seems plausible as
it is similar to the Hawk-Dove model to which we refer, in the sense that the
loss of a fight is like an injury (whether a real injury or a psychological one).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the possible RHP values of individual x at times t = 1
and t = 2. For example, the expected payoff of individual x at t = 1, denoted
by E[ln(RHPx,1)] is equal to
E[ln(RHPx,1)] =
1
2
ln(RHPinitial(1 + V )) +
1
2
ln(RHPinitial(1− C)).
An individual either wins or loses a fight, and we denote a win (loss) in the kth
contest by jk = 1 (jk = 0). Thus at time t individual x has at wins and bt losses
which are given as follows:
at =
t∑
k=1
jk (3.9)
and
bt = t−
t∑
k=1
jk. (3.10)
The RHP for individual x, having won at contests and lost bt, will be denoted
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Figure 3.1: RHP of individual x and individual y at times t = 1 and t = 2
when they both start with the same RHPinitial and always fight (θx = θy = 0).
by Rat,bt and is given by (cf. equations (3.3) and (3.4))
Rat,bt = RHPinitial(1 + V )
at(1−C)bt = RHPinitial(1 + V )
∑t
k=1 jk(1−C)t−
∑t
k=1 jk .
The probability of winning after at wins and bt losses at time t will be denoted
byWat,bt , whereas the probability of losing will be denoted by Lat,bt = 1−Wat,bt .
From equation (3.2) we obtain
Wat,bt =
(1 + V )at(1− C)bt
(1 + V )at(1− C)bt + (1 + V )bt(1− C)at
.
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If we consider all combinations of wins and losses and consider ln(RHP ), then
the overall expected payoff is given by
E[ln(RHPx,T )] =
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
1∑
j3=0
....
1∑
jT=0
ln(RaT ,bT )
T∏
i=1
W jiaT ,bTL
1−ji
aT ,bT
(3.11)
where aT and bT are given by equations (3.9) and (3.10).
3.3.2 Individuals with general strategies θx and θy
In this section we analyse the expected payoffs for individuals x and y when
they have potentially non-zero and different strategies θx and θy, respectively.
We start by deriving a general criterion for the number of losses necessary
so that an individual retreats. Suppose that at time t individual x has won at
contests against individual y and lost bt. Then it’s RHP will be RHPx,t = Rat,bt .
In contrast, individual y has won bt contests and lost at against individual x
resulting in a RHP of RHPy,t = Rbt,at . Thus from equations (3.3)-(3.6) we
obtain
Rat,bt = RHPinitial(1 + V )
at(1− C)bt
and
Rbt,at = RHPinitial(1 + V )
bt(1− C)at .
The next interaction between the individuals x and y will result in a fight if
equation (3.1) holds for both individuals. In other words, the following two
equations have to be satisfied simultaneously
RHPx,t
RHPy,t
=
Rat,bt
Rbt,at
= (1 + V )at−bt(1− C)bt−at =
(
1 + V
1− C
)at−bt
≥ θx (3.12)
and
RHPy,t
RHPx,t
=
Rbt,at
Rat,bt
= (1 + V )bt−at(1− C)at−bt =
(
1 + V
1− C
)bt−at
≥ θy. (3.13)
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Next, we take the logarithm of equations (3.12) and (3.13) on both sides and
obtain
(at − bt) ≥
ln(θx)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
(3.14)
and
(bt − at) ≥
ln(θy)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
. (3.15)
We define
dx =
− ln(θx)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
(3.16)
and
dy =
− ln(θy)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
(3.17)
where dx and dy are both positive numbers for any pair of individuals which do
not concede immediately. As equations (3.14) and (3.15) have to be fullfilled
simultaneously we obtain
− dx ≤ at − bt ≤ dy. (3.18)
This means that if the excess of the number of wins over the number of losses
is within [−dx, dy], individuals x and y will engage in a fight. If both individuals
start by fighting and the first condition to not hold is at− bt ≤ dy, then we have
a case where individual y decides to retreat and individual x to fight. After
retreating for the first time, an individual then retreats in every contest until
time T . Consequently, after y has retreated, individual x increases its RHP for
every contest. By contrast, if the first condition to not hold is −dx ≤ at − bt
then individual x decides to retreat and individual y increases its RHP for
every contest. The situation where both individuals retreat only occurs if this
happens at t = 1.
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We define the time when individual x retreats by
Ts(x) = min{t ≥ 1 : at − bt < −dx}. (3.19)
Ts(x) will be called the x-stopping time. The y-stopping time Ts(y) is defined
similarly. Clearly, in any contest exactly one of these values will be finite; the
time of the last contest where both individuals fight is given by the stopping
time Ts, where
Ts = min{Ts(x), Ts(y)}. (3.20)
Then the expected payoff E[ln(RHPx,T )] at time T is given by:
E[ln(RHPx,T )] =
1∑
j1=0
1∑
j2=0
....
1∑
jTs=0
ln[RaT ,bT (1 + V )
(T−Ts)I1 ]
Ts∏
i=1
W jiaT ,bTL
1−ji
at,bt
(3.21)
where
I1 =

0 if at − bt < dx
1 if at − bt > dy
and (1 + V )(T−Ts)I1 is the multiplicative increase in RHP that individual x gets
after the stopping time Ts. It follows from inequality (3.18) and the fact that
at − bt is an integer that all θ values within a certain interval result in the
same expected payoff (for fixed V and C). We denote those intervals of strategy
values by [θx,min, θx,sup) where θx,sup is the value of θx that corresponds to ⌊dx⌋
and θx,min the value of θx that corresponds to ⌈dx⌉. The intervals are closed at
the lower bound and open at the upper bound and θx,min < θx,sup. We set
k′x = ⌊dx⌋ =
⌊
− ln(θx,sup)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
⌋
(3.22)
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and obtain
θx,sup =
(
1− C
1 + V
)k′x
.
Further, we set kx = ⌈dx⌉. The corresponding strategy value θx for kx is θx,min
and we have
kx = ⌈dx⌉ =
⌈
− ln(θx,min)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
⌉
(3.23)
which results in
θx,min =
(
1− C
1 + V
)kx
.
Similarly to the above, for given V and C there is a range of θ values that cor-
respond to a given k. Importantly, each strategy θ from that range results in the
same payoff. We note, however, that this range changes for different V and C.
For simplicity, we shall assume that individual x chooses the middle value from
[θx,min, θx,sup), and this strategy will be denoted by θx,rep as the representative
strategy of the [θx,min, θx,sup) range
θx,rep =
(
1− C
1 + V
)kx (2 + V − C
2(1− C)
)
. (3.24)
3.3.3 Stopping time Ts
The expected payoff E[ln(RHPx,T )] given by equation (3.21) depends on the
stopping time Ts. In this section we explore the properties of Ts as defined by
equation (3.20), in particular its distribution.
To do so we firstly determine the values of kx and ky for individuals x and
y with strategies θx and θy, respectively. The time when the random process
at− bt is equal to kx or ky represents the stopping time. For instance, individual
x would not engage in aggressive interactions when at − bt ≤ −kx and the
stopping time defined in equation (3.19) can be written alternatively as
Ts(x) = min{t ≥ 1 : at − bt ≤ −kx}. (3.25)
107
A Game-Theoretical Winner and Loser Model of Dominance Hierarchy Formation
But which values can the stopping time Ts(x) assume? The earliest possible
x-stopping time is T = kx, i.e. individual y has kx consecutive wins from the
start of the interaction. The next possible stopping time will be at kx+2, where
a single win by individual x within the first kx interactions has to be met by a
total of kx + 1 wins by y. In general the stopping times for individual x will be
given by kx+(2n)n≥0. Consequently, the stopping times for individual y will be
given by ky + (2n)n≥0. Thus Ts = min{Ts(x), Ts(y)} can assume the following
values
Ts=

1 : kx = ky = 1
min{kx, ky}+ (2n)n≥0 : kx + ky even
max{kx, ky}+ n+ even numbers in [min{kx, ky},max{kx, ky}] : kx + ky odd,
min{kx, ky}
odd
max{kx, ky}+ n+ odd numbers in [min{kx, ky},max{kx, ky}] : kx + ky odd,
min{kx, ky}
even
(3.26)
In summary, the stopping time defines the exact round when one individual
starts to retreat for different strategy combinations. It also gives the number of
possible interactions that need to be observed in order to distinguish between
a pair of individuals, so that in our model the second individual will always
concede to the first (for a different interpretation of this concept, see [73]).
Note that it is possible for our model to generate one experience, a winner
effect or a loser effect, without the other. For example for V > 0 and C = 0 we
have a case when only the winner effect is in place. Table A.1 and Table A.2
(see Appendix) show the expected payoffs for different strategic values when
V = 0.1 and C = 0. On the other hand when C > 0 and V = 0, illustrated by
Table A.3 and Table A.4 (see Appendix), we have a case where only the loser
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effect is operating.
In the next section we derive the distribution of Ts for the parameter con-
stellation V = C = 0.1 (both winner and loser effect are influencing the RHP ).
3.3.4 Example: V = C = 0.1
To illustrate the findings of the last sections we consider an example by assum-
ing the parameters V = 0.1, C = 0.1 and T = 20. In particular, we calculate
the expected payoffs E[ln(RHPx,20)] for different combinations of strategies
θx and θy, determine the unique ESS and derive the distribution of the stop-
ping time Ts. In this section and throughout the chapter we will assume that
RHPinitial = 10.
Firstly we determine the representative strategies to kx = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
by using equation (3.24). Note that there is a range of strategies θx that cor-
respond to the same value of kx and we take the middle one as described in
Section 3.3.2. We obtain the following mappings (the same values apply for
individual y as well.).
kx = 1 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.91, kx = 2 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.74, kx = 3 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.61,
kx = 4 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.50, kx = 5 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.41, kx = 6 ⇒ θx,rep = 0.33,
kx = 7⇒ θx,rep = 0.27, kx = 8⇒ θx,rep = 0.22.
For this set of strategies we then calculate the expected payoffs E[ln(RHPx,20)]
for individual x and E[ln(RHPy,20)] for individual y by using equation (3.21).
Table 3.1 represents the matrix of payoffs for different combinations of strate-
gies θx and θy. We plot these values in Figure 3.2.
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ky=1(θy=0.91) ky=2(θy=0.74) ky=3(θy=0.61) ky=4(θy=0.50) ky=5(θy=0.41) ky=6(θy=0.33) ky=7(θy=0.27) ky=8(θy=0.22)
kx=1(θx=0.91) 3.2000 2.8700 2.7300 2.6500 2.6000 2.5800 2.5600 2.5400
kx=2(θx=0.74) 3.4400 3.0600 2.8700 2.7600 2.7000 2.6600 2.6200 2.6000
kx=3(θx=0.61) 3.5000 3.1000 2.8900 2.7700 2.6900 2.6500 2.6100 2.6000
kx=4(θx=0.50) 3.5100 3.0800 2.8700 2.7400 2.6700 2.6200 2.5600 2.5600
kx=5(θx=0.41) 3.5000 3.0500 2.8400 2.700 2.6200 2.5700 2.5400 2.5200
kx=6(θx=0.33) 3.4600 3.0200 2.7900 2.6600 2.6000 2.5300 2.5000 2.4700
kx=7(θx=0.27) 3.4300 2.9900 2.7700 2.6200 2.5600 2.5000 2.4800 2.4500
kx=8(θx=0.22) 3.4200 2.9500 2.7300 2.6000 2.5100 2.4800 2.4400 2.4100
Table 3.1: The matrix of payoffs where each entry represent the expected pay-
off E[ln(RHPx,T )] at time T = 20 (calculated by equation (3.21)) for different
strategies θx and θy.
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Figure 3.2: The payoffs E[ln(RHPx,T )] at time T = 20 (calculated by equation
(3.21)) for different strategies θx and θy.
Now for each strategy we can find the best response, i.e. for each column of
Table 3.1 we find the highest payoff and use the “diagonal rule” (see Chapter
1) to find the ESS. We note that for a pure ESS, all our results satisfy ESS
condition (1.3); condition (1.4) is only achieved when mixtures are present,
which we do not get in our example. In this example we obtain θ = 0.61,
corresponding to k = 3, as the unique ESS. Note that there is a range of
strategies [θx,min, θx,sup) = [0.55, 0.67] that corresponds to k = 3. Thus any
strategy from this range results in the same expected payoff and is therefore
equivalent to our ESS. Lastly we derive the distribution of the stopping time
Ts. For example, when θx = 0.5 (corresponding to kx = 4) and θy = 0.7
(corresponding to ky = 2), Ts can only assume the values (ky + 2n)n≥0 because
kx + ky = 6 is an even number (see equation (3.26)). But how does this
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distribution change when kx and ky are varied? To explore this we assume that
individual x has a strategy θx corresponding to kx = 1, 2, 3 and his opponent
has strategies θy corresponding to ky ∈ [1, 8]. We choose the value 8 as an
upper bound for ky as an arbitrary large cut-off value which corresponds to
small values of θ, but we could have chosen any other high value. Figure 3.3
shows the distribution functions of the stopping time for various combinations
of kx and ky for V = C = 0.1.
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Figure 3.3: The distribution function of the stopping time for the case when
V = C = 0.1, ky = 1, 2, . . . , 8 and (a) kx = 1, (b) kx = 2, (c) kx = 3. Note that
parts of the distribution functions are overlaid by other distribution functions,
e.g. all lines in (a), include the segment with starting coordinate (1, 0) and
ending coordinate (1,
1
2
).
Figures 3.3 illustrates that a pair of individuals will fight longer for higher
values of kx and ky. In this example one of the individuals x and y has started
retreating before time T , for most of the possible cases. This means that observ-
ing 20 interactions would allow us to distinguish between the two individuals
almost with certainty. As we increase the values of kx and ky, the probability of
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retreating before T = 20 is decreased.
3.3.5 An alternative payoff function
Table 3.1 shows the expected payoff of individuals x and y after Tmax = 20
possible interactions using equation (3.21). In this section we explore how
limited resources are divided between the two individuals based on an alterna-
tive payoff function. We will use the concept of reproductive skew as discussed
in ([27], [66], [103], [109], [121]). In this case the expected payoff for indi-
vidual x after 20 interactions is given by function:
E[θx, θy] = E
[
ln(RHPx,20)
ln(RHPx,20) + ln(RHPy,20)
]
. (3.27)
Consequently the expected payoff for individual y is given by function
E[θy, θx] = E
[
ln(RHPy,20)
ln(RHPx,20) + ln(RHPy,20)
]
.
The results are given in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4.
ky=1(θy=1) ky=2(θy)=0.7 ky=3(θy)=0.6 ky=4(θy=0.5) ky=5(θy=0.4) ky=6(θy=0.35) ky=7(θy=0.27) ky=8(θy=0.23)
kx=1(θx=1) 0.5000 0.4585 0.4417 0.4353 0.4344 0.4354 0.4360 0.4385
kx=2(θx)=0.7 0.5415 0.5000 0.4825 0.4777 0.4765 0.4777 0.4806 0.4825
kx=3(θx)=0.6 0.5583 0.5175 0.5000 0.4941 0.4928 0.4949 0.4973 0.4999
kx=4(θx=0.5) 0.5647 0.5223 0.5059 0.5000 0.4992 0.5013 0.5034 0.5066
kx=5(θx=0.4) 0.5656 0.5235 0.5072 0.5008 0.5000 0.5014 0.5046 0.5077
kx=6(θx=0.35) 0.5646 0.5223 0.5051 0.4987 0.4986 0.5000 0.5026 0.5054
kx=7(θx=0.27) 0.5640 0.5194 0.5027 0.4966 0.4954 0.4974 0.5000 0.5033
kx=8(θx=0.23) 0.5615 0.5175 0.5001 0.4934 0.4923 0.4946 0.4967 0.5000
Table 3.2: Division of resources for different values of k, when V = C = 0.1
From Table 3.2, we find that θ = 0.4 (corresponding to k = 5) is the ESS.
Comparing this result with the result obtained from Table 3.1, we notice that
they differ; when using this alternative payoff function we obtain k = 5 as
the ESS, while for the original payoff function used in Section 3.3.4 the ESS
is k = 3. This difference is related to the amount of available resources, in
113
A Game-Theoretical Winner and Loser Model of Dominance Hierarchy Formation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
 
k
x
ky
 
E[
ln(
RH
P x
)/(
ln(
RH
P x
)+l
n(R
HP
y))
]
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
Figure 3.4: Division of resources for different values of k, when V = C = 0.1
particular whether they are plentiful or limited. We assume that for plentiful
resources, the absoluteRHP is more important, but for scarce resources shared
between group-members, the relative RHP is the key element. If an individual
needs to maximize the RHP then it should fight less compared to the situation
where it needs to maximise the division of limited resources. In this latter case
the individual needs to be more aggressive so that it can win a greater share
than its opponent, since “hurting” its opponent leads directly to improving its
proportion in equation (3.27).
3.3.6 How the expected payoffs and the division of resources
change when varying V and C
In this section we will vary the values of V and fix the value of C (C = 0.1),
noting that different combinations of V and C correspond to different values of
k for any given value of θ. For each of these combinations we find the ESS (θ
and the corresponding k) when ln(RHP ) is considered as the payoff function
and when the alternative payoff function is used. The results are summarised
in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 where we plot the ratio V
C
with C = 0.1 on the x-axis
and the ESS on the y-axis (k value in Figure 3.5 and θ value in Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.5: The evolutionarily stable strategy k for variable V and fixed C
(C = 0.1) for ln(RHP ) and alternative payoff function. When C = 0 the ESS
will be the highest possible value of k (C → 0 =⇒ k →∞).
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Figure 3.6: The evolutionarily stable strategy θ for variable V and fixed C
(C = 0.1) for ln(RHP ) and alternative payoff function. When C = 0 the ESS
will be the highest possible value of k (C → 0 =⇒ k →∞).
For the case when V = 0 and C > 0, we expect the ESS to be the strategy
where an individual retreats immediately. This is true when ln(RHP ) is con-
sidered as the payoff function. When the alternative payoff function is used we
obtain k = 1 (θ = 1) as the ESS (for C = 0.1). Thus in this case it is best to
fight initially to potentially reduce the RHP of the opponent, as this increases
the individual’s payoff function. On the other hand for C = 0 and V > 0, we
obtain k →∞ as the ESS. This is the expected result as since there is no cost
for losing, it is best to fight until the end of the competition. When V ≤ 4 we
obtain lower values of θ as an ESS for the alternative payoff function than for
the payoff function given by ln(RHP ). This means that when resources are
scarce, individuals need to be more aggressive in order to get a high payoff.
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For sufficiently high V ratio, (e.g., for V > 4), we obtain the same value of θ
as an ESS for both payoff functions. The corresponding tables showing the
expected payoffs for different combinations of kx and ky when V and C vary
are given in Appendix A.
3.4 The N -individual model
In Section 3.3 we demonstrated how the expected payoff can be derived analyt-
ically for the situation of two interacting individuals. Generalisations of these
results to situations with more than two individuals, however, have proven to
be analytically intractable. To nevertheless gain insights into the behaviour of
larger groups we develop a simulation approach which determines the ESS
for N interacting individuals. We imagine a population of 10000N individu-
als, which at the start of the game is divided into 10000 groups of size N at
random. Members within each group interact as previously described, for a
total of 200 contests and record their payoff (this correspond to steps S1-S2.3).
The individuals then produce offspring proportional to their payoff to form
a new generation of 10000N individuals. This process is repeated for 10000
generations (this corresponds to step S3). The algorithm which generates our
approach is defined as follows.
S1.0 Initially, the N individuals can choose their strategies from the range
Θ = [θ1, θ2, . . . , θ10] = [0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1]
with probability p(θ = θk) =
1
10
, k = 1, . . . , 10.
Set i = 0.
S2.0 Set H = [0, 0, . . . , 0] (H has dimension 10) and j = 0.
S2.1 Each of the N individuals chooses a strategy θxl , l = 1, . . . , N according
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to the probability function p(θ = θk).
S2.2 Repeat the following for Tmax = 200 times steps.
Randomly choose two individuals with their strategies θxl and θxm , l,m =
1, . . . , N out of the N individuals and update their RHP according to
equations (3.3-3.6).
S2.3 Update the vector H as follows
H(10θxl) = H(10θxl) + ln(RHPxl,200), l = 1, . . . , N.
Set j = j + 1. If j < 10, 000 go to S2.0 otherwise to S3.
S3.0 Update probability function p(θ = θk) as follows
p(θ = θk) =
H(10θk)
10∑
k=1
H(10θk)
.
Set i = i+1. If i < 10, 000 go to S2.0 otherwise the simulation is finished.
The outcome of this algorithm is the probability vector p(θ = θk) and in most
cases the probability mass will be concentrated in a single strategy θk which
represents the ESS. When this is not the case, the mean value of the strategies
at the end of the simulation (i.e. after 10000 generations) will be considered
as the ESS. In order to analyse the accuracy of the simulation algorithm we
consider the same parameter constellation as in Section 3.3.4, namely N = 2
and V = C = 0.1, and determine the ESS. We obtain p(θ = 0.6) = 1 and
conclude that θ = 0.6 is the ESS, which falls within the [0.55, 0.67] range; the
result that we obtained from equation (3.21). We considered other values of V
and C as well and in all situations analytical and simulation results coincided.
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3.4.1 Example: population size N = 4
Now we consider a group of N = 4 individuals and use the simulation algo-
rithm described above to determine the ESSs. We do this for different combi-
nations of V and C and the results are shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.7.
C=0.025 C=0.05 C=0.075 C=0.1 C=0.125 C=0.15
V=0.01 0.9400 0.9900 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
V=0.02 0.8800 0.9000 0.9200 0.9500 0.9700 0.9900
V=0.03 0.7000 0.8100 0.9000 0.9000 0.9200 0.9400
V=0.04 0.6000 0.8000 0.8000 0.8700 0.9000 0.9100
V=0.05 0.4900 0.7000 0.7900 0.8000 0.8000 0.9000
V=0.06 0.4000 0.6200 0.7000 0.7700 0.8000 0.8000
V=0.07 0.3700 0.6000 0.6900 0.7000 0.7600 0.8000
V=0.08 0.3000 0.5000 0.6000 0.6900 0.7000 0.7000
V=0.09 0.2900 0.5000 0.6000 0.6000 0.6500 0.6500
V=0.1 0.2600 0.4400 0.5100 0.6000 0.6000 0.6900
V=0.11 0.2100 0.4000 0.5000 0.5300 0.6000 0.6100
V=0.12 0.2000 0.4000 0.5000 0.5100 0.6000 0.6000
V=0.15 0.2000 0.3000 0.4000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5100
V=0.18 0.1400 0.2900 0.3000 0.4000 0.4300 0.4400
Table 3.3: The ESS value of θ for different combinations of V and C.
The ESS values show that when the value of C is increased for a fixed value
of V the value of θ is also increased. This means that the individuals fight less
as the cost of injury, for example, is increased. On the other hand, when V is
increased for a fixed C we notice that the value of θ is decreased, thus individ-
uals are fighting longer. If V = C then the value of the ESS decreases when
V and C are simultaneously increased by the same factor. This is supported
by the results of V = C = 0.05, V = C = 0.1 and V = C = 0.15 which have
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respective ESSs 0.6, 0.49 and 0.45.
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Figure 3.7: The ESS θ for N = 4 and different combinations of V and C.
Next, we analyse the level of aggressiveness in a population of 10 indi-
viduals for the same combination of V and C as in N = 4. The results are
plotted in Figure 3.8. From this figure, we notice that increasing the reward
(cost) for a fixed value of the cost (reward), increases (decreases) the level of
aggressiveness. This was the case for N = 4 as well, explained above.
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Figure 3.8: The ESS θ for N = 10 and different combinations of V and C.
We then, compare the ESSs for N = 2, N = 4 and N = 10. In Table 3.4
we show the values of the ESS for these three group sizes for some combina-
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tions of V and C. We conclude that as the group size is increased the values
of strategies θ are also increased. This implies less aggressiveness in larger
groups. Hence in larger group sizes it is best to fight less than it is in smaller
populations, because an individual will suffer a larger loss in RHP for fighting
longer and potentially losing against all individuals.
N=2 N=4 N=10
V=0.1, C=0.2 [0.53, 0.73] 0.9 1.01
V=0,1, C=0.1 [0.55, 0.67] 0.6 0.65
V=0.2, C=0.1 [0.32, 0.42] 0.5 0.5
V=0.3, C=0.1 [0.23, 0.33] 0.35 0.36
Table 3.4: The ESS values for different combinations of V and C for N = 2,
N = 4 andN = 10. ForN = 2 there is a range of strategies θ that correspond to
the same critical value of the excess number of defeats k leading to concession.
This range is determined by (3.23).
3.5 Comparison of strategies
In the above sections we have derived how the ESS for different values of
C and V can be calculated. Now we explore whether the knowledge about
the ESS in a specific situation characterized by V and C allows us to infer
the ESS for a related situation with αV and αC (for sufficiently small α).
Similarly to the Hawk-Dove game, the ratio V/C might be the most important
aspect regarding the expected payoffs (if V < C the ESS of the Hawk-Dove
game is simply play Hawk with probability p = V/C), as opposed to specific
values of V and C. This means that if we know the ESS for small values of V
and C, we can also calculate the ESS for αV and αC. The following holds
dx =
− ln(θx)
ln(1 + V )− ln(1− C)
≈
− ln(θx)
V − (−C)
=
− ln(θx)
V + C
⇒ (3.28)
dx(V + C) = − ln(θx)
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If we multiply V and C by α we obtain
dx =
− ln(θ′x)
ln(1 + αV )− ln(1− αC)
≈
− ln(θ′x)
αV + αC
=
− ln(θ′x)
α(V + C)
⇒ (3.29)
αdx(V + C) = − ln(θ
′
x)
where θ′x is the strategy of individual x when V and C become αV and αC
respectively. Now from equations (3.28) and (3.29) we obtain
ln(θ′x) = α ln(θx)⇒ θ
′
x = θ
α
x . (3.30)
This means that if for a sequence of wins and losses individual x retreats follow-
ing strategy θx, it will retreat for the same sequence following strategy θ
′
x = θ
α
x
when V and C are exchanged for αV and αC, respectively (assuming that
changing the value of V using α in this way does not affect the choice of kx).
Thus if only the ratio V/C matters for finding the ESS and θx is the ESS for
V and C, then θ′x will be the ESS for αV and αC. We illustrate this point
with an example. We assume the parameter constellation N = 2, V = 0.02,
C = 0.04 and α = 3/2 and use the simulation algorithm given in section 3.4 to
determine the ESS. We obtain θx = 0.91 (corresponding to kx = 2) as the ESS
for V = 0.02, C = 0.04 and θx = 0.87 (corresponding to kx = 2) for αV = 0.03
and αC = 0.06. When we use formula (3.30) and take θx = 0.91 as the ESS
baseline (V = 0.02, C = 0.04), we obtain θ′x = 0.91
3
2 = 0.868 as the new
ESS which is close to the 0.87 value that we get from the simulations. Thus
the results from these simulations support formula (3.30). We have also anal-
ysed different values of α = 2, 1/2, 1/5, 5 and we obtain ESS corresponding to
kx = 2 for all the cases. We can conclude that equation (3.30) gives a good
approximation for the ESS. This is always true when we have small values of
V and C, however there are some cases when it works less well, principally
where V or C is large (or we have an α which will lead to large V or C in the
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comparative model). We note that the larger V and C, and the bigger T , the
more unrealistic multiplying the RHP by a constant after every contest is. On
the other hand the smaller T , the more times there are when we cannot dis-
tinguish between a pair of individuals as neither of them has retreated. Thus a
realistic model should only contain relatively small V and C.
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter we have introduced game-theoretical elements to the winner-
loser model developed by Dugatkin ([42], [44], [73]). We considered a group
of individuals that are characterised by their RHP and a strategy θ that in-
dicates whether an individual would engage in an aggressive interaction or
retreat. All individuals were assumed to possess the same RHP initially. We
have developed a model that determines the expected payoff and ESS for dif-
ferent group sizes and payoffs, involving V and C, in such a population.
In the first part of this chapter, we derived analytical results for a group of
two individuals for the expected payoff and found the ESS, using ln(RHP ) as
the payoff function, which corresponds to situations with unlimited resources.
In order to calculate the expected payoff for individual x with strategy θx, we
first found the condition when this individual would retreat, represented by
k. The variable k describes the critical difference between the number of wins
and losses, below which individual x retreats. Given that a win increases the
value of RHP , the value of k corresponds to the difference in RHP and thus
only the individuals with a high RHP relative to their opponents risk engaging
in an agonistic interaction to obtain more access to the available resources.
We showed that there is a range of strategies θx that correspond to the same
value of k, meaning that they will give the same payoff. Furthermore different
combinations of V and C yield different ranges of θx for any given value of k.
We illustrated this analytical part with an example where we assumed V =
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C = 0.1. We found the expected payoff for different strategies θ ≥ 0. In this
case we obtained a pure ESS which was achieved for k = 3, corresponding to
the θ range [0.55, 0.67]. Any strategy from this range gives the same payoff and
is an ESS. We next varied V and C and saw the effect of this variation on the
expected payoff and the ESS. As expected, if V is increased for a fixed C the
individuals will fight more, corresponding to lower values of θ. On the other
hand, if C is increased for a fixed V , we get bigger values of θ as an ESS. This
means that individuals will fight less as C is increased.
We also used the idea of the reproductive skew ([27], [66], [103], [109],
[121]) to study how scarce resources are divided between a pair of individuals
by using an alternative payoff function given in equation (3.27). When com-
paring the results with the ones obtained for the original payoff function we
observe smaller values of θ as an ESS. This means that in this case individuals
need to be more aggressive in order to obtain a larger share of the available
resources.
Enquist and Leimar [49], developed a mathematical model to study the
evolution of fighting behavior. The model consists of a pair of individuals with
different fighting abilities which have only noisy information about this dif-
ference prior to an aggressive interaction, although they can gain some infor-
mation during the game by keeping track of the outcomes of the fights (wins
and losses). This gives them an idea of the probability of winning the next
contests. The individuals are fighting over a resource of value V and in each
round, there is a cost for both of them. Depending on the value of the costs
and reward, each individual fights until it meets a given threshold. Note that in
our model, we assume that the individuals start with the same fighting ability
(denoted RHP ) which then changes following the results of interactions, and
they have perfect knowledge of this ability at every point in time. The ESS for
an individual against the strategy of its opponent was calculated and similarly
to our result, they concluded that there is a unique, pure ESS that evolves as
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opposed to a mixture of strategies.
Whilst in our model, and in those of [42] and [44], linear hierarchies are
generally formed efficiently when (i) winner and loser effects are both present,
(ii) only the winner effect or (iii) only the loser effect is present, the three
models give clearly distinct predictions. With only the winner effect present
individuals in our model (for optimal strategy choice) and that of [42] will
continue fighting indefinitely, whereas in [44] individuals start fighting, but
eventually contests cease. With only the loser effect present, individuals would
give up immediately in our model (at least for the plentiful resources case
defined by payoff function (3.11)), would give up after the first loss in the
model of [42], and would fight for some longer period in the model of [44].
These differences in the results of the three models are rooted in the modelling
assumptions. In [42] there is no strategic choice and individuals do not know
their opponent’s RHP , in [44] there is no strategic choice but they do know
their opponent’s RHP and in our model there is strategic choice and their
opponent’s RHP is known. Thus [44] can be thought of as an intermediate
model between the other two. However, the predictions of our model are closer
to that of [42] than [44] and we would argue that these are more realistic.
Other authors have considered alternative game-theoretical models of dom-
inance hierarchy formation. A good recent survey, which raises some interest-
ing questions and suggestions for further modelling is [89]. We shall discuss
two such models. Van Doorn and co-workers [118] analysed the evolution
of dominance hierarchies by assuming that individuals are identical in ability
throughout the time of their interaction, and so while their strategic choices
depend upon past results, the actual probability of winning a contest depends
upon the strategic choices of individuals, rather than their actual abilities. This
is an example of what Maynard Smith [83] called an uncorrelated asymmetry
(as opposed to a correlated asymmetry, as in our model). They found several
evolutionary equilibria, one of them was the “dominance” equilibrium with the
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winner and loser effect where previous winners were more likely to take part
in aggressive interactions and previous losers less likely to be aggressive. They
also found a paradoxical equilibrium where the higher position was occupied
by the loser of an aggressive interaction rather than the winner. These results
are very similar to those from the owner-intruder game [83] where paradoxical
convention-based outcomes can occur. For example in Oecibus civitas spiders,
it has been observed that owners of the webs give up their webs to the intrud-
ers [83]. They then extended this model to larger group sizes [119], where
the individuals still had limited information about previous fights. The results
were the same as in the two-player model. The assumptions and outcomes are
thus rather different to our model.
Fawcett & Johnstone [53] developed a model to analyse the level of ag-
gression where each individual differed in strength, but where they had no
information about this difference. They predicted that the level of aggression
is related to the amount of information that an individual has about prior con-
tests. While the young individuals should be more aggressive as they are not
sure about their fighting ability, the older ones are not. They have knowledge
of prior experience and they retreat after a series of losses. Although the mech-
anisms differ, the actual way that the populations evolve is quite similar to
ours. In their model there are real differences between individuals, but the
individuals start with no knowledge and learn over time; in our model indi-
viduals have varying probabilities of being able to win a contest, which change
(perhaps due to psychological factors) over time. In each case, after a time it is
clear which individuals are the better ones, and the level of aggressive interac-
tions declines, as more individuals play the more passive strategy. We note that
in their model, the eventual division into mainly aggressive strong individuals
and mainly passive weak individuals is dependent upon an intermediate num-
ber of strong/ weak individuals, and that this divide would not happen for all
population divisions.
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In each of the strategic models discussed above ([53], [118] and [119], in
addition to ours) individuals face a potentially long sequence of contests where
they have two options at each step. Thus, in the same way as in games such as
the classical iterated prisoner’s dilemma [7], there is a vast array of potential
strategies. Each model reduces the dimensions of this strategy space in differ-
ent ways. In the models of [118], [119], individuals were constrained to have
a memory only of the latest interaction with an individual, and so could base
their play only on the results of this latest interaction (from the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma “tit for tat” is such a strategy). Fawcett & Johnstone [53] allow
individuals to know their performance from all past contests, but allow them
only to condition play on the total number of contests encountered, together
with the number of wins in these contests. Our model behaves in a similar way
to that of [53], basing strategy on the RHP , which in turn depends directly
upon the number of won and lost contests of the participating individuals.
Similar results to those from our model concerning aggression levels have
been found in experimental settings. Kotrschal et al. [72] performed a feeding
experiment with greylag geese. Grained food was given in high, medium and
low density. The geese were fed twice daily and the level of aggression was
recorded. They found a low number of agonistic interactions in the high food
density setting and an increase in those aggressive interactions when the food
density was decreased. Nie et al. [99] conducted feeding experiments with
varying levels of predation with root voles. They considered four treatments
by combining different levels of predation and food supply (i.e. (no preda-
tion, food), (predation, food), (predation, no food), (no predation, no food)).
They observed higher levels of aggressiveness in the groups treated with un-
favourable conditions (predation, no food) compared to groups treated with
(no predation, food). When the groups were treated with (predation, food)
and (no predation, no food) the level of aggression observed was intermedi-
ate. These findings support our model’s predictions that if resources are scarce,
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then an individual needs to be more aggressive in order to obtain a larger share.
An important concept related to the expected payoff is that of the stopping
time. The stopping time is defined as the first time when one of the two indi-
viduals hits its stopping value of k. It gives a guideline for how many agonistic
interactions we need to observe in a pair of individuals before one retreats.
After hitting the stopping time an individual would then always retreat after-
wards. We showed in our example that twenty possible interactions is enough
for an individual to retreat in almost all cases. Note that if Tmax is relatively
larger than the stopping time, the continued increase of the winner’s RHP
after the stopping time is unrealistic. If, however, Tmax is smaller than the stop-
ping time, it is more difficult to distinguish between a pair of individuals in
terms of their ranks in the hierarchy.
Analytical results can be derived for a group of two individuals but for larger
group sizes those derivations become effectively intractable. To explore the
behaviour of larger group sizes, in particular to find the ESS, we developed in
the second part of the chapter a simulation approach. Analysing a group of
four individuals we found that the value of the ESS is increased when V is
increased (for a fixed C) and by contrast the value of the ESS is decreased
when C is increased (for a fixed V ). Comparing the values of ESS for a group
of two individuals with the ones obtained for a group of four individuals leads
to the conclusion that individuals should be less aggressive (i.e. fight less) in
larger groups.
While this result is commonly observed in behavioural experiments, there
are experimental settings leading to contradictory conclusions. For example,
Nicol et al. [98] conducted a feeding experiment with Isa brown hens. They
analysed the behaviour of the birds in groups of four different sizes (72, 168,
264 and 368). The birds were fed twice a day and the number of aggressive
pecking interactions were recorded. The results suggested a higher level of
aggression in the smallest group (72) compared to the larger groups (168, 264,
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368). Further, Anderson et al. [5] compared their model predictions (larger
group sizes result in lower aggression levels) with results from an experiment
with crossbred pigs. They considered three groups of 6, 12 and 24 pigs (which
had not interacted with each other previously) which were put into pens and
the space per individual was kept the same. There was one feeder per six pigs
and they were fed on ‘Format Start’ every morning. The aggressive interactions
in each group were then recorded. It was observed that the level of aggression
decreased with increasing group size. This result was also supported by further
experiments ([50], [51], [113] [117]). However, Bilvci et al. [14] observed
the aggressive behaviour in a feeding experiment with groups of 15, 30, 60 and
120 Hisex white hens and noticed higher level of aggression in larger groups
of birds than in the smaller ones.
Summarizing, we presented a game-theoretical model which determines
the evolutionarily stable aggression level in a populations of N individuals and
different payoff functions, involving V and C, within a winner-loser frame-
work. Within a group, we found that the population evolves to a unique
aggression threshold, indicating that relative to their strength, all individuals
adopt the same decision rule against whom to fight. Typically the hierarchy is
established quickly, with aggressive fights happening only in the early contests.
While higher values of C for losing an aggressive interaction (keeping the
value of V constant) lead to lower aggression levels in the population the
reverse is true for increasing the value V for winning an aggressive interac-
tion (keeping C constant): the higher the value of V the higher is the ag-
gression level in the population. Further, we predict lower aggression levels
in larger populations. Our results are largely supported by experimental evi-
dence so that we conclude that the introduction of game-theoretical elements
to Dugatkin’s winner-loser model, provides a further step towards a realistic
description of aggressive interactions.
It is clear from our model that winner-loser effects can produce linear hi-
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erarchies similar to the ones found in different groups of animals. However,
in nature, animals tend to fight opponents of the same strength [23]. In the
following chapter, we analyse the Swiss tournament that describes exactly such
scenarios.
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Chapter 4
An Alternative Swiss Tournament
Model of Dominance Hierarchy
Formation
4.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 3, we analysed dominance hierarchies formed under the in-
fluence of the winner and the loser effect, where individuals of a population
are randomly paired together and fighting only when the conditions are favor-
able for both of them. As explained in Section 1.3.4, winner and loser effects
are one possible mechanism to understand how different groups of animals ar-
range themselves into a ranking order. There are other types of tournaments
that animals can follow in order to establish a dominance hierarchy. In this
chapter we present an alternative model of dominance hierarchy formation
where only individuals with the same strength fight each other. The model that
we consider is the Swiss tournament developed by Broom & Cannings [23] and
we refer to this model as the usual Swiss tournament. Initially, it is assumed
that each individual has the same ability to win a fight. At each round only
the individuals with the same number of wins fight each other. Although this
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is a very structured model, it can happen due to different features of the envi-
ronment, possibly spatial. For example [23] consider the example of carpenter
bees Xylocopa (Neoxylocopa) varipuncta, (see [2]), that live in an environment
where higher positions in altitude are preferred as opposed to the lower ones.
At first, bees might meet at an intermediate level (height) with the winners go-
ing up in height and the losers down. Thus at every level only the individuals
with the same success rate are aggregated together. There are two issues when
considering dominance hierarchies following this type of model. The first one
is that the dominance relation is not clear for all the pairs in the group, thus
we do not get a linear hierarchy if we follow the definition of linearity given in
Chapter 1. The second issue is related to the correlation between the outcome
of consecutive contests of an individual. While a win increases the probability
of winning the next fight (winner effect), a loss decreases it (loser effect). The
winner and the loser effect are not used in the Swiss tournament developed
by [23] as individuals with the same success rate fight each other and thus
the outcome of a fight is not affected by the sequence of wins and losses and
two justifications are given for this. The first one is that there is a long time
from one contest to the next and the individuals have a short memory and thus
they cannot use the prior experience. The next justification is that each indi-
vidual measures its strength by the position where it is at a specific moment
(the height on the hill for the bees) and that it is not important how it arrived
in that position.
One of the limitations of this tournament is that it can be used only for
population of size 2n. In this chapter, we generalise this model to be applied
in populations of size N by introducing the concept of “byes” . A number of
assumptions are the same as in the Swiss tournament developed by [23].
(1) We still consider populations where individuals have the same strength
initially.
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(2) The winners go one level up and the losers go one level down. If there
are unpaired individuals, they will get a bye and be classed as a winner.
As in [23] the prior experience is not taken into consideration as only the
individuals with the same number of wins and losses fight each other. Thus the
probability of winning is 0.5.
We prove that linear hierarchies are always established in Swiss tourna-
ments with byes and that we can distinguish between each pair of individuals.
As we mentioned above, this was an issue in the first model. Hence Swiss tour-
naments with byes are better designed for groups of individuals that want to
establish a linear hierarchy, where everyone has a clear position in the group.
The fact that we can distinguish between each pair of individuals means
that the Swiss tournament with byes has more fights and hence last longer
than the usual Swiss model where the hierarchy was established in n rounds.
In Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 we find how many round are needed for the winner
and the second place to be unique. In Section 4.2.3 we give an approximation
for the total number of rounds until the dominance hierarchy is established and
in Section 4.2.4 the formula for the total number of fights is derived. In Section
4.2.5 we find the expected reward for an individual that has won i contests out
of j and the probability of being aggressive (playing Hawk). We illustrate this
with an example. In Section 4.2.6 the effect of the group size and cost on
the level of aggressiveness is analysed and in Section 4.2.7 we analyse how
the probability of being aggressive changes when an individual with a score
i|j wins any consecutive round. In Section 4.2.8 we compare the properties
of Swiss tournaments with byes with winner and loser models. Another point
of interest is finding the total number of fights until the last round. This is
analysed in Section 4.2.4.
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4.2 Swiss tournaments with byes
In this section we extend further the usual Swiss tournament by analysing pop-
ulations of size N rather than 2n. We use the same principles as in the usual
Swiss tournament [23]. The only difference is in the fact that in the Swiss
tournament with byes in each round we might have individuals that are not
paired, due to the general group size N . In this case those individuals get a
‘bye’ and will end up in a winner’s group. As in [23], the Swiss tournament
with byes is modelled as a Hawk-Dove game, the matrix of payoffs is given by
Mij in Section 1.3.5.2 and the results 3, 4, 5 and 6 hold for this model as well.
Consider a population of size N and let us denote by Si,k the number of
individuals with a score i in round k. At the beginning, each individual starts
with 0 wins. Thus S00 = N . In each round, the individuals with the same score
are paired together to fight. The winner gets an extra win and the loser gets an
extra loss. Those individuals that are not being paired (due to having unique
scores or not being selected to fight from an odd-numbered group), get an
extra win. Assume that in round k we have Si,k individuals. We are interested
to analyse how the individuals are divided in each round. To do so we first
need to give the definition of an unbroken sequence as follows:
Definition 4. An unbroken sequence is one where Si,k > 0 and Sl,k > 0⇒ Sj,k >
0 ∀i < j < l.
In other words, by an unbroken sequence we mean an uninterrupted order-
ing of losses.
If each individual has a different score at round k we say that we reach
a unique sequence. The round where we get a unique sequence will be con-
sidered as the last round of the competition. Equation (4.1) below gives the
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number of individuals with a score i at round k + 1;
Si,k+1 = ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋+ ⌈
Si−1,k
2
⌉ (4.1)
where ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋ gives the number of individuals with i wins that lose in round k
and ⌈
Si−1,k
2
⌉ gives the number of individuals with i − 1 wins that win in round
k. Figure 4.1 gives the number of individuals and their corresponding scores
in rounds 1 and 2.
 
�00 (score 0|0)  
�002  (score 1|1) 
�0022  (score 2|0) 
�0022 + �0022  (score 1|2) 
�002  (score 0|1) �0022  (score 0|3) 
Figure 4.1: The number of winners and losers in round 1 and 2. For example,
if we have S0,0 individuals at the beging with 0 wins and losses, we would have
⌈S0,0
2
⌉ individuals on the next round with one win and no losses, and ⌊S0,0
2
⌋
individuals with one loss and no wins.
In Figures 4.2 and 4.3 we show how the individuals are divided in every
round for N = 3, 4
Lemma 4.2.1. If Si,k > 0 and Sl,k > 0 then Sj,k > 0 ∀i < j < l and ∀k. This
means that in each round we have an unbroken sequence.
Proof. As mentioned earlier S00 = N and Si,0 = 0 otherwise. Thus at the
beginning (round 0), we have an unbroken sequence of zeros.
Suppose that we have an unbroken sequence in round k so that Si,k > 0 for
m ≤ i ≤M and Si,k = 0 for i < m or i > M .
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�00 = 3 
(score 0|0) 
1 win + 1 bye 
(score 1|1) 
1 win 
(score 2|2) 
1 bye 
(score 3|3) 
1 loss + 1 bye 
(score 1|2) 
1 win 
(score 2|3) 
1 loss 
(score 1|3) 
1 loss 
(score 0|1) 
Figure 4.2: The number of winners and losers in every round in a group of 3
individuals. For example at the begining we have 3 individuals on a score 0|0
(0 wins out of 0 rounds), in the first round we have 2 individuals on a score 1|1
( one gets this score after fighting and winning and the other gets to this score
by getting a bye as it was not paired with any oponent), and 1 individual on a
score 0|1.
From equation (4.1) we have that Si,k > 0 ⇒ Si+1,k+1 > 0. Similarly Sj,k+1 = 0
for j < m or j > M + 1. Sm,k+1 = 0 if and only if Sm,k = 1, but whether it is
or not, we have an unbroken sequence in round k + 1. Thus by induction the
sequence is always unbroken in every round.
Corollary 4.2.2. Note that as S00 > 0, from equation (4.1) we haveM = k, ∀k .
Lemma 4.2.3. The Swiss tournament with byes produces linear hierarchies where
each individual has a unique profile. Thus if the hierarchy is established in U˜N
rounds, then S
i,U˜N
= 1 ∀i ∈ [U˜N −N + 1, U˜N ].
Proof. From Corollary 4.2.2 we have that Sk,k > 0 ∀k. If Sk,k > 1 then Sk+1,k+1 <
Sk,k and so eventually Sk1,k1 = 1, and moreover Sk,k = 1 ∀k > k1.
Next we consider the remaining N − 1 individuals. Eventually we will obtain a
unique high score where Sk2−1,k2 = 1 (from Lemma 4.2.1 we have Sk2−1,k2 > 0)
and this score cannot be reached by other individuals in the group. Similarly
we can consider the remaining N − 2 individuals and so on. We thus obtain
a unique sequence, where each individual ends the competition with a unique
score.
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�00 = 4 
(score 0|0) 
 
2 win 
(score 1|1) 
1 win 
(score 2|2) 
1 bye 
(score 3|3) 
1 bye 
(score 4|4) 
1 loss + 1 bye 
(score 1|2) 
1 win 
(score 2|3) 
1 bye 
(score 3|4) 
1 loss + 1 bye 
(score 1|3) 
1 win 
(score 2|4) 
1 loss 
(score(1|4) 
2 losses 
(score 0|1) 1 loss 
(score 0|2) 
Figure 4.3: The number of winners and losers in every round in a group of 4
individuals. For example at the begining we have 4 individuals on a score 0|0
(0 wins out of 0 rounds), in the first round we have 2 individuals on a score
1|1 ( they both get to this score by fighting and winning), and 2 individuals on
a score 0|1.
4.2.1 The exact number of rounds until a unique winner
In this section we find the number of rounds needed in order to have a unique
winner. The winner will be that individual that has not lost a fight. In the
first round of the tournament there are ⌈N
2
⌉ winners. In the following round
there are ⌈
⌈N
2
⌉
2
⌉ undefeated individuals and this continues until there is a single
winner which happens in round ⌈log2(N)⌉. Then the time t1 when the first
place is established is
t1 = ⌈
log(N)
log(2)
⌉ (4.2)
In Figure 4.4 we have plotted the time when the first place is established for
group size from 2 to 100. Clearly, the time of establishment of the first place
is either constant or increased by one. After the winner is decided (at round
t1), it will get a bye ( getting a bye is the same as winning) until the end of the
competition and no other individual can ever catch it.
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Figure 4.4: The time of establishment for the first place when N = 2, ..., 100
4.2.2 The exact number of rounds until a unique second
place
We are interested in finding the number of rounds until the second place is
decided. We consider populations of size 2n and N individuals
4.2.2.1 Populations of 2n individuals
Firstly, we need to find the number of individuals that are at the second place
at time t1 (when the winner is decided). In other words we need to find St1−1,t1.
Consider Pascal’s triangle in Figure 4.5. Row 2 contains two number 1’s.
Equation (4.3) (
n
k
)
=
n!
k! (n− k)!
(4.3)
gives the numbers in the triangle where n is the number of the row and k is
the element in that row. The sum of numbers in each row is equal to 2n. We
relate this triangle with the division of individuals at round t1, where t1 is the
round where we get a unique winner and is found by formula 4.2. For example
the sixth row gives how the individuals are split in a group of 25 individuals,
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1
1 1
1 2 1
1 3 3 1
1 4 6 4 1
1 5 10 10 5 1
1 6 15 20 15 6 1
Figure 4.5: Pascal’s triangle
when the winner is established. The second value of this row (which is 5)
gives the number of individuals that are in the second place at this moment.
In general for 2n individuals, we have n individuals at time t1 = n, because the
value of the second element is increased by one when we go from row i to row
i + 1, ∀i ≤ n. Thus St1−1,t1 = n. To find the time when the second place is
established, which we denote it by t2, we use the same procedure as we did for
the winner (see Section 4.2.1). Thus the time (round) when the second place
is unique is given by the following equation
t2 = n+ ⌈
log(n)
log(2)
⌉. (4.4)
where n is the time when the winner is established (in a group of size 2n) and
⌈ log(n)
log(2)
⌉ is the time when the winner is established in a group of n individuals.
4.2.2.2 Populations of N individuals
So far we found the round t1 where we have a unique winner in a group of N
individuals and also St1−1,t1 and t2 (the round when we have a unique second
place) in a group of 2n individuals. We are interested to find t2 for a group of
size N . First we need to find how many individuals are on the second place
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(St1−1,t1) when the winner becomes unique. If we denote the following
G(N) = ⌈
N
2
⌉ (4.5)
and
F (N) = ⌊
N
2
⌋ (4.6)
then, for the early rounds the N individuals will be divided as in Figure 4.6
G(G(G(N)))
G(G(N))
G(N) F (G(G(N))) +G[F (G(N)) +G(F (N))]
N F (G(N)) +G(F (N))
F (N) F [F (G(N)) +G(F (N))] +G(F (F (N)))
F (F (N))
F (F (F (N)))
Figure 4.6: How N individuals are split in rounds 1, 2 and 3.
From Figure 4.6 we can generalize and say that the number of individuals
at the second place, at time t1 is:
St1−1,t1 = FG
t1−1 +G(FGt1−2 +G(FGt1−3 +G(FGt1−4 + ...+G(FG+GF )))...)
(4.7)
where e.g. FG2 = F (G(G(N))). Note that FGt1−1 = 1 as this represent a single
individual that has lost to the winner. Thus equation (4.7) becomes
St1−1,t1 = 1+G(FG
t1−2+G(FGt1−3+G(FGt1−4+ ...+G(FG+GF )))...). (4.8)
From equation (4.2) we find that it takes ⌈
log(St1−1,t1 )
log(2)
⌉ rounds to have a unique
winner in a group of St1−1,t1 individuals. This means that the time when the
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second place is unique is given by t2 as follows
t2 = t1 + ⌈
log(St1−1,t1)
log(2)
⌉ = ⌈
log(N)
log(2)
⌉+ ⌈
log(St1−1,t1)
log(2)
⌉. (4.9)
Note that for populations of size 2n, equation (4.9) reduces to equation (4.4).
4.2.2.3 An approximation for the number of rounds until the second
place is unique in a group of N individuals
Above we derived a formula that gives the exact number of rounds until we
have a unique second place individual. Sometimes for large group sizes, it takes
a lot of steps to calculate t2. For this reason, here we give an approximation for
t2 which we denote it by t˜2 so that we can distinguish with t2. For 2
n individuals
we found that there are n individuals at the second place and that t1 = n. This
means that for N individuals we have t1 = ⌈
log(N)
log(2)
⌉ andSt1−1,t1 = ⌈
log(N)
log(2)
⌉ . Thus
the time step when the second place is unique will be
t˜2 = ⌈
log(N)
log(2)
⌉+ ⌈
log(⌈ log(N)
log(2)
⌉)
log(2)
⌉. (4.10)
Most of the times t˜2 gives the right value for when the second place is unique
and occasionally it gives one less than the exact one.
We found analytically the round when the winner and the second place are
unique. For the other ranks in the group, it is not easy to find analytically
the time when they are unique. In Figure 4.7, we have plotted the time of
establishment for each rank in different group sizes.
4.2.3 The total number of rounds
In this section we find how many rounds are needed in total in order to have a
unique sequence (linear hierarchy). We know that the winner wins every con-
test until a unique sequence is established. This means that the total number
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N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 1000
U˜N 1 3 4 6 8 10 11 13 15 ... 1968
Table 4.1: Number of wins for the first place at the end of the tournament for
different group sizes.
of rounds until a linear hierarchy is established, is equal to the total number of
wins of the first place, which consists of real fights and byes.
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Figure 4.7: The time of establishment for ranks from 1 to 6.
Following the procedure given in Figure 4.1 we compute the number of
wins for N = 2, 3, ..., 1000. We denote the total number of wins for the first
place, until a unique sequence, in a group of N individuals by U˜N . Some of
the results are given in Table 4.1. In general we find that when we go from a
group of size N to N + 1 the number of wins for the first place is increased by
2 except for when N = 4, 8, 15, 24, 32,48, 62, 80, 101, 122, 147, 171, 202,
230, 267, 299, 339, 377, 418, 464, 509, 559, 611, 664, 719, 776, 836, 896,
960,... where the total number of wins is increased by one (a jump of one).
We plot the group sizes with a jump of one in Figure 4.8 where on x− axis we
have N = 2, ...., 1000 and on y− axis we have the times when a jump of one
happens.
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Figure 4.8: Group sizes where a jump of one happens in the number of wins of
the first place individual.
We find that the curve with equation
Cf = 1.047N
0.4878 − 0.912 (4.11)
fits these data with R2 = 0.99. Then
UN = 2(N − 1)− 1.047N
0.4878 + 0.912 (4.12)
gives an approximation for the number of wins for the first place in a popula-
tion of size N .
As the number of wins is an integer, we round the equation (4.12) to the
nearest integer. Then the number of wins U˜N for the first place is
U˜N = [UN ] = [2(N − 1)− 1.047N
0.4878 + 0.912], (4.13)
where [.] stands for the nearest integer. For most values equation (4.13) gives
the exact result for the number of wins, but occasionally it overestimates it or
underestimates it by 1.
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4.2.4 The number of real fights
In this section we find the total number of real fights in the tournament.
If we denote by A = [a1, a2, ..., aU˜N ] the number for fights in each round, where
aj corresponds to the number of fights at round j, then
∑U˜N
j=1 aj gives the total
number of fights. For example, for N = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 we have the following:
N = 5⇒ A = [2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]⇒ The number of total fights is 10
N = 6⇒ A = [3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]⇒ The number of total fights is 15
N = 7⇒ A = [3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]⇒ The number of total fights is 21
N = 8⇒ A = [4, 4, 4, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]⇒ The number of total fights is 28
N = 9⇒ A = [4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0]⇒ The number of total fights is 36
N = 10 ⇒ A = [5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0] ⇒ The number of total
fights is 45
We notice that the total number of fights in a group of N individuals is equal
to N(N − 1)/2, which corresponds with the number of fights in a round-robin
tournament.
Now we prove analytically that the total number of fights in a group of N
individuals is equal to N(N − 1)/2.
For any particular group of individuals we are able to find their deficit with
the maximum (winner) and the number of fights. Assume that Si,k is the num-
ber of individuals at round k that have scored i wins (denoted by i|k) where
each individual has a deficit of (k−i) from the maximum. The number of fights
for this group is ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋. Then the total deficit below the maximum at round k
which we denote by dk will be
dk =
k∑
i=0
Si,k(k − i) (4.14)
Furthermore the total number of fights at round k will be denoted by fk and is
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equal to
fk =
k∑
i=0
⌊
Si,k
2
⌋ (4.15)
Theorem 4.2.4. The deficiency dk below the maximum at round k is equal to the
number of fights prior to this round and because the deficit in the last round is
d
U˜N
=
N(N − 1)
2
then the total number of fights is N(N−1)
2
, where U˜N and N are the index of the
last round and the group size respectively.
Proof. For the Si,k group where the number of fights is ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋, each individual
before the fight has a deficit of (k − i). Let us see what happens at the next
round (k + 1). We know that a bye or a win does not change the number of
losses, whereas a loss increases the number of losses by 1. Then on the next
round we have ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋ individuals on a score i|(k + 1) where each individual
has a deficit of k + 1 − i and the rest of individuals Si,k − ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋ have a score
(i+ 1)|(k+ 1) where each individual has a deficit of (k− i). The total deficit in
round k is dk given in equation (4.14) and the total deficit in round k + 1 will
be
dk+1 =
k∑
i=0
[⌊
Si,k
2
⌋(k + 1− i) + (Si,k − ⌊
Si,k
2
⌋)(k − i]
=
k∑
i=0
⌊
Si,k
2
⌋+
k∑
i=0
Si,k(k − i)
= fk + dk
(4.16)
Thus we have shown that
dk+1 = dk + fk (4.17)
which means that the new deficit in round k+1 is equal to the total sum of the
deficit and number of fights at round k.
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Let us show now that dk =
∑k
j=0 fj is equal to the total number of fights.
The deficit in round 0 is d0 = f0 = 0. Assume that equation (4.18) is true.
dk =
k∑
j=0
fj (4.18)
Then from equation (4.17) we have dk+1 = dk + fk ⇒ dk+1 =
∑k+1
j=0 fj.
Thus we proved that if equation (4.18) is true for k, then it is also true for k+1.
By induction equation (4.18) holds for every k and in particular it is true for
the last round U˜N where we have
d
U˜N
=
U˜N∑
j=0
fj =
N(N − 1)
2
(4.19)
But we know the deficit in the last round is
d
U˜N
=
N(N − 1)
2
. (4.20)
Thus the total number of fights in a group of N individuals is N(N−1)
2
.
In summary, in previous sections, we have analysed the model with respect
to the fighting structure. We have seen how long it takes until the winner and
the second place are established and we also found the total number of real
fights. In the following section we find the expected reward for an individual
after any win or loss.
4.2.5 The expected reward for an individual on a score i|j
In this section we find the expected reward for an individual that is on a score
i|j (having won i contests until round j). As in the Swiss tournament developed
by Broom & Cannings [23], the Swiss tournament with byes is modelled as a
Hawk-Dove model where individuals always interact with each other with the
winners getting an extra point and the losers staying on the same score. The
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only difference is on the rewards where the payoff matrix is as follows:
Mij =
12(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1) − C) W(i+1)(j+1)
Wi(j+1)
1
2
(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1))
 (4.21)
where again, Wi,j is the expected reward for an individual with a score i|j,
W(i+1),(j+1) is the expected reward for an individual with a score i|j to win the
next contest, Wi,(j+1) is the expected reward if it loses and C is the cost that
the loser pays if the contest is Hawk-Hawk. If pij is the probability of playing
Hawk in the ESS (for an individual on a score i|j) then the followings apply.
(1) pij = 0means that an individual plays Dove. This happens ifW(i+1),(j+1)−
Wi,(j+1) < 0. The expected payoff for this strategy is
1
2
(W(i+1),(j+1) +
Wi,(j+1)).
(2) p = 1means that an individual plays Hawk, which happens ifW(i+1),(j+1)−
Wi,(j+1) ≥ C. The expected payoff for this strategy is then
1
2
(W(i+1),(j+1) +
Wi,(j+1) − C).
(3) For 0 ≤ W(i+1),(j+1) −Wi,(j+1) < C we have p =
W(i+1),(j+1)−Wi,(j+1)
C
and the
expected payoff in this case is 1
2
(W(i+1),(j+1) +Wi,(j+1))−
1
2C
(W(i+1),(j+1)−
Wi,(j+1))
2.
In [23] (2n individuals) the expected payoff is given by the following single
expression:
Wij =
1
2
(W(i+1)(j+1) +Wi(j+1) − p
2
ijC) (4.22)
In the Swiss tournament with byes, equation (4.22) becomes
Wij =
⌈
Si,j
2
⌉
Si,j
Wi+1,j+1 +
⌊
Si,j
2
⌋
Si,j
Wi,j+1 −
⌊
Si,j
2
⌋
Si,j
p2ijC. (4.23)
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where Si,j is the number of individuals on a score i|j, C is the cost and pij is the
probability of being aggressive when on score i|j. Thus
⌈
Si,j
2
⌉
Si,j
is the probability
that an individual will win or get a bye and
⌊
Si,j
2
⌋
Si,j
is the probability that it loses.
The probability pij is as follows:
pij = mid
(
0,
Wi+1,j+1 −Wi,j+1
C
, 1
)
. (4.24)
As in the Hawk-Dove model, pij = 0 does not occur, and so equation (4.24)
becomes
pij = min
(
Wi+1,j+1 −Wi,j+1
C
, 1
)
. (4.25)
We found that the total number of rounds until a linear hierarchy is established,
is equal to the total number of wins of the first place, which is given by U˜N ,
thus the reward for finishing on a score i|U˜N is Vi where V0 ≤ V1 ≤ ... ≤ VU˜N
∀i.
Note then when Si,j = 0 (no individual is on a score i|j), the expected reward
Wij will be equal to the expected reward if there was to be one individual on
i|j. In this case as Si,j = 1 the individual will get a bye and end up on a score
(i + 1)|(j + 1). Thus in this case we have Wi,j = W(i+1),(j+1). In the matrix of
payoffs we put brackets around Wij when the corresponding Si,j = 0. We use
the same logic for the probability pij when Si,j = 0 as for when Si,j = 1.
4.2.5.1 A Numerical example
Consider a game with N = 4 individuals, cost C = 1 and rewards Vi = i for
i = 1, .., U˜N . For example the expected reward for an individual finishing on a
score 1|3 is. W1,3 =
1
2
2 + 1
2
1 − 1
2
1 = 1 where p1,3 = min
(
2−1
1
, 1
)
= 1. We find
the successive values of Wij and pij by using (4.23) and (4.25).
The results for Wi,j and pi,j are given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
147
An Alternative Swiss Tournament Model of Dominance Hierarchy Formation
i|j 0 1 2 3 4
4 - - - - 1
3 - - - 1 1
2 - - 1 1 1
1 - 2 2 2 1
0 4 2 1 0 1
Table 4.2: The number of individuals on a score i|j (Si,j)
i|j 0 1 2 3 4
4 - - - - 4
3 - - - 4 3
2 - - 4 3 2
1 - 9
4
3
2
1 1
0 19
16
9
8
1 (1) 0
Table 4.3: Expected pay-offs to individuals on a score i|j (Wij)
i|j 0 1 2 3 4
4 - - - - -
3 - - - (1) -
2 - - (1) (1) -
1 - 1 1 1 -
0 1 1
2
(1) (1) -
Table 4.4: The probability of playing Hawk on a score i|j (pij)
4.2.6 The effect of group size and cost on the level of aggres-
sivenes
Another important concept is that of the weighted average of the probability
pij, which is a general measure of aggressiveness, and we will denote it by pN
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and calculate it as follows
pN =
∑U˜N
i,j=0⌊
Si,j
2
⌋pi,j∑U˜N
i,j=0⌊
Si,j
2
⌋
. (4.26)
For the numerical example in section 4.2.5.1, we find he weighted average of
probability pij to be
pN = 0.9.
We are interested to see how the weighted probability pN changes when we
increase the cost C and the group size. Firstly we calculate pN for N = 4 and
C = 1, 2, ..., 100 and the results are plotted in Figure 4.9. We find that when the
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Cost C
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 p i
j
 
 
N=4
Figure 4.9: Weighted average of probability pij for N = 4, when C ranges from
1 to 100.
cost C is sufficiently large, the product CpN tends towards the value 1. Next,
we plot pN multiplied by the value of cost on the y-axis, and the value of the
cost on the x-axis. We do this for N = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 48 and C = 1, 2, ..., 1000.
The results are plotted in Figure 4.10. From this figure we find that when the
cost is increased, the value of pN decreases. This means that for very large
values of cost, individuals are less aggressive. For each of the group sizes we
notice that the product CpN , converges to a value that we denote by lN
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Figure 4.10: Weighted average of probability pij *C when we increase the cost
from 1 to 1000 in different group sizes
For each group size we find the value of lN for when C = 1000. We plot
these results in Figure 4.11.
When the group size is increased, the value of lN also increases which im-
plies that pN also increases. This is related to the expected number of fights
that an individual has when it wins the first fight and when it loses the first
fight. For example when N = 4 (see Figure 4.3), the following sequences are
possible:
(1) An individual wins two fights in a row. We denote this sequenceWW . In
this case, the total number of fights is equal to two.
(2) If an individual follows the sequence WLW (win-lose-win), it will finish
with a total of three fights.
(3) If an individual follows the sequence LWW (lose-win-win), it will finish
with a total of three fights.
(4) If the first two outcomes are LL (two loses in a row), it will finish with a
total of three fights.
(5) When it follows the sequence WLL or LWL, this individual will finish
with a total of four fights
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Thus, in general, an individual has more fights if it loses the first contest than
it has if it wins it. This is why the level of aggressiveness increases at round
1, as an individual does not benefit by ending up in a group of losers. As the
group size is increased, the difference between the first place and the last one,
increases.
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Figure 4.11: Weighted average of probability pij *C when we increase the cost
from 1 to 1000 in different group sizes
Note that in Figure 4.11 we have calculated lN for some other group sizes
as well. We find that the function
lN = 0.704(N + 1)
0.4329 − 0.1765 (4.27)
fits the data in Figure 4.11 with R2 = 0.999. Finally, we can say that the
weighted average of probability pij is given by the following approximation:
pN =
1
C
(0.704(N + 1)0.4329 − 0.1765) (4.28)
For example for N = 2 we get pN =
1
C
which is exactly what we expect as
lN = 1.
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4.2.7 The effect of winning or losing a fight on the level of
aggressivenes
In this section we analyse the probability pij in more detail. Denote by P =
[pij]i,j=1,...,U˜N the matrix of probabilities pij where pij represent the probability
of being aggressive if an individual has won i rounds until round j. If we
look at the leading diagonal, it gives us the probability of aggressiveness for
an individual when it wins all the fights. The next diagonal, parallel with
the leading one, gives us the probability of being aggressive for an individual
that starts with one loss and wins every round. Then the following parallel
diagonal gives us the probability of being aggressive for an individual that starts
with two losses and wins every other fight, and so on for the next diagonals.
Now, we analyse the behavior on each of these diagonals. For example for a
tournament with 5 rounds the matrix P is as follows
P =

p00 p01 p02 p03 p04 p05
− p11 p12 p13 p14 p15
− − p22 p23 p24 p25
− − − p33 p34 p35
− − − − p44 p45
− − − − − p55

(4.29)
The leading diagonal has j − i = 0. We will call this diagonal 0. The values in
this diagonal are: p00, p11, p22, p33, p44, p55
The next diagonal parallel with diagonal 0 has values: p01, p12, p23, p34, p45 where
the difference j − i = 1, we will call this diagonal 1. We repeat this for all di-
agonals parallel with the main one. We are interested only in those pij values
that have corresponding Si,j ≥ 2 as they represent the ‘real fights’.
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4.2.7.1 Example: N=20
In this example we consider a group of 20 individuals. We find the total number
of rounds given by U˜N as follows:
U˜N = [2(N − 1)− 1.047N
0.4878 + 0.912] = 34 (4.30)
Thus it takes approximately 34 rounds (which coincide with the exact number
of rounds) for the hierarchy to be established. We calculate the values in matrix
P and the values on each diagonal corresponding to Si,j ≥ 2 are plotted in
Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Diagonal probabilities in P for N = 20. On the x-axis we have the
score i. The corresponding round for this score is i + ξ.
On the x-axis we have the score i and on y-axis the corresponding pij where
j = (i + ξ), and ξ correspond to the diagonal number. For example if we
consider diagonal 4, the first value correspond to i = 1. Then we can find
the round j as j = 1 + 4 = 5. This means that the first value in diagonal 4
is p1,5, the following one will be p2,6 and so on. We notice in Figure 4.12 that
the maximum for each diagonal is reached when there are only two individuals
fighting, and that is the final fight before the corresponding position is decided.
We are interested to see whether consecutive wins increase the probability of
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Diagonal (ξ) 0 1 2 3 4 5
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1, 4, 6, 6 1,4,5,6 1,4,5,5 1,4,5,4 1,4,4,4 1,3,4,4
Diagonal (ξ) 6 7 8 9 10 11
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,3,3,4 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,2 1,3,2,2 1,2,2,2
Table 4.5: The number of individuals at the ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place in
diagonal ξ at the time when we have a unique winner. For example in diagonal
0 at the time when we have a unique winner kt1,t1 = 1 there are 4 individual
at the second place, 6 individuals at the third place and 6 individuals at the
fourth place.
being aggressive. In other words we want to check if p(i+1),(j+1) ≥ pi,j, as for
the original Swiss tournament [23]. While in most cases this is true, winning a
fight does not guarantee a higher level of aggressiveness. This can be seen on
diagonal 2 where p3,5 = 0.0032 and p4,6 = 0.003 and thus p4,6 < p3,5.
Another point of interest is to see how the level of aggressiveness changes from
one diagonal to the other. In order to do so we plot the maximum probability
(corresponding to the last fight) for each diagonal, in Figure 4.13. We know
that in each diagonal ξ, the position ξ + 1 is determined. For example the
winner is decided on diagonal 0, the second place is determined on diagonal 1,
and so on. From Figures 4.12 and 4.13, we see that the level of aggressiveness
is higher in diagonals 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. In diagonal 5 there is a jump, the
pattern changes and there is less aggression. This is because the consequences
of winning and losing are less when we shift the diagonals. To understand
this better, for each diagonal ξ, we find the number of individuals that are at
position ξ+2 (one win less than the winner of that diagonal). These results are
given in Table 4.5 From diagonal 0 to diagonal 4 there are 4 individuals with
one win less than the winner, whereas at diagonal 5 there are 3 individuals
with one win less than the winner of this diagonal. Being in a group of 3 is
better than being in a group of 4, because in a group of 4, an individual needs
to win 2 fights to be at the top of the group, and in a group of 3 it needs to win
an average of
3
2
fights to be at the top. Thus a loss in diagonal 5 is not as costly
as a loss in the previous diagonals. This is the reason why the pattern changes,
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because it is affected by the cost of losing.
For the same reasons the pattern changes in diagonal 11, because here if an
individual loses, it would end up in a group of two individuals. In this case it
takes only one round to be the next best individual.
In general this means that the level of aggressiveness is higher when individuals
are fighting for a higher position in the group and lower when they are fighting
for the last positions in the hierarchy, as the reward is smaller.
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Figure 4.13: The maximum of each diagonal in matrix P when N = 20
4.2.7.2 Example: N=44
In this example we consider a group of N = 44 individuals. In Figure 4.14 we
plot the probabilities for each diagonal.
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Figure 4.14: Diagonal probabilities in P for N = 44. On x-axis we have the
score i. The corresponding round for this score is i + diagonal number.
Now we plot the maximum for each diagonal in Figure 4.15
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Figure 4.15: The maximum of each diagonal of matrix P for N = 44
From Figure 4.15 we see that the level of aggressiveness changes when
we go form one diagonal to the other, in particular there are five significant
changes. For the same reasons as in the previous example, these changes are
related with the number of individuals that are at positions ξ+2 and ξ+3 re-
spectively, at the time that the winner for each diagonal is established. These
numbers are given in Table 4.6. The first change in the level of aggressiveness
happens in diagonal 1, because here if an individual loses ends up in a group of
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Diagonal(ξ) 0 1 2 3 4 5
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1, 5, 10, 14 1,4,7,10 1,4,7,10 1,4,7,9 1,4,7,9 1,4,7,9
Diagonal (ξ) 6 7 8 9 10 11
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,4,7,8 1,4,7,7 1,4,7,7 1,4,7,7 1,4,7,7 1,4,7,6
Diagonal (ξ) 12 13 14 15 16 17
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,4,6,6 1,4,5,6 1,4,5,5 1,4,5,5 1,4,5,5 1,4,5,5
Diagonal (ξ) 18 19 20 21 22
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,4,5,5 1,4,5,4 1,4,4,4 1,3,4,4 1,3,3,4
Diagonal (ξ) 23 24 25 26 27
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,3
Diagonal (ξ) 28 29 30 31 32
No ind. in ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place 1,3,3,3 1,3,3,2 1,3,2,2 1,2,2,2 1,2,2,2
Table 4.6: The number of individuals at the ξ+1, ξ+2, ξ+3, ξ+4 place at the
moment that we have a unique winner for diagonal i and N=44. For example
in diagonal 0 at the time when we have a unique winner (kt1,t1 = 1), there
are 5 individual at the second place, 10 individuals at the third place and 14
individuals at the fourth place.
four individuals. Again being in a group of four individuals is better than being
in a group of five individuals (main diagonal). The next change in the level
of aggressiveness happens in diagonal 12, where for the first time we go from
having 7 individuals at the ξ+3 place to having 6 individuals. This means that
if an individual loses there can be 4 other individuals that can reach its score
when there are 7 individuals with one win less than this individual, and there
can be 3 individuals that can reach it if there are 6 individuals with one win less
than this individual. The next change in the level of aggressiveness happens
in diagonal 21, where we go from having 4 individuals at the ξ+2 place to 3
individuals. In diagonal 31 we have the first time that if an individual loses it
would end up in a group of two individuals.
4.2.8 Swiss tournaments with byes vs. winner-loser models
In this section we compare Swiss tournaments with byes with winner and loser
models. In both models we consider a population of size N . In winner-loser
models each individual has a score RHP (resource holding potential). At each
point in time two individuals are chosen at random to fight each other. Indi-
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vidual x will fight individual y if RHPx/RHPy ≥ θ where RHPx and RHPy
are the resource holding potential of individuals x and y respectively. θ is the
aggression threshold that indicates whether an individual fights or not. Thus in
winner-loser models we randomly pair individuals against each other, so there
will be extra fights that will not feature in the Swiss tournament. In winner-
loser models we have a fixed group interacting together. Thus the Swiss tour-
nament is better designed for larger population size where individuals react
locally and locality is influenced by the success of an individual.
The probability of winning in the Swiss tournament with byes is equal to 1/2
and the winner is decided at random. In winner and loser model this proba-
bility is equal to RHPx/(RHPx +RHPy). If we consider the Swiss tournament
in terms of the RHP , the probability of winning will be still 1/2 as only the
individuals with the same score (RHP ) will fight each other. Hence we are in
the same world in terms of probability of winning.
Linearity: Both Swiss tournaments with byes and winner-loser models produce
linear hierarchies. In the updated winner-loser model the time when the hier-
archy is established depends on whether the winner effect is considered alone,
the loser effect is considered alone or both the winner and loser effect are
present. We have considered mostly groups of four individuals as it is time-
consuming to calculate after how many rounds the hierarchy is established in
larger groups. On the other hand, the Swiss tournament produces linear hier-
archies in less rounds than the winner-loser model. For example, in a group
of 4 individuals, only 4 rounds are needed to establish a linear hierarchy. In
winner and loser models (with θ = 1, W,L = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) the linearity is
established after 41 rounds when only the winner effect is present, after 44
rounds when only the loser effect is present and after 32 rounds when both the
winner and the loser effects were present. In all three cases the last pair to be
distinguishable is the second and the third place.
The Swiss tournament with byes is similar to the winner-loser model when
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only the loser effect is present, where not fighting (retreating) is considered as
winning. The loser effect is found to be present in a variety of species where it
lasts longer than the winner effect. This might be due to the fact that after a
loss, an individual would think that has less chances of winning an aggressive
interaction.
Strategies: Now we compare the ESS in the winner-loser model with strate-
gic factors, with the weighted probability in the Swiss tournament with byes.
Figure 4.16 show the level of aggressiveness in the winner loser model for a
group of two individuals. When the cost is increased the values of θ are also
increased which means that individuals are less aggressive. Also in the Swiss
tournament, when the cost is increased the values of the weighted probabil-
ity are decreased which means that individuals are less aggressive (see Figure
4.9). Thus the effect of the cost on the level of aggressiveness is the same in
both models.
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Figure 4.16: The evolutionarily stable strategy θ for different combinations
of reward and cost for ln(RHP ). When C = 0 the ESS will be the highest
possible value of k (C → 0 =⇒ k →∞ )
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4.3 Discussion
In this chapter we have introduced an alternative Swiss tournament model of
dominance hierarchy formation, following a Hawk-Dove type of model. Our
starting point of interest was the model developed by Broom & Cannings [23],
where 2n individuals were pitted against each other. This model can be applied
to groups of individuals that are meeting for the first time with no dominance
relationships established between pairs of individuals. In order to establish the
dominance hierarchy, individuals need to participate in a series of aggressive
interactions with each other. Their position in the hierarchy (and their reward)
is based upon the number of conflicts won and lost by an individual. In [23]
only individuals with the same sequence of wins and losses fight each other.
As a result, the hierarchies established were not linear, there were pairs of
individuals that we cannot distinguish in ranks. This was one of the limitations
of the usual Swiss tournament, the other one was that only populations of size
2n were considered. We extended this model to overcome these limitations, by
considering a group of N individuals and introducing the concept of byes. For
example if there is an unpaired individual (N odd), it will get a bye on the next
round which is considered the same as winning. We call the new model the
Swiss tournament with byes. At each round individuals with the same number
of wins and losses are paired together. In the Swiss tournament with byes
the sequence of wins and losses is not important. This means that a pair of
individuals can fight each other more than once.
We showed that our model produces linear hierarchies all the time, because
if a group of individuals has the same number of wins and losses, they will
fight until this number is different. The individual with the highest number of
wins will occupy the highest position in the group. Our model predicts that
the winner will be that individual that has not lost a single fight while in the
winner-loser model the winner does not necessary wins all the fights. We found
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the point in time when the winner is established and see that after this point,
the winner will get a bye until the end, because no other individual can ever
catch it. We did the same for the second place and showed that for the rest of
the ranks it is not easy to find analytically the time when they are established.
We also showed that the ranks are established in numerical ordering; the first
to be decided is the winner, the second is the second place and so on until the
last place individual. The last fight will be between bottom-ranked individuals.
Because the first place has won all the contests, means that the total number
of rounds coincides with the total number of wins for the first place individual.
We derived a formula which gives a good approximation of the total number
of rounds.
We continued our research and found the expected reward for an individual
on a score i|j (having won i contests until round j). There are examples from
real populations where the division of resources is uneven, where only the top-
ranked individuals have more access to the limited resources. The numerical
example in Section 4.2.5.1 illustrates such scenarios.
Our model predicts that the level of aggressiveness is higher in individuals
that are fighting for the top positions than it is in individuals fighting for the
lower positions in the hierarchy. Those that are fighting for the lower positions
are less aggressive as the reward is small for them. This model also predicts
that the level of aggressiveness is higher when there are only two individuals
left fighting for the higher rank. The winner then cannot be reached by any
other individual as it will get a bye until the end of the competition. The level
of aggressiveness for an individual x depends on the number of individuals
that are one win less than this individual. If this number is large, the level of
aggressiveness for x will be high and if it is small the level of aggressiveness
will be low. The reason is that the larger the number of individuals with one
win less than x, the larger the group that x would end up if it loses. Being
in a smaller group is better than being in a larger one; we have less fights in
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smaller groups. Group size affect the level of aggression at the beginning as
well, the larger the group size, the larger p0,0 is. Thus individuals need to be
more aggressive at the beginning. Other factors such as rewards and costs,
influence the level of aggression as well. We see that as the cost is increased,
the level of aggression decreases.
An important feature is that of the weighted average of the probability pi,j
(being aggressive when on a score i|j). Using this model set up we found that
as the group size is increased, the average probability is also increased.
If we compare the Swiss tournament with byes with the usual Swiss tour-
nament, it is easy to prove that Results 1 - 6 in [23], hold in our model as well.
Another important result is that while on most cases winning a fight, increases
the level of aggression, this is not always true. We found that when N = 4
we have p4,6 < p3,5. Furthermore, we found analytically that for a group of N
individuals, N(N − 1)/2 gives the total number of real fights.
Lastly, we compared Swiss tournaments with byes with the winner and loser
models. They are both models that produce linear hierarchies, but Swiss tour-
nament is better designed for larger populations where the linear hierarchy is
quickly decided. This is not the case in winner and loser models where two
random individuals are repeatedly paired against each other.
In summary, this model produces linear hierarchies if a group of individu-
als stays together for a long time, and it will be of future interest to test our
predictions.
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Conclusions and future work
In this research study, we have explored the formation of dominance hierar-
chies. In particular, we were interested in analysing the relationship between
key parameters, for example, reward size, population structure, prior experi-
ence and the level of aggressiveness in the population. We were concerned
with situations where groups of individuals are meeting for the first time with
no prior dominance relationships between pairs of individuals.
We have focused on the influence of the winner and loser effects on the for-
mation of dominance hierarchies and aimed to understand different types of
hierarchies that are commonly found in nature. These effects have been docu-
mented in different groups of animals which influence the level of aggressive-
ness and the chances of winning an escalated contest. They are independent of
each other, we can have only the winner effect operating, only the loser effect
or both to be present in a group of individuals. For decades, experimentalists
have analysed the linearity of hierarchies in different species. A linear hierar-
chy is one where each individual has a clear rank in the group. In this study,
we developed a new statistical measure describing the time until the hierar-
chy is established. This information is important for the experimentalists, as
it provides a guideline of how many interactions need to be observed between
individuals, until a dominance hierarchy is established. To our best knowledge
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no such measure has been found so far concerning winner and loser models.
We demonstrated that the level of linearity depends on whether the winner
and loser effect are operating alone or both are present, as well as the level of
information that each individual has about the strength of their groupmates.
Our model, which is based on similar work of Dugatkin, predicts that if we
find the winner effect only to be present in real populations, then the hierar-
chy should be linear. If the hierarchy is quickly decided, like often happens in
nature, then it is likely that individuals can estimate the strength of their op-
ponents. We showed that the more reliable the information that one has about
its opponents’ ability to win a fight, the quicker the linear hierarchy is estab-
lished. Secondly, if we analyse the aggression in different groups of animals
and find the loser effect only to be present, then we predict linear hierarchies
if individuals could estimate (at least with some degree of accuracy) their op-
ponents’ strength, and less distinct hierarchies if they can not estimate their
opponents strength at all. Thirdly, when both the winner and loser effect are
found to be present, our model predicts linear hierarchies when individuals
only possess a small amount of information about the other individuals in the
group. Additionally, hierarchies with a clear winner, clear last place individual,
but where the other positions may or may not be distinguishable, are estab-
lished when they do not have any information about each other’s ability to
win a fight. Whether these intermediate positions are distinguishable or not is
decided early in the fights.
As linear hierarchies are often observed in different groups of animals, we
conclude from our research that one of the possible mechanisms to produce
such hierarchies is the presence of winner and loser effects and that individuals
are likely to posses some information about the strength of their groupmates.
This model helps us to make predictions about how hierarchies can be formed
under the influence of winner and loser effects, as well as the time when these
hierarchies are established.
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It will be of future interest to test our predictions in different groups of
animals. There is evidence of the winner and loser effect in different species,
but no observations have been carried out regarding the type of hierarchies
that those species form, and how long they take to be established.
We went on to address questions such as when should individuals be more
aggressive and what is the best strategy to play? To answer these questions
we introduced game -theoretical elements in the form of strategic factors to
the above winner-loser model. We found that in a group of individuals, the
population evolves to a unique aggression threshold as opposed to a mixture of
strategies. This means that, within any group, they all adopt the same decision
rule against whom to fight. This model predicts the time of establishment
of the dominance hierarchy to be small and that aggressive interactions only
happen at the beginning. Applied to real world situations, this points to the
crucial importance of the first few fights for hierarchy formation. Later fights
only determine the position of the lower-ranked individuals. The effect of the
group size is also analysed, and our model predicts lower aggression threshold
levels in larger populations. This result is supported by different experimental
evidences ([50], [51], [113] [117]). Another point of interest was to analyse
how aggressive individuals are when the resources are limited, and our model
predict that they should be more aggressive than when they are plentiful in
order to obtain a larger share.
This model is presented in its simplest form as other factors, such as for
example coalitions between individuals or migration, are not considered to be
present. These effects are worth exploring in the future. In this research, we
assume that the level of aggressiveness is determined by the winner and loser
effect only, but there are other documented factors such as the audience ef-
fect and the bystander effect (see Chapter 1) as described in [43]. Although
bystander effects are found to be present in different groups of animals such
as fighting fish [100], chickens ([34], [35]) and rainbow trout [63], there is
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not a lot of empirical work regarding their influence on dominance hierarchy
formation.
We note that these effects can only exist in groups larger than two individuals
when they do not have a lot of information about the abilities of their oppo-
nents. We can develop the non-updated model as described in Chapter 1, so
that it includes these factors. For example, we can include the audience effect,
where individuals adjust their behaviour as a result of being watched by other
individuals, by increasing or decreasing the value of the aggression threshold
θ by a factor of ε1 ≥ 0 depending on the type of audience. If an individual
increases (decreases) the value of θ, it means that it would be less (more) ag-
gressive. In Siamese fighting fish [80], it was observed that males increase the
level of aggressiveness in front of a female audience and decrease it in front of
a male audience.
When the bystander effect is present, an individual X would vary its level
of aggression according to what it observes in the group. We can include this
effect by increasing or decreasing the value of RHPinitial by a factor of ε2 ≥ 0.
For example if X observes the fight between individuals Y and Z at time t
where individual Y wins and Z loses, then X would increase the RHPinitial
when fighting Y and decrease it when fighting Z. This affects the aggressive
behaviour of individual X which would be less aggressive against Y and more
aggressive against Z.
This model set up would allow us to see whether a linear hierarchy could be es-
tablished and if it is possible for a lower ranked individual to overturn its rank.
When bystanders effects are present we would expect linear hierarchies to be
established as this is similar to the updated model with imperfect information
where linear hierarchies are always established.
In the last part of this work we give an alternative dominance hierarchy for-
mation model based on the Swiss tournament as described by Broom & Can-
nings in [23]. This is a very structured model and the authors do not claim that
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in real populations animals will follow such model, but as animals often choose
to fight opponents of the same strength and try to establish the dominance hi-
erarchy quickly, this type of tournament might be a reasonable approximation.
This model produces hierarchies in a relatively small number of rounds, but
they are never linear and are applied to groups of 2n individuals. To overcome
these issues, we introduced the concept of byes for the unpaired individuals.
The most important result of this part is that we find the exact number of fights
until the hierarchy is established to be N(N − 1)/2. The hierarchies following
this model take longer than the usual Swiss tournament to establish, but are
better designed than the winner and loser model, especially for large group
sizes. Our model predicts that in real biological situations, if individuals are
fighting with each other for a long period of time, linear hierarchies are always
achieved. This model also predicts that if the group size is increased the level
of aggressiveness is also increased. Another result derived from this model is
that if an individual wins a number of fights in a row, does not guaranties an
increase on aggressiveness. This model is potentially useful for human com-
petitions, for example in chess tournaments, but whether animals behave like
this, it still needs to be established through experimental research.
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Expected payoffs for different V
and C
In this section we give the expected payoffs for different combinations of kx
and ky as described in Chapter 3 where both the ln(RHP ) and the alternative
payoff function are considered as payoffs.
k=1(θy=1) k=2(θy)=0.9 k=3(θy)=0.8 k=4(θy=0.7) k=5(θy=0.65) k=6(θy=0.6) k=25(θy=0.1)
k=1(θx=1) 3.2560 2.8414 2.8414 2.7754 2.7392 2.7131 2.6645
k=2(θx)=0.9 3.5456 3.2550 3.1092 3.0271 2.9705 2.9417 2.8767
k=3(θx)=0.8 3.6699 3.4022 3.2517 3.1682 3.1168 3.0786 3.0138
k=4(θx=0.7) 3.7360 3.4843 3.3432 3.2572 3.1991 3.1643 3.0995
k=5(θx=0.65) 3.7721 3.5409 3.3946 3.3123 3.2588 3.2175 3.1514
k=6(θx=0.6) 3.7983 3.5697 3.4328 3.3471 3.2939 3.2570 3.1855
k=25(θx=0.1) 3.8469 3.6347 3.4976 3.4119 3.3600 3.3259 3.2551
Table A.1: Expected payoffs for different values of k when V = 0.1, C = 0
k=1(θy=1) k=2(θy)=0.9 k=3(θy)=0.8 k=4(θy=0.7) k=5(θy=0.65) k=6(θy=0.6) k=25(θy=0.1)
k=1(θx=1) 0.500 0.4555 0.4364 0.4262 0.4207 0.4167 0.4092
k=2(θx)=0.9 0.5445 0.500 0.4775 0.4649 0.4562 0.4518 0.4418
k=3(θx)=0.8 0.5636 0.5225 0.4994 0.4866 0.4787 0.4728 0.4629
k=4(θx=0.7) 0.5738 0.5351 0.5134 0.500 0.4913 0.4860 0.4760
k=5(θx=0.65) 0.5793 0.5438 0.5213 0.5087 0.500 0.4941 0.4840
k=6(θx=0.6) 0.5833 0.5482 0.5272 0.5140 0.5059 0.500 0.4892
k=25(θx=0.1) 0.5908 0.5582 0.5371 0.5240 0.5160 0.5108 0.5000
Table A.2: Division of resources for different values of k when V = 0.1, C = 0
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k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy)=1 k=2(θy)=0.9 k=3(θy=0.8) k=4(θy=0.7) k=5(θy=0.6) k=22(θy=0.1)
k=0(θx=1.2) 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026
k=1(θx)=1 2.3026 2.2500 2.2122 2.1559 2.1156 2.0843 2.0052
k=2(θx)=0.9 2.3026 2.2099 2.1723 2.0648 2.0038 1.9601 1.8634
k=3(θx=0.8) 2.3026 2.1452 2.0539 1.9020 1.8218 1.7661 1.6553
k=4(θx=0.7) 2.3026 2.0961 1.9798 1.8064 1.7194 1.6621 1.5486
k=5(θx=0.6) 2.3026 2.0508 1.9208 1.7315 1.6421 1.5854 1.4706
k=22(θx=0.1) 2.3026 1.8927 1.7268 1.5113 1.4190 1.3606 1.2500
Table A.3: Expected payoffs for different values of k when V = 0, C = 0.1
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy)=1 k=2(θy)=0.9 k=3(θy=0.8) k=4(θy=0.7) k=5(θy=0.6) k=22(θy=0.1)
k=0(θx=1.2) 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
k=1(θx)=1 0.500 0.500 0.5004 0.5019 0.5038 0.5068 0.5293
k=2(θx)=0.9 0.500 0.4996 0.500 0.5020 0.5049 0.5084 0.5362
k=3(θx=0.8) 0.500 0.4981 0.4980 0.500 0.5035 0.5081 0.5395
k=4(θx=0.7) 0.500 0.4962 0.4951 0.4965 0.500 0.5048 0.5364
k=5(θx=0.6) 0.500 0.4932 0.4916 0.4919 0.4952 0.500 0.5317
k=22(θx=0.1) 0.500 0.4707 0.4638 0.4605 0.4636 0.4683 0.5000
Table A.4: Division of resources for different values of k when V = 0, C = 0.1
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy)=0.9 k=2(θy)=0.7 k=3(θy=0.5) k=4(θy=0.4) k=5(θy=0.3) k=9(θy=0.1)
k=0(θx=1.2) 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026
k=1(θx)=0.9 5.9490 4.0724 3.5544 3.3444 3.2392 3.2011 3.1203
k=2(θx)=0.7 5.9490 4.4956 3.9443 3.6854 3.5594 3.4934 3.4014
k=3(θx=0.5) 5.9490 4.6207 4.0597 3.7925 3.6494 3.5800 3.4715
k=4(θx=0.4) 5.9490 4.6521 4.0743 3.8035 3.6629 3.5895 3.4778
k=5(θx=0.3) 5.9490 4.6299 4.0573 3.7795 3.6393 3.5616 3.4574
k=9(θx=0.1) 5.9490 4.5454 3.9244 3.6488 3.5102 3.4255 3.3109
Table A.5: Expected payoffs for different values of k when V = 0.2, C = 0.1
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy)=0.9 k=2(θy)=0.7 k=3(θy=0.5) k=4(θy=0.4) k=5(θy=0.3) k=9(θy=0.1)
k=0(θx=1.2) 0.500 0.2790 0.2790 0.2790 0.2790 0.2790 0.2790
k=1(θx)=0.9 0.7210 0.500 0.4430 0.4233 0.4161 0.4161 0.4227
k=2(θx)=0.7 0.7210 0.5570 0.500 0.4781 0.4712 0.4701 0.4805
k=3(θx=0.5) 0.7210 0.5767 0.5219 0.500 0.4923 0.4916 0.5012
k=4(θx=0.4) 0.7210 0.5839 0.5288 0.5077 0.500 0.4991 0.5084
k=5(θx=0.3) 0.7210 0.5834 0.5299 0.5084 0.5009 0.500 0.5104
k=9(θx=0.1) 0.7210 0.5773 0.5195 0.4988 0.4916 0.4896 0.5000
Table A.6: Division of resources for different values of k when V = 0.2, C = 0.1
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k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy=1) k=2(θy=0.70) k=3(θy=0.50) k=4(θy=0.30) k=5(θy=0.25) k=8(θy=0.10)
k=0(θx=1.2) 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026
k=1(θx=1) 4.2088 3.1454 2.8027 2.6514 2.5755 2.5237 2.4678
k=2(θx=0.70) 4.2088 3.2896 2.8714 2.6631 2.5416 2.4852 2.4037
k=3(θx=0.50) 4.2088 3.2705 2.8019 2.565 2.4378 2.3715 2.2812
k=4(θx=0.30) 4.2088 3.2019 2.7000 2.4429 2.3217 2.2399 2.1442
k=5(θx=0.25) 4.2088 3.1383 2.5824 2.3190 2.1796 2.1203 2.0265
k=8(θx=0.10) 4.2088 2.9289 2.2914 2.0099 1.8699 1.8030 1.7182
Table A.7: Expected payoffs for different values of k when V = 0.1, C = 0.2
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy=1) k=2(θy=0.70) k=3(θy=0.50) k=4(θy=0.30) k=5(θy=0.25) k=8(θy=0.10)
k=0(θx=1.2) 0.5000 0.3536 0.3536 0.3536 0.3536 0.3536 0.3536
k=1(θx=1) 0.6464 0.5000 0.4630 0.4554 0.4600 0.4679 0.5091
k=2(θx)=0.70 0.6464 0.5370 0.5000 0.4938 0.5006 0.5171 0.5786
k=3(θx=0.50) 0.6464 0.5446 0.5062 0.5000 0.5092 0.5268 0.5936
k=4(θx=0.30) 0.6464 0.5400 0.4994 0.4905 0.5000 0.5177 0.5860
k=5(θx=0.25) 0.6464 0.5321 0.4829 0.4732 0.4823 0.5000 0.5684
k=8(θx=0.10) 0.6464 0.4909 0.4214 0.4064 0.4140 0.4316 0.5000
Table A.8: Division of resources for different values of k when V = 0.1, C = 0.2
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy=0.85) k=2(θy=0.59) k=3(θy=0.41) k=4(θy=0.28) k=5(θy=0.19) k=6(θy=0.13)
k=0(θx=1.2) 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026 2.3026
k=1(θx=0.85) 7.5500 4.8750 4.1779 3.9227 3.8359 3.7927 3.7710
k=2(θx=0.59) 7.5500 5.4765 4.7500 4.4620 4.3284 4.2858 4.2275
k=3(θx=0.41) 7.5500 5.6512 4.9101 4.9000 4.4783 4.4089 4.3710
k=4(θx=0.28) 7.5500 5.6705 4.9720 4.6375 4.5023 4.4298 4.4038
k=5(θx=0.19) 7.5500 5.6573 4.9114 4.6229 4.4937 4.4200 4.3725
k=6(θx=0.13) 7.5500 5.6304 4.9107 4.5955 4.4477 4.3944 4.3500
Table A.9: Expected payoffs for different values of k when V = 0.3, C = 0.1
k=0(θy=1.2) k=1(θy=0.85) k=2(θy=0.59) k=3(θy=0.41) k=4(θy=0.28) k=5(θy=0.19) k=6(θy=0.13)
k=0(θx=1.2) 0.5000 0.2337 0.2337 0.2337 0.2337 0.2337 0.2337
k=1(θx=0.85) 0.7663 0.5000 0.4342 0.4131 0.4089 0.4088 0.4104
k=2(θx=0.59) 0.7663 0.5658 0.5000 0.4783 0.4711 0.4727 0.4714
k=3(θx=0.41) 0.7663 0.5869 0.5217 0.5000 0.4936 0.4926 0.4940
k=4(θx=0.28) 0.7663 0.5911 0.5289 0.5064 0.5000 0.4986 0.5016
k=5(θx=0.19) 0.7663 0.5912 0.5273 0.5074 0.5014 0.5000 0.5007
k=6(θx=0.13) 0.7663 0.5896 0.5286 0.5060 0.4984 0.4993 0.5000
Table A.10: Division of resources for different values of k when V = 0.3, C =
0.1
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